Results for 'Concepts'

1000+ found
Order:
  1. The Points of Concepts: Their Types, Tensions, and Connections.Matthieu Queloz - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
    In the literature seeking to explain concepts in terms of their point, talk of ‘the point’ of concepts remains under-theorised. I propose a typology of points which distinguishes practical, evaluative, animating, and inferential points. This allows us to resolve tensions such as that between the ambition of explanations in terms of the points of concepts to be informative and the claim that mastering concepts requires grasping their point; and it allows us to exploit connections between types (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. Thick Concepts and Underdetermination.Pekka Väyrynen - 2013 - In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Thick Concepts. Oxford University Press.
    Thick terms and concepts in ethics somehow combine evaluation and non-evaluative description. The non-evaluative aspects of thick terms and concepts underdetermine their extensions. Many writers argue that this underdetermination point is best explained by supposing that thick terms and concepts are semantically evaluative in some way such that evaluation plays a role in determining their extensions. This paper argues that the extensions of thick terms and concepts are underdetermined by their meanings in toto, irrespective of whether (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3. The Big Concepts Paper: A Defence of Hybridism.Agustín Vicente & Fernando Martínez Manrique - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):59-88.
    The renewed interest in concepts and their role in psychological theorizing is partially motivated by Machery’s claim that concepts are so heterogeneous that they have no explanatory role. Against this, pluralism argues that there is multiplicity of different concepts for any given category, while hybridism argues that a concept is constituted by a rich common representation. This article aims to advance the understanding of the hybrid view of concepts. First, we examine the main arguments against hybrid (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  4.  33
    Concepts, Conceptions and Self-Knowledge.Sarah Sawyer - 2019 - Erkenntnis (y).
    Content externalism implies first, that there is a distinction between concepts and conceptions, and second, that there is a distinction between thoughts and states of mind. In this paper, I argue for a novel theory of self-knowledge: the partial-representation theory of self-knowledge, according to which the self-ascription of a thought is authoritative when it is based on a con-scious, occurrent thought in virtue of which it partially represents an underlying state of mind.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Moral Responsibility for Concepts.Rachel Fredericks - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1381-1397.
    I argue that we are sometimes morally responsible for having and using (or not using) our concepts, despite the fact that we generally do not choose to have them or have full or direct voluntary control over how we use them. I do so by extending an argument of Angela Smith's; the same features that she says make us morally responsible for some of our attitudes also make us morally responsible for some of our concepts. Specifically, like attitudes, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  29
    The Role of Concepts in Fixing Language.Sarah Sawyer - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    This is a contribution to the symposium on Herman Cappelen’s Fixing Language. Cappelen proposes a metasemantic framework—the ‘Austerity Framework’—within which to understand the general phenomenon of conceptual engineering. The proposed framework is austere in the sense that it makes no reference to concepts. Conceptual engineering is then given a ‘worldly’ construal according to which conceptual engineering is a process that operates on the world. I argue, contra Cappelen, that an adequate theory of conceptual engineering must make reference to (...). This is because concepts are required to account for topic continuity, a phenomenon which lies at the heart of projects in conceptual engineering. I argue that Cappelen’s own account of topic continuity is inadequate as a result of the austerity of his metasemantic framework, and that his worldly construal of conceptual engineering is untenable. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. The Development of Temporal Concepts: Learning to Locate Events in Time.Teresa McCormack & Christoph Hoerl - 2017 - Timing and Time Perception 5 (3-4):297-327.
    A new model of the development of temporal concepts is described that assumes that there are substantial changes in how children think about time in the early years. It is argued that there is a shift from understanding time in an event-dependent way to an event-independent understanding of time. Early in development, very young children are unable to think about locations in time independently of the events that occur at those locations. It is only with development that children begin (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  23
    Language as a Disruptive Technology: Abstract Concepts, Embodiment and the Flexible Mind.Guy Dove - 2018 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 1752 (373):1-9.
    A growing body of evidence suggests that cognition is embodied and grounded. Abstract concepts, though, remain a significant theoretical chal- lenge. A number of researchers have proposed that language makes an important contribution to our capacity to acquire and employ concepts, particularly abstract ones. In this essay, I critically examine this suggestion and ultimately defend a version of it. I argue that a successful account of how language augments cognition should emphasize its symbolic properties and incorporate a view (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Phenomenal Concepts.Katalin Balog - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 292--312.
    This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience, called “phenomenal concepts”. They are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experience strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  10. Concepts, Introspection, and Phenomenal Consciousness: An Information-Theoretical Approach.Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):197-255.
    This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  11.  89
    Three Symbol Ungrounding Problems: Abstract Concepts and the Future of Embodied Cognition.Guy Dove - 2016 - Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 4 (23):1109-1121.
    A great deal of research has focused on the question of whether or not concepts are embodied as a rule. Supporters of embodiment have pointed to studies that implicate affective and sensorimotor systems in cognitive tasks, while critics of embodiment have offered nonembodied explanations of these results and pointed to studies that implicate amodal systems. Abstract concepts have tended to be viewed as an important test case in this polemical debate. This essay argues that we need to move (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  12.  31
    Automating Leibniz’s Theory of Concepts.Paul Edward Oppenheimer, Jesse Alama & Edward N. Zalta - 2015 - In Amy P. Felty & Aart Middeldorp (eds.), Automated Deduction – CADE 25: Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on Automated Deduction (Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence: Volume 9195), Berlin: Springer. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 73-97.
    Our computational metaphysics group describes its use of automated reasoning tools to study Leibniz’s theory of concepts. We start with a reconstruction of Leibniz’s theory within the theory of abstract objects (henceforth ‘object theory’). Leibniz’s theory of concepts, under this reconstruction, has a non-modal algebra of concepts, a concept-containment theory of truth, and a modal metaphysics of complete individual concepts. We show how the object-theoretic reconstruction of these components of Leibniz’s theory can be represented for investigation (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Phenomenal Concepts.Kati Balog - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience, called “phenomenal concepts”. They are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experience strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  14. Dual Character Concepts in Social Cognition: Commitments and the Normative Dimension of Conceptual Representation.Del Pinal Guillermo & Reuter Kevin - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (S3):477–501.
    The concepts expressed by social role terms such as artist and scientist are unique in that they seem to allow two independent criteria for categorization, one of which is inherently normative. This study presents and tests an account of the content and structure of the normative dimension of these “dual character concepts.” Experiment 1 suggests that the normative dimension of a social role concept represents the commitment to fulfill the idealized basic function associated with the role. Background information (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15.  83
    The Importance of Concepts.Sarah Sawyer - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):127-147.
    Words change meaning over time. Some meaning shift is accompanied by a corresponding change in subject matter; some meaning shift is not. In this paper I argue that an account of linguistic meaning can accommodate the first kind of case, but that a theory of concepts is required to accommodate the second. Where there is stability of subject matter through linguistic change, it is concepts that provide the stability. The stability provided by concepts allows for genuine disagreement (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Grasp of Concepts: Common Sense and Expertise in an Inferentialist Framework.Pietro Salis - 2015 - In M. Bianca P. Piccari (ed.), Epistemology of Ordinary Knowledge. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 289-297.
    The paper suggests a distinction between two dimensions of grasp of concepts within an inferentialist approach to conceptual content: a common sense "minimum" version, where a simple speaker needs just a few inferences to grasp a concept C, and an expert version, where the specialist is able to master a wide range of inferential transitions involving C. This paper tries to defend this distinction and to explore some of its basic implications.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. Phenomenal Concepts.Andreas Elpidorou - 2015 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    Phenomenal concepts are the concepts that we deploy when – but arguably not only when – we introspectively examine, focus on, or take notice of the phenomenal character of our experiences. They refer to phenomenal properties (or qualities) and they do so in a subjective (first-personal) and direct (non-relational) manner. It is through the use of such concepts that the phenomenal character of our experiences is made salient to us. Discourse about the nature of phenomenal concepts (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. The Normativity of Evaluative Concepts.Christine Tappolet - 2014 - In Anne Reboul (ed.), Mind, Values, and Metaphysics. Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan, Volume 2. pp. 39-54.
    It is generally accepted that there are two kinds of normative concepts : evaluative concepts, such as good, and deontic concepts, such as ought. The question that is raised by this distinction is how it is possible to claim that evaluative concepts are normative. Given that deontic concepts appear to be at the heart of normativity, the bigger the gap between evaluative and deontic concepts, the less it appears plausible to say that evaluative (...) are normative. After having presented the main differences between evaluative and deontic concepts, and shown that there is more than a superficial difference between the two kinds, the paper turns to the question of the normativity of evaluative concepts. It will become clear that, even if these concepts have different functions, there are a great many ties between evaluative concepts, on the one hand, and the concepts of ought and of reason, on the other. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19. Justified Concepts and the Limits of the Conceptual Approach to the A Priori.Darren Bradley - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):267-274.
    Carrie Jenkins (2005, 2008) has developed a theory of the a priori that she claims solves the problem of how justification regarding our concepts can give us justification regarding the world. She claims that concepts themselves can be justified, and that beliefs formed by examining such concepts can be justified a priori. I object that we can have a priori justified beliefs with unjustified concepts if those beliefs have no existential import. I then argue that only (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  20. The Dual Concepts Objection to Content Externalism.Bryan Frances - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2):123-138.
    Many philosophers have used premises about concepts and rationality to argue that the protagonists in the various Twin Earth thought experiments do not have the concepts that content externalists say they have. This essay argues that this popular internalist argument is flawed in many different ways, and more importantly it cannot be repaired in order to cast doubt on externalism.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Thick Concepts.Brent G. Kyle - 2016 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A term expresses a thick concept if it expresses a specific evaluative concept that is also substantially descriptive. It is a matter of debate how this rough account should be unpacked, but examples can help to convey the basic idea. Thick concepts are often illustrated with virtue concepts like courageous and generous, action concepts like murder and betray, epistemic concepts like dogmatic and wise, and aesthetic concepts like gaudy and brilliant. These concepts seem to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22.  97
    H.O.T. Theory, Concepts, and Synesthesia: A Reply to Adams and Shreve.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2016 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 3 (4):443-448.
    In response to Fred Adams and Charlotte Shreve’s (2016) paper entitled “What Can Synesthesia Teach Us about Higher Order Theories of Consciousness?”, previously published in Symposion, I argue that H.O.T. theory does have the resources to account for synesthesia and the specific worries that they advance in their paper, such as the relationship between concepts and experience and the ability to handle instances of ‘pop-out’ experiences.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23. Can Groups Have Concepts? Semantics for Collective Intentions.Cathal O'Madagain - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):347-363.
    A substantial literature supports the attribution of intentional states such as beliefs and desires to groups. But within this literature, there is no substantial account of group concepts. Since on many views, one cannot have an intentional state without having concepts, such a gap undermines the cogency of accounts of group intentionality. In this paper I aim to provide an account of group concepts. First I argue that to fix the semantics of the sentences groups use to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24.  59
    Mental Concepts: Theoretical, Observational or Dispositional Approach?Marek Pokropski - 2017 - Hybris. Revista de Filosofía 38:58-73.
    In the article I discuss the conceptual problem of other minds and different approaches to mental concepts. Firstly, I introduce the conceptual problem and argue that solutions proposed by theory-theory and direct perception approach are inadequate. I claim that mental concepts are neither theoretical terms nor observational terms. Then, I consider third option which states that mental concepts are dispositional terms, i.e. they concern particular patterns (stereotypes) of behavior. Finally, I argue that dispositional approach is to some (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  40
    A Dualist Account of Phenomenal Concepts.Martina Fürst - 2014 - In Andrea Lavazza & Howard Robinson (eds.), Contemporary Dualism. A Defense. 112-135. Routledge. pp. 112-135.
    The phenomenal concept strategy is considered a powerful response to anti-physicalist arguments. This physicalist strategy aims to provide a satisfactory account of dualist intuitions without being committed to ontological dualist conclusions. In this paper I first argue that physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts fail to explain their cognitive role. Second, I develop an encapsulation account of phenomenal concepts that best explains their particularities. Finally, I argue that the encapsulation account, which features self-representing experiences, implies non-physical referents. Therefore, the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26. Thick Concepts and Variability.Pekka Väyrynen - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11:1-17.
    Some philosophers hold that so-called "thick" terms and concepts in ethics (such as 'cruel,' 'selfish,' 'courageous,' and 'generous') are contextually variable with respect to the valence (positive or negative) of the evaluations that they may be used to convey. Some of these philosophers use this variability claim to argue that thick terms and concepts are not inherently evaluative in meaning; rather their use conveys evaluations as a broadly pragmatic matter. I argue that one sort of putative examples of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  27. Objectionable Thick Concepts in Denials.Pekka Väyrynen - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):439-469.
    So-called "thick" moral concepts are distinctive in that they somehow "hold together" evaluation and description. But how? This paper argues against the standard view that the evaluations which thick concepts may be used to convey belong to sense or semantic content. That view cannot explain linguistic data concerning how thick concepts behave in a distinctive type of disagreements and denials which arise when one speaker regards another's thick concept as "objectionable" in a certain sense. The paper also (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  28. Concepts, Perception and the Dual Process Theories of Mind.Marcello Frixione & Antonio Lieto - 2014 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 9.
    In this article we argue that the problem of the relationships between concepts and perception in cognitive science is blurred by the fact that the very notion of concept is rather confused. Since it is not always clear exactly what concepts are, it is not easy to say, for example, whether and in what measure concept possession involves entertaining and manipulating perceptual representations, whether concepts are entirely different from perceptual representations, and so on. As a paradigmatic example (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. ‘BOGHOSSIAN's BLIND REASONING’, CONDITIONALIZATION AND THICK CONCEPTS A FUNCTIONAL MODEL.Olga Ramirez - 2012 - Ethics in Progress Quarterly 3 (1):31-52.
    Boghossian’s (2003) proposal to conditionalize concepts as a way to secure their legitimacy in disputable cases applies well, not just to pejoratives – on whose account Boghossian first proposed it – but also to thick ethical concepts. It actually has important advantages when dealing with some worries raised by the application of thick ethical terms, and the truth and facticity of corresponding statements. In this paper, I will try to show, however, that thick ethical concepts present a (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  8
    Information: From Philosophic to Physics Concepts for Informational Modeling of Consciousness.Florin Gaiseanu - 2018 - Philosophy Study 8 (8).
    Information was a frequently used concept in many fields of investigation. However, this concept is still not really understood, when it is referred for instance to consciousness and its informational structure. In this paper it is followed the concept of information from philosophical to physics perspective, showing especially how this concept could be extended to matter in general and to the living in particular, as a result of the intimate interaction between matter and information, the human body appearing as a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Essentially Contested Concepts and Semantic Externalism.Simon J. Evnine - 2014 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 8 (1):118-140.
    In 1956, W.B. Gallie introduced his idea of essentially contested concepts. In my paper, I offer a novel interpretation of his theory and argue that his theory, thus interpreted, is correct. The key to my interpretation lies in a condition Gallie places on essentially contested concepts that other interpreters downplay or dismiss: that the use of an essentially contested concept must be derived “from an original exemplar whose authority is acknowledged by all the contestant users of the concept.” (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  32. Concepts as Soft Detectors - On the Role Concepts Play in Perception.Paweł Grabarczyk - 2016 - New Ideas in Psychology 40:86-93.
    The idea that concepts play a significant role in some perceptions is widespread but everybody seems to differ as to where to draw the line. Some researchers say that the difference between direct and indirect, concept driven acts of perception manifests itself whenever we perceive abstract or general properties. Others point at second order properties or causal properties. I call this inability to precisely differentiate between acts of direct and indirect perception “The Division Problem”. Furthermore there is always a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. On Triplet Classification of Concepts.Vladimir Kuznetsov - 1997 - Knowledge Organization 24 (3):163-175.
    The scheme for classifications of concepts is introduced. It has founded on the triplet model of concepts. In this model a concept is depicted by means of three kinds of knowledge: a concept base, a concept representing part and the linkage between them. The idea of triplet classifications of concepts is connected with a usage of various specifications of these knowledge kinds as classification criteria.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34. Thick Concepts, Non-Cognitivism, and Wittgenstein's Rule Following Considerations.Adam M. Croom - 2010 - South African Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):286-309.
    Non-cognitivists claim that thick concepts can be disentangled into distinct descriptive and evaluative components and that since thick concepts have descriptive shape they can be mastered independently of evaluation. In Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following, John McDowell uses Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations to show that such a non-cognitivist view is untenable. In this paper I do several things. I describe the non-cognitivist position in its various forms and explain its driving motivations. I then explain McDowell’s argument against non-cognitivism and the Wittgensteinian (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35.  89
    The Benefits of Prototypes: The Case of Medical Concepts.Cristina Amoretti, Marcello Frixione & Antonio Lieto - 2017 - Reti, Saperi E Linguaggi, The Italian Journal of Cognitive Sciences, 2017 3.
    In the present paper, we shall discuss the notion of prototype and show its benefits. First, we shall argue that the prototypes of common-sense concepts are necessary for making prompt and reliable categorisations and inferences. However, the features constituting the prototype of a particular concept are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for determining category membership; in this sense, the prototype might lead to conclusions regarded as wrong from a theoretical perspective. That being said, the prototype remains essential to handling (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Thick Concepts: Where's Evaluation?Pekka Väyrynen - 2012 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 7. Oxford University Press. pp. 235-70.
    This paper presents an alternative to the standard view that the evaluations that the so-called "thick" terms and concepts in ethics may be used to convey belong to their sense or semantic meaning. I describe a large variety of linguistic data that are well explained by the alternative view that the evaluations that (at least a very wide range of) thick terms and concepts may be used to convey are a certain kind of defeasible implications of their utterances (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. Do the Primary and Secondary Intensions of Phenomenal Concepts Coincide in All Worlds?Robert Schroer - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):561-577.
    A slew of conceivability arguments have been given against physicalism. Many physicalists try to undermine these arguments by offering accounts of phenomenal concepts that explain how there can be an epistemic gap, but not an ontological gap, between the phenomenal and the physical. Some complain, however, that such accounts fail to do justice to the nature of our introspective grasp of phenomenal properties. A particularly influential version of this complaint comes from David Chalmers (1996; 2003), who claims, in opposition (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Ockham on Judgment, Concepts, and the Problem of Intentionality.Susan Brower-Toland - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):67-110.
    In this paper I examine William Ockham’s theory of judgment and, in particular, his account of the nature and ontological status of its objects. Commentators, both past and present, habitually interpret Ockham as defending a kind of anti-realism about objects of judgment. My aim in this paper is two-fold. The first is to show that the traditional interpretation rests on a failure to appreciate the ways in which Ockham’s theory of judgment changes over the course of his career. The second, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  39. From the Pragmatics of Classification Systems to the Metaphysics of Concepts". [REVIEW]Stella Vosniadou, Costas Pagondiotis & Maria Deliyianni - 2005 - Journal of the Learning Sciences 14 (1):115-125.
    Review of the books: Jerry A. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science went wrong. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998, 174 pp., ISBN 0-19-823636-0. Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star. Sorting things out: Classification and its consequences. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999, 377 pp., ISBN 0-262-02461-6.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Taking the Concepts of Others Seriously.Terence Rajivan Edward - 2016 - Meta 8 (1):143-153.
    This paper assesses an argument against the representationalist tradition in anthropology: the tradition of reporting how a cultural group represents the world. According to the argument, anthropologists working within this tradition cannot take the concepts of those they study seriously. I defend the representationalist tradition against this argument.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Shared Representations, Perceptual Symbols, and the Vehicles of Mental Concepts.Paweł Gładziejewski - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):102-124.
    The main aim of this article is to present and defend a thesis according to which conceptual representations of some types of mental states are encoded in the same neural structures that underlie the first-personal experience of those states. To support this proposal here, I will put forth a novel account of the cognitive function played by ‘shared representations’ of emotions and bodily sensations, i.e. neural structures that are active when one experiences a mental state of a certain type as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42.  53
    Why and How to Naturalize Semiotic Concepts for Biosemiotics.Tommi Vehkavaara - 2002 - Sign Systems Studies 30 (1):293-312.
    Any attempt to develop biosemiotics either towards a new biological ground theory or towards a metaphysics of living nature necessitates some kind of naturalization of its semiotic concepts. Instead of standard physicalistic naturalism, a certain kind of semiotic naturalism is pursued here. The naturalized concepts are defined as referring only to the objects of our external experience. When the semiotic concepts are applied to natural phenomena in biosemiotics, there is a risk of falling into anthropomorphic errors if (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  43.  72
    Unconscious Conceiving and Leibniz's Argument for Primitive Concepts.Paul Lodge & Stephen Puryear - 2006 - Studia Leibnitiana 38 (2):177-196.
    In a recent paper, Dennis Plaisted examines an important argument that Leibniz gives for the existence of primitive concepts. After sketching a natural reading of this argument, Plaisted observes that the argument appears to imply something clearly inconsistent with Leibniz’s other views. To save Leibniz from contradiction, Plaisted offers a revision. However, his account faces a number of serious difficulties and therefore does not successfully eliminate the inconsistency. We explain these difficulties and defend a more plausible alternative. In the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  44.  35
    Leibniz on Concepts and Their Relation to the Senses.Stephen Puryear - 2008 - In Dominik Perler & Markus Wild (eds.), Sehen und Begreifen: Wahrnehmungstheorien in der Frühen Neuzeit. de Gruyter. pp. 235-264.
    Despite holding that all concepts are strictly speaking innate, Leibniz attempts to accommodate the common belief that at least some concepts are adventitious by appealing to his theory of ideal action. The essential idea is that an innate concept can be considered adventitious, in a sense, just in case its ideal cause is to be found outside the mind of the one who possesses the concept. I explore this attempt at accommodation and argue that it fails. [See external (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45.  69
    The Theory-Theory of Moral Concepts.John Jung Park - 2015 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (2).
    There are many views about the structure of concepts, a plausible one of which is the theory-theory. Though this view is plausible for concrete concepts, it is unclear that it would work for abstract concepts, and then for moral concepts. The goal of this paper is to provide a plausible theory-theory account for moral concepts and show that it is supported by results in the moral psychology literature. Such studies in moral psychology do not explicitly (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Fuzzy Concepts and Relations between Them.Vladimir Kuznetsov - 2006 - In М Попович (ed.), Problems of Mentality Theory. pp. 163-197.
    It is proposed to analyze fuzzy concepts and relations between them in the frame of triplet concept modeling. Fuzzy concepts are introduced by means of the so-called fuzzification of dichotomous concepts. The cognitive and psychological aspects of concept possession are separated and studied.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Concepts and Reference: Defending a Dual Theory of Natural Kind Concepts.Jussi Jylkkä - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Turku
    In this thesis I argue that the psychological study of concepts and categorisation, and the philosophical study of reference are deeply intertwined. I propose that semantic intuitions are a variety of categorisation judgements, determined by concepts, and that because of this, concepts determine reference. I defend a dual theory of natural kind concepts, according to which natural kind concepts have distinct semantic cores and non-semantic identification procedures. Drawing on psychological essentialism, I suggest that the cores (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48.  77
    William James's Naturalistic Account of Concepts and His 'Rejection of Logic'.Henry Jackman - 2018 - In Philosophy of Mind in the Nineteenth Century: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 5. New York: Routledge. pp. 133-146.
    William James was one of the most controversial philosophers of the early part of the 20 century, and his apparent skepticism about logic and any robust conception of truth was often simply attributed to his endorsing mysticism and irrationality out of an overwhelming desire to make room for religion in his world-view. However, it will be argued here that James’s pessimism about logic and even truth (or at least ‘absolute’ truth), while most prominent in his later views, stem from the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Representationalism, Perceptual Distortion and the Limits of Phenomenal Concepts.David Bourget - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):16-36.
    This paper replies to objections from perceptual distortion against the representationalist thesis that the phenomenal characters of experiences supervene on their intentional contents. It has been argued that some pairs of distorted and undistorted experiences share contents without sharing phenomenal characters, which is incompatible with the supervenience thesis. In reply, I suggest that such cases are not counterexamples to the representationalist thesis because the contents of distorted experiences are always impoverished in some way compared to those of normal experiences. This (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  50. Authoritatively Normative Concepts.Tristram McPherson - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
    This paper offers an analysis of the authoritatively normative concept PRACTICAL OUGHT that appeals to the constitutive norms for the activity of non-arbitrary selection. I argue that this analysis permits an attractive and substantive explanation of what the distinctive normative authority of this concept amounts to. I contrast my account with more familiar constitutivist theories, and briefly show how it answers ‘schmagency’-style objections to constitutivist explanations of normativity. Finally, I explain how the account offered here can be used to help (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000