The unity of consciousness and the split-brain syndrome

Journal of Philosophy 105 (6):277-300 (2008)
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Abstract
According to conventional wisdom, the split-brain syndrome puts paid to the thesis that consciousness is necessarily unified. The aim of this paper is to challenge that view. I argue both that disunity models of the split-brain are highly problematic, and that there is much to recommend a model of the split-brain—the switch model—according to which split-brain patients retain a fully unified consciousness at all times. Although the task of examining the unity of consciousness through the lens of the split-brain syndrome is not a new one—such projects date back to Nagel’s seminal paper on the topic—the time is ripe for a re-evaluation of the issues.
ISBN(s)
0022-362X
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BAYTUO-2
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Archival date: 2017-09-07
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2009-01-28

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