- Do Lefty and Righty Matter More Than Lefty Alone?Johan E. Gustafsson & Petra Kosonen - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-6.details
- A case of shared consciousness.Tom Cochrane - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1019-1037.details
- Non-branching personal persistence.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2307-2329.details
- There is no haecceitic Euthyphro problem.Alexander Skiles - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):477-484.details
- The Unimportance of Being Any Future Person.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):745-750.details
- Self-Consciousness and Split Brains: The Minds' I.Elizabeth Schechter - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
- Parfits Reduktionismus und die Möglichkeit struktureller Einheit: Vorarbeiten zu einer aristotelischen Theorie personaler Identität.Sascha Settegast - 2018 - In Sebastian Gäb, Dominic Harion & Peter Welsen (eds.), Person und Identität. Regensburg: S. Roderer. pp. 109-170.details
- Homunculi Are People Too! Lewis's Definition of Personhood Debugged.Cody Gilmore - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):54-60.details
- Fission, First Person Thought, and Subject-body Dualism.Kirk Ludwig - 2017 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 13 (1):5-25.details
- Baker's First-person Perspectives: They Are Not What They Seem.Marc Andree Weber - 2015 - Phenomenology and Mind 7:158-168.details
- Does Division Multiply Desert?Theron Pummer - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (1):43-77.details
- The Argument for Subject‐Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity.Kirk Ludwig - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):684-701.details
- Psychological Continuity and the Necessity of Identity.Robert Francescotti - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):337-349.details
- Fission, cohabitation and the concern for future survival.Rebecca Roache - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):256-263.details
- The unity of consciousness and the split-brain syndrome.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (6):277-300.details
- Psychological Continuity, Fission, and the Non-Branching Constraint.Robert Francescotti - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):21-31.details
- Split Brains and the Godhead.Trenton Merricks - 2006 - In Thomas Crisp, David Vander Laan & Matthew Davidson (eds.), Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 299-326.details
- How to Be a Conventional Person.Kristie Miller - 2004 - The Monist 87 (4):457-474.details
- Points of Concern.Simon Beck - 2000 - Theoria 47:121-130.details
- One self: The logic of experience.Arnold Zuboff - 1990 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):39-68.details
- Divided minds and the nature of persons.Derek A. Parfit - 1987 - In Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (eds.), Mindwaves. Blackwell. pp. 19-26.details
- Can a person break a world record?Henk Bij de Weg - manuscriptdetails
- What Matters in Survival: Self-determination and The Continuity of Life Trajectories.Heidi Brock - manuscriptdetails
- Parfit on Division.Hugh S. Chandler - manuscriptdetails
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