Reply to Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu

Res Philosophica 93 (1):295-309 (2016)
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Abstract
Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu respond to my paper “Valuing Disability, Causing Disability” by arguing that my assessment of objections to the mere-difference view of disability is unconvincing and fails to explain their conviction that it is impermissible to cause disability. In reply, I argue that their response misconstrues, somewhat radically, both what I say in my paper and the commitments of the mere-difference view more generally. It also fails to adequately appreciate the unique epistemic factors present in philosophical discussions of disability.
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2168-9105
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BARRTG-6
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Archival date: 2019-06-04
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