Singuläre Propositionen und das Fassen eines Gedankens

Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 36 (1):71-93 (2011)
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Abstract

This essay develops the thesis that Frege’s notion of grasping does not refer to some special psychological relation between a subject and a proposition. Instead, the verb “to grasp” is a contextually defined technical term that, taken by itself, has no meaning. If that is right, then not only Frege’s resentment to the idea of grasping singular propositions is unfounded. The view that intentionality without representations is possible, championed by some advocates of the New Theory of Reference, is groundless as well.

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Wolfgang Barz
Goethe University Frankfurt

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