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  1. The Reliable Route from Nonmoral Evidence to Moral Conclusions.Neil Sinhababu - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (6):2321-2341.
    We can infer moral conclusions from nonmoral evidence using a three-step procedure. First, we distinguish the processes generating belief so that their reliability in generating true belief is statistically predictable. Second, we assess the processes’ reliability, perhaps by observing how frequently they generate true nonmoral belief or logically inconsistent beliefs. Third, we adjust our credence in moral propositions in light of the truth ratios of the processes generating beliefs in them. This inferential route involves empirically discovering truths of the form (...)
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  2. Process Reliabilism, Prime Numbers and the Generality Problem.Frederik J. Andersen & Klemens Kappel - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (2):231-236.
    This paper aims to show that Selim Berker’s widely discussed prime number case is merely an instance of the well-known generality problem for process reliabilism and thus arguably not as interesting a case as one might have thought. Initially, Berker’s case is introduced and interpreted. Then the most recent response to the case from the literature is presented. Eventually, it is argued that Berker’s case is nothing but a straightforward consequence of the generality problem, i.e., the problematic aspect of the (...)
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  3. Reliable Knowledge: A Reply to Turri.Jonathan Dixon - 2020 - Dialectica 74 (3):495-509.
    Recently John Turri (2015b) has argued, contra the orthodoxy amongst epistemologists, that reliability is not a necessary condition for knowledge. From this result, Turri (2015a, 2017, 2016a, 2019) defends a new account of knowledge - called abilism - that allows for unreliable knowledge. I argue that Turri's arguments fail to establish that unreliable knowledge is possible and argue that Turri's account of knowledge is false because reliability must be a necessary condition for knowledge.
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  4. Reliabilismus.Steffen Koch - 2019 - In Martin Grajner & Guido Melchior (eds.), Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie. Stuttgart: Metzler. pp. 169-178.
    This is a survey article about reliabilism. It introduces its main ideas, outlines some of its core challenges and discusses a number of solutions.
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  5. A New Response to the New Evil Demon Problem.Umut Baysan - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):41-45.
    The New Evil Demon Problem is meant to show that reliabilism about epistemic justification is incompatible with the intuitive idea that the external-world beliefs of a subject who is the victim of a Cartesian demon could be epistemically justified. Here, I present a new argument that such beliefs can be justified on reliabilism. Whereas others have argued for this conclusion by making some alterations in the formulation of reliabilism, I argue that, as far as the said problem is concerned, such (...)
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  6. On the Nature of Intellectual Vice.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6 (12):1-6.
    Vice epistemology, as Quassim Cassam understands it, is the study of the nature, identity, and significance of the epistemic vices. But what makes an intellectual vice a vice? Cassam calls his own view “Obstructivism” – intellectual vices are those traits, thinking styles, or attitudes that systematically obstruct the acquisition, retention, and transmission of knowledge. -/- I shall argue that Cassam’s account is an improvement upon virtue-reliabilism, and that it fares better against what I call Montmarquet’s objection than its immediate rivals. (...)
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  7. Inferentialism and cognitive penetration of perception.Jack C. Lyons - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):1-28.
    Cognitive penetration of perception is the idea that what we see is influenced by such states as beliefs, expectations, and so on. A perceptual belief that results from cognitive penetration may be less justified than a nonpenetrated one. Inferentialism is a kind of internalist view that tries to account for this by claiming that some experiences are epistemically evaluable, on the basis of why the perceiver has that experience, and the familiar canons of good inference provide the appropriate standards by (...)
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  8. Goldman on Evidence and Reliability.Jack C. Lyons - 2016 - In Hilary Kornblith & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Goldman and his Critics. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
    Goldman, though still a reliabilist, has made some recent concessions to evidentialist epistemologies. I agree that reliabilism is most plausible when it incorporates certain evidentialist elements, but I try to minimize the evidentialist component. I argue that fewer beliefs require evidence than Goldman thinks, that Goldman should construe evidential fit in process reliabilist terms, rather than the way he does, and that this process reliabilist understanding of evidence illuminates such important epistemological concepts as propositional justification, ex ante justification, and defeat.
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  9. Goldman on Evidence and Reliability.Jack C. Lyons - 2016 - In Hilary Kornblith & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Goldman and his Critics. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 149–177.
    In this chapter, the author regards reliabilism as one of the major achievements of twentieth century philosophy and Alvin Goldman as one of the chief architects of this important theory. It focuses on three related issues in Goldman's epistemology. Goldman has recently been making friendly overtures toward evidentialist epistemologies, and although the author agrees that reliabilism needs some kind of evidentialist element. More specifically, the author think he concedes too much to the evidentialist. In particular, he concedes: that a great (...)
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  10. A New Paradigm for Epistemology From Reliabilism to Abilism.John Turri - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
    Contemporary philosophers nearly unanimously endorse knowledge reliabilism, the view that knowledge must be reliably produced. Leading reliabilists have suggested that reliabilism draws support from patterns in ordinary judgments and intuitions about knowledge, luck, reliability, and counterfactuals. That is, they have suggested a proto-reliabilist hypothesis about “commonsense” or “folk” epistemology. This paper reports nine experimental studies (N = 1262) that test the proto-reliabilist hypothesis by testing four of its principal implications. The main findings are that (a) commonsense fully embraces the possibility (...)
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  11. Reliabilism and Brains in Vats.Jon Altschul - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):257-272.
    According to epistemic internalism, the only facts that determine the justificational status of a belief are facts about the subject’s own mental states, like beliefs and experiences. Externalists instead hold that certain external facts, such as facts about the world or the reliability of a belief-producing mechanism, affect a belief’s justificational status. Some internalists argue that considerations about evil demon victims and brains in vats provide excellent reason to reject externalism: because these subjects are placed in epistemically unfavorable settings, externalism (...)
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  12. Circularity, reliability, and the cognitive penetrability of perception.Jack Lyons - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311.
    Is perception cognitively penetrable, and what are the epistemological consequences if it is? I address the latter of these two questions, partly by reference to recent work by Athanassios Raftopoulos and Susanna Seigel. Against the usual, circularity, readings of cognitive penetrability, I argue that cognitive penetration can be epistemically virtuous, when---and only when---it increases the reliability of perception.
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  13. Strategic Reliabilism: A Naturalistic Approach to Epistemology.Michael A. Bishop & J. D. Trout - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1049-1065.
    Strategic Reliabilism is a framework that yields relative epistemic evaluations of belief-producing cognitive processes. It is a theory of cognitive excellence, or more colloquially, a theory of reasoning excellence (where 'reasoning' is understood very broadly as any sort of cognitive process for coming to judgments or beliefs). First introduced in our book, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment (henceforth EPHJ), the basic idea behind SR is that epistemically excellent reasoning is efficient reasoning that leads in a robustly reliable fashion (...)
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  14. Michael Bishop & JD Trout. Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment. New York: Oxford University Press. 205 pp.(2005). [REVIEW]Andrés Páez - 2007 - Ideas Y Valores 56 (133):169-173.
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  15. Can virtue reliabilism explain the value of knowledge?Berit Brogaard - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):335-354.
    Virtue reliabilism appears to have a major advantage over generic reliabilism: only the former has the resources to explain the intuition that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. I argue that this appearance is illusory. It is sustained only by the misguided assumption that a principled distinction can be drawn between those belief-forming methods that are grounded in the agent’s intellectual virtues, and those that are not. A further problem for virtue reliabilism is that of explaining why knowledge (...)
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  16. Beyond transparency: computational reliabilism as an externalist epistemology of algorithms.Juan Manuel Duran - 2024
    Abstract This chapter is interested in the epistemology of algorithms. As I intend to approach the topic, this is an issue about epistemic justification. Current approaches to justification emphasize the transparency of algorithms, which entails elucidating their internal mechanisms –such as functions and variables– and demonstrating how (or that) these produce outputs. Thus, the mode of justification through transparency is contingent on what can be shown about the algorithm and, in this sense, is internal to the algorithm. In contrast, I (...)
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