Self-consciousness

Philosophical Review 106 (1):69-117 (1997)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Self-consciousness constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to functionalism. Either the standard functional definitions of mental relations wrongly require the contents of self-consciousness to be propositions involving “realizations” rather than mental properties and relations themselves. Or else these definitions are circular. The only way to save functional definitions is to expunge the standard functionalist requirement that mental properties be second-order and to accept that they are first-order. But even the resulting “ideological” functionalism, which aims only at conceptual clarification, fails unless it incorporates the thesis that the mental properties are fully “natural” universals. Accordingly, mental properties are sui generis: first-order, nonphysical, natural universals.
ISBN(s)
0031-8108
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BEAS
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-12-19
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
666 ( #8,217 of 2,445,942 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
23 ( #29,424 of 2,445,942 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.