A New Response to the New Evil Demon Problem

Logos and Episteme 8 (1):41-45 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The New Evil Demon Problem is meant to show that reliabilism about epistemic justification is incompatible with the intuitive idea that the external-world beliefs of a subject who is the victim of a Cartesian demon could be epistemically justified. Here, I present a new argument that such beliefs can be justified on reliabilism. Whereas others have argued for this conclusion by making some alterations in the formulation of reliabilism, I argue that, as far as the said problem is concerned, such alterations are redundant. No reliabilist should fear the demon.
Reprint years
2017
ISBN(s)
2069-0533
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BAYANR
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-03-28
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-01-04

Total views
529 ( #9,088 of 55,822 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
68 ( #10,064 of 55,822 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.