A New Response to the New Evil Demon Problem

Logos and Episteme 8 (1):41-45 (2017)
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Abstract
The New Evil Demon Problem is meant to show that reliabilism about epistemic justification is incompatible with the intuitive idea that the external-world beliefs of a subject who is the victim of a Cartesian demon could be epistemically justified. Here, I present a new argument that such beliefs can be justified on reliabilism. Whereas others have argued for this conclusion by making some alterations in the formulation of reliabilism, I argue that, as far as the said problem is concerned, such alterations are redundant. No reliabilist should fear the demon.
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2017
ISBN(s)
2069-0533
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BAYANR
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-03-28
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Finkish Dispositions.Lewis, David K.
Misremembering.Robins, Sarah K.

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2017-01-04

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