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From Kant's Highest Good to Hegel's Absolute Knowing
In Stephen Houlgate & Michael Baur (eds.), A Companion to Hegel. Malden, MA: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 452–473 (2011)
Abstract
This chapter contains sections titled: Kant's Anti‐Cartesianism Kant on the Highest Good and the Practical Necessity of Belief in God's Existence The Moral Proof at the Tübinger Stift and Its Fate Self‐Positing and the “Only True and Thinkable Creation out of Nothing” The Way to Absolute Knowing in Hegel's Phenomenology.Author's Profile
from Kant's highest good ‐ to Hegel's absolute knowing appreciating Hegel's work in epistemology and metaphysics ‐ following Kant, beyond “special metaphysics” of self Hegel's critical appropriation and transformation of Kantian thought Kant's anti‐Cartesianism ‐ Kant's theory of knowledge, three departures from Descartes's theory of knowledge Kant, seeking to show that our talk of self, world and God ‐ three separate, knowable kinds of being Kant, arguing in his Critique of Pure Reason ‐ difficulties and contradictions, encountered in metaphysics Kant's argument, his so‐called moral proof of God's existence ‐ notion of “highest good” moral proof at the Tübinger Stift and its fate ‐ Kant's moral proof, the so‐called Tübinger Stift For Hegel, every conscious self ‐ necessarily both a finite self, that is conscious self of Kantian “morality” ‐ success in bringing about highest good, consequence of such success
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