Two Dogmas of Moral Psychology

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I contend that there are two dogmas that are still popular among philosophers of action: that agents can only desire what they think is good and that they can only intentionally pursue what they think is good. I also argue that both dogmas are false. Broadly, I argue that our best theories of action can explain the possibility of intentionally pursuing what one thinks is not at all good, that we need to allow for the possibility of intentionally pursuing what one think is not at all good, and that if we can intentionally pursue what we think is not at all good then we can desire it on similar grounds.
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