Results for 'Tarski'

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  1. What Are Logical Notions?John Corcoran & Alfred Tarski - 1986 - History and Philosophy of Logic 7 (2):143-154.
    In this manuscript, published here for the first time, Tarski explores the concept of logical notion. He draws on Klein's Erlanger Programm to locate the logical notions of ordinary geometry as those invariant under all transformations of space. Generalizing, he explicates the concept of logical notion of an arbitrary discipline.
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  2.  59
    Tarski.Benedict Eastaugh - 2017 - In Alex Malpass & Marianna Antonutti Marfori (eds.), The History of Philosophical and Formal Logic: From Aristotle to Tarski. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 293-313.
    Alfred Tarski was one of the greatest logicians of the twentieth century. His influence comes not merely through his own work but from the legion of students who pursued his projects, both in Poland and Berkeley. This chapter focuses on three key areas of Tarski's research, beginning with his groundbreaking studies of the concept of truth. Tarski's work led to the creation of the area of mathematical logic known as model theory and prefigured semantic approaches in the (...)
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  3. Tarski's Nominalism.Greg Frost-Arnold - 2008 - In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Alfred Tarski was a nominalist. But he published almost nothing on his nominalist views, and until recently the only sources scholars had for studying Tarski’s nominalism were conversational reports from his friends and colleagues. However, a recently-discovered archival resource provides the most detailed information yet about Tarski’s nominalism. Tarski spent the academic year 1940-41 at Harvard, along with many of the leading lights of scientific philosophy: Carnap, Quine, Hempel, Goodman, and (for the fall semester) Russell. This (...)
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  4. Ordinary Truth in Tarski and Næss.Joseph Ulatowski - 2016 - In Adrian Kuzniar & Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska (eds.), Uncovering Facts and Values. Brill. pp. 67-90.
    Alfred Tarski seems to endorse a partial conception of truth, the T-schema, which he believes might be clarified by the application of empirical methods, specifically citing the experimental results of Arne Næss (1938a). The aim of this paper is to argue that Næss’ empirical work confirmed Tarski’s semantic conception of truth, among others. In the first part, I lay out the case for believing that Tarski’s T-schema, while not the formal and generalizable Convention-T, provides a partial account (...)
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  5. The Absence of Multiple Universes of Discourse in the 1936 Tarski Consequence-Definition Paper.John Corcoran & José Miguel Sagüillo - 2011 - History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (4):359 - 374.
    This paper discusses the history of the confusion and controversies over whether the definition of consequence presented in the 11-page 1936 Tarski consequence-definition paper is based on a monistic fixed-universe framework?like Begriffsschrift and Principia Mathematica. Monistic fixed-universe frameworks, common in pre-WWII logic, keep the range of the individual variables fixed as the class of all individuals. The contrary alternative is that the definition is predicated on a pluralistic multiple-universe framework?like the 1931 Gödel incompleteness paper. A pluralistic multiple-universe framework recognizes (...)
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  6. Was Tarski's Theory of Truth Motivated by Physicalism?Greg Frost-Arnold - 2004 - History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4):265-280.
    Many commentators on Alfred Tarski have, following Hartry Field, claimed that Tarski's truth-definition was motivated by physicalism—the doctrine that all facts, including semantic facts, must be reducible to physical facts. I claim, instead, that Tarski did not aim to reduce semantic facts to physical ones. Thus, Field's criticism that Tarski's truth-definition fails to fulfill physicalist ambitions does not reveal Tarski to be inconsistent, since Tarski's goal is not to vindicate physicalism. I argue that (...)'s only published remarks that speak approvingly of physicalism were written in unusual circumstances: Tarski was likely attempting to appease an audience of physicalists that he viewed as hostile to his ideas. In later sections I develop positive accounts of: (1) Tarski's reduction of semantic concepts; (2) Tarski's motivation to develop formal semantics in the particular way he does; and (3) the role physicalism plays in Tarski's thought. (shrink)
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  7. REVIEW OF Alfred Tarski, Collected Papers, Vols. 1-4 (1986) Edited by Steven Givant and Ralph McKenzie. [REVIEW]John Corcoran - 1991 - MATHEMATICAL REVIEWS 91 (h):01101-4.
    Alfred Tarski (1901--1983) is widely regarded as one of the two giants of twentieth-century logic and also as one of the four greatest logicians of all time (Aristotle, Frege and Gödel being the other three). Of the four, Tarski was the most prolific as a logician. The four volumes of his collected papers, which exclude most of his 19 monographs, span over 2500 pages. Aristotle's writings are comparable in volume, but most of the Aristotelian corpus is not about (...)
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  8. Tarski and Primitivism About Truth.Jamin Asay - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.
    Tarski’s pioneering work on truth has been thought by some to motivate a robust, correspondence-style theory of truth, and by others to motivate a deflationary attitude toward truth. I argue that Tarski’s work suggests neither; if it motivates any contemporary theory of truth, it motivates conceptual primitivism, the view that truth is a fundamental, indefinable concept. After outlining conceptual primitivism and Tarski’s theory of truth, I show how the two approaches to truth share much in common. While (...)
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  9. More on Putnam and Tarski.Panu Raatikainen - 2003 - Synthese 135 (1):37 - 47.
    Hilary Putnam's famous arguments criticizing Tarski's theory of truth are evaluated. It is argued that they do not succeed to undermine Tarski's approach. One of the arguments is based on the problematic idea of a false instance of T-schema. The other ignores various issues essential for Tarski's setting such as language-relativity of truth definition.
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  10. Truth, Correspondence, Models, and Tarski.Panu Raatikainen - 2007 - In Approaching Truth: Essays in Honour of Ilkka Niiniluoto. London: College Press. pp. 99-112.
    In the early 20th century, scepticism was common among philosophers about the very meaningfulness of the notion of truth – and of the related notions of denotation, definition etc. (i.e., what Tarski called semantical concepts). Awareness was growing of the various logical paradoxes and anomalies arising from these concepts. In addition, more philosophical reasons were being given for this aversion.1 The atmosphere changed dramatically with Alfred Tarski’s path-breaking contribution. What Tarski did was to show that, assuming that (...)
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  11. Tarski’s Convention T: Condition Beta.John Corcoran - forthcoming - SOUTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LOGIC 1 (1).
    Tarski’s Convention T—presenting his notion of adequate definition of truth (sic)—contains two conditions: alpha and beta. Alpha requires that all instances of a certain T Schema be provable. Beta requires in effect the provability of ‘every truth is a sentence’. Beta formally recognizes the fact, repeatedly emphasized by Tarski, that sentences (devoid of free variable occurrences)—as opposed to pre-sentences (having free occurrences of variables)—exhaust the range of significance of is true. In Tarski’s preferred usage, it is part (...)
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  12.  31
    Alfred Tarski - the Man Who Defined Truth.Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska - 2008 - Filozofia, Scientific Works of Jan Długosz Academy, Częstochowa:67-71.
    This article is a translation of the paper in Polish (Alfred Tarski - człowiek, który zdefiniował prawdę) published in Ruch Filozoficzny 4 (4) (2007). It is a personal Alfred Tarski memories based on my stay in Berkeley and visit the Alfred Tarski house for the invitation of Janusz Tarski.
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  13.  99
    Book Reviews: Anita Burdman Feferman and Solomon Feferman, "Alfred Tarski: Life and Logic", Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Walter Carnielli - 2006 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (1):91-96.
    Anita Burdman Feferman and Solomon Feferman, "Alfred Tarski: Life and Logic", Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2004, pp. 432.
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  14. Lies, Half-Truths, and Falsehoods About Tarski’s 1933 “Liar” Antinomies.John Corcoran & Joaquin Miller - 2012 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18 (1):140-141.
    We discuss misinformation about “the liar antinomy” with special reference to Tarski’s 1933 truth-definition paper [1]. Lies are speech-acts, not merely sentences or propositions. Roughly, lies are statements of propositions not believed by their speakers. Speakers who state their false beliefs are often not lying. And speakers who state true propositions that they don’t believe are often lying—regardless of whether the non-belief is disbelief. Persons who state propositions on which they have no opinion are lying as much as those (...)
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  15. How Tarski Defined the Undefinable.Cezary Cieśliński - 2015 - European Review 23 (01):139 - 149.
    This paper describes Tarski’s project of rehabilitating the notion of truth, previously considered dubious by many philosophers. The project was realized by providing a formal truth definition, which does not employ any problematic concept.
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  16. 2007. Notes on the Founding of Logics and Metalogic: Aristotle, Boole, and Tarski. Eds. C. Martínez Et Al. Current Topics in Logic and Analytic Philosophy / Temas Actuales de Lógica y Filosofía Analítica. Imprenta Univeridade Santiago de Compostela.John Corcoran - 2007 - In C. Martínez (ed.), Current Topics in Logic and Analytic Philosophy /. pp. 145-178.
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  17. Elementare ma complessa: la prospettiva della complessità computazionale attraverso il caso studio della geometria di Tarski.Pierluigi Graziani - 2012 - In Vincenzo Fano, Enrico Giannetto, Giulia Giannini & Pierluigi Graziani (eds.), Complessità e Riduzionismo. © ISONOMIA – Epistemologica, University of Urbino. pp. 66-81.
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  18.  32
    The Prolog Inference Model Refutes Tarski Undefinability.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    The generalized conclusion of the Tarski and Gödel proofs: All formal systems of greater expressive power than arithmetic necessarily have undecidable sentences. Is not the immutable truth that Tarski made it out to be it is only based on his starting assumptions. -/- When we reexamine these starting assumptions from the perspective of the philosophy of logic we find that there are alternative ways that formal systems can be defined that make undecidability inexpressible in all of these formal (...)
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  19.  27
    Tarski Undefinability Theorem Terse Refutation.P. Olcott - manuscript
    Both Tarski and Gödel “prove” that provability can diverge from Truth. When we boil their claim down to its simplest possible essence it is really claiming that valid inference from true premises might not always derive a true consequence. This is obviously impossible.
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  20. Nihilism and Tarski's truth definition: an interests incompatibility.Maurilio Lovatti - 1998 - Per la Filosofia (43):46-56.
    In this paper the importance of Tarski's truth definition is evaluated like a productive resource to criticize Nietzsche's nihilistic view and any pragmatic understanding of truth.
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  21. The Development of Mathematical Logic From Russell to Tarski, 1900-1935.Paolo Mancosu, Richard Zach & Calixto Badesa - 2009 - In Leila Haaparanta (ed.), The Development of Modern Logic. Oxford University Press.
    The period from 1900 to 1935 was particularly fruitful and important for the development of logic and logical metatheory. This survey is organized along eight "itineraries" concentrating on historically and conceptually linked strands in this development. Itinerary I deals with the evolution of conceptions of axiomatics. Itinerary II centers on the logical work of Bertrand Russell. Itinerary III presents the development of set theory from Zermelo onward. Itinerary IV discusses the contributions of the algebra of logic tradition, in particular, Löwenheim (...)
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  22. CORCORAN REVIEWS THE 4 VOLUMES OF TARSKI's COLLECTED PAPERS.John Corcoran - 1991 - MATHEMATICAL REVIEWS 91 (I):110-114.
    CORCORAN REVIEWS THE 4 VOLUMES OF TARSKI’S COLLECTED PAPERS Alfred Tarski (1901--1983) is widely regarded as one of the two giants of twentieth-century logic and also as one of the four greatest logicians of all time (Aristotle, Frege and Gödel being the other three). Of the four, Tarski was the most prolific as a logician. The four volumes of his collected papers, which exclude most of his 19 monographs, span over 2500 pages. Aristotle's writings are comparable in (...)
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  23.  50
    Tarski Undefinability Theorem Succinctly Refuted.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    If the conclusion of the Tarski Undefinability Theorem was that some artificially constrained limited notions of a formal system necessarily have undecidable sentences, then Tarski made no mistake within his assumptions. When we expand the scope of his investigation to other notions of formal systems we reach an entirely different conclusion showing that Tarski's assumptions were wrong.
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  24. Brentano's Criticism of the Correspondence Conception of Truth and Tarski's Semantic Theory.Jan Woleński - 1989 - Topoi 8 (2):105-110.
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  25.  23
    La Forma della Verità. Logica e filosofia nell'opera di Alfred Tarski.Ciro De Florio - 2013 - Italy: Mimesis.
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  26. Truth, Meaning, and Translation.Panu Raatikainen - 2008 - In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New essays on Tarski and philosophy. O.University Press. pp. 247.
    Philosopher’s judgements on the philosophical value of Tarski’s contributions to the theory of truth have varied. For example Karl Popper, Rudolf Carnap, and Donald Davidson have, in their different ways, celebrated Tarski’s achievements and have been enthusiastic about their philosophical relevance. Hilary Putnam, on the other hand, pronounces that “[a]s a philosophical account of truth, Tarski’s theory fails as badly as it is possible for an account to fail.” Putnam has several alleged reasons for his dissatisfaction,1 but (...)
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  27. The Antinomy of the Variable: A Tarskian Resolution.Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (3):137-170.
    Kit Fine has reawakened a puzzle about variables with a long history in analytic philosophy, labeling it “the antinomy of the variable”. Fine suggests that the antinomy demands a reconceptualization of the role of variables in mathematics, natural language semantics, and first-order logic. The difficulty arises because: (i) the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ cannot be synonymous, since they make different contributions when they jointly occur within a sentence, but (ii) there is a strong temptation to say that distinct variables ‘x’ (...)
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  28. Logicality and Invariance.Denis Bonnay - 2006 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 14 (1):29-68.
    What is a logical constant? The question is addressed in the tradition of Tarski's definition of logical operations as operations which are invariant under permutation. The paper introduces a general setting in which invariance criteria for logical operations can be compared and argues for invariance under potential isomorphism as the most natural characterization of logical operations.
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  29.  66
    On the Mutual Definability of the Notions of Entailment, Rejection, and Inconsistency.Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska - 2016 - Axioms 5 (15).
    In this paper, two axiomatic theories T− and T′ are constructed, which are dual to Tarski’s theory T+ (1930) of deductive systems based on classical propositional calculus. While in Tarski’s theory T+ the primitive notion is the classical consequence function (entailment) Cn+, in the dual theory T− it is replaced by the notion of Słupecki’s rejection consequence Cn− and in the dual theory T′ it is replaced by the notion of the family Incons of inconsistent sets. The author (...)
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  30.  54
    Modeling Truth for Semantics.Ori Simchen - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    The Tarskian notion of truth-in-a-model is the paradigm formal capture of our pre-theoretical notion of truth for semantic purposes. But what exactly makes Tarski’s construction so well suited for semantics is seldom discussed. In my Semantics, Metasemantics, Aboutness (OUP 2017) I articulate a certain requirement on the successful formal modeling of truth for semantics – “locality-per-reference” – against a background discussion of metasemantics and its relation to truth-conditional semantics. It is a requirement on any formal capture of sentential truth (...)
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  31.  80
    Swap Structures Semantics for Ivlev-Like Modal Logics.Marcelo E. Coniglio & Ana Claudia Golzio - forthcoming - Soft Computing.
    In 1988, J. Ivlev proposed some (non-normal) modal systems which are semantically characterized by four-valued non-deterministic matrices in the sense of A. Avron and I. Lev. Swap structures are multialgebras (a.k.a. hyperalgebras) of a special kind, which were introduced in 2016 by W. Carnielli and M. Coniglio in order to give a non-deterministic semantical account for several paraconsistent logics known as logics of formal inconsistency, which are not algebraizable by means of the standard techniques. Each swap structure induces naturally a (...)
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  32. Introduction. The School: Its Genesis, Development and Significance.U. Wybraniec-Skardowska - 2018 - In Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska & Ángel Garrido (eds.), in: The Lvov-Warsaw School. Past and Present. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 3-14.
    The Introduction outlines, in a concise way, the history of the Lvov-Warsaw School – a most unique Polish school of worldwide renown, which pioneered trends combining philosophy, logic, mathematics and language. The author accepts that the beginnings of the School fall on the year 1895, when its founder Kazimierz Twardowski, a disciple of Franz Brentano, came to Lvov on his mission to organize a scientific circle. Soon, among the characteristic features of the School was its serious approach towards philosophical studies (...)
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  33.  70
    Foundational Holism, Substantive Theory of Truth, and A New Philosophy of Logic: Interview with Gila Sher BY Chen Bo.Gila Sher & Chen Bo - 2019 - Philosophical Forum 50 (1):3-57.
    Gila Sher interviewed by Chen Bo: -/- I. Academic Background and Earlier Research: 1. Sher’s early years. 2. Intellectual influence: Kant, Quine, and Tarski. 3. Origin and main Ideas of The Bounds of Logic. 4. Branching quantifiers and IF logic. 5. Preparation for the next step. -/- II. Foundational Holism and a Post-Quinean Model of Knowledge: 1. General characterization of foundational holism. 2. Circularity, infinite regress, and philosophical arguments. 3. Comparing foundational holism and foundherentism. 4. A post-Quinean model of (...)
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  34. Reid, Constance. Hilbert (a Biography). Reviewed by Corcoran in Philosophy of Science 39 (1972), 106–08.John Corcoran - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (1):106-108.
    Reid, Constance. Hilbert (a Biography). Reviewed by Corcoran in Philosophy of Science 39 (1972), 106–08. -/- Constance Reid was an insider of the Berkeley-Stanford logic circle. Her San Francisco home was in Ashbury Heights near the homes of logicians such as Dana Scott and John Corcoran. Her sister Julia Robinson was one of the top mathematical logicians of her generation, as was Julia’s husband Raphael Robinson for whom Robinson Arithmetic was named. Julia was a Tarski PhD and, in recognition (...)
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  35. Logical Indefinites.Jack Woods - 2014 - Logique Et Analyse -- Special Issue Edited by Julien Murzi and Massimiliano Carrara 227: 277-307.
    I argue that we can and should extend Tarski's model-theoretic criterion of logicality to cover indefinite expressions like Hilbert's ɛ operator, Russell's indefinite description operator η, and abstraction operators like 'the number of'. I draw on this extension to discuss the logical status of both abstraction operators and abstraction principles.
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  36. Meanings of Word: Type-Occurrence-Token.John Corcoran - 2005 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (1):117.
    Corcoran, John. 2005. Meanings of word: type-occurrence-token. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11(2005) 117. -/- Once we are aware of the various senses of ‘word’, we realize that self-referential statements use ambiguous sentences. If a statement is made using the sentence ‘this is a pronoun’, is the speaker referring to an interpreted string, a string-type, a string-occurrence, a string-token, or what? The listeners can wonder “this what?”. -/- John Corcoran, Meanings of word: type-occurrence-token Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150 E-mail: (...)
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  37. Vagueness and Intuitionistic Logic.Ian Rumfitt - forthcoming - In Alexander Miller (ed.), Language, Logic,and Mathematics: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press.
    In his essay ‘“Wang’s Paradox”’, Crispin Wright proposes a solution to the Sorites Paradox (in particular, the form of it he calls the ‘Paradox of Sharp Boundaries’) that involves adopting intuitionistic logic when reasoning with vague predicates. He does not give a semantic theory which accounts for the validity of intuitionistic logic (and the invalidity of stronger logics) in that area. The present essay tentatively makes good the deficiency. By applying a theorem of Tarski, it shows that intuitionistic logic (...)
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  38. Conceptual Structure of Classical Logic.John Corcoran - 1972 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 33 (1):25-47.
    One innovation in this paper is its identification, analysis, and description of a troubling ambiguity in the word ‘argument’. In one sense ‘argument’ denotes a premise-conclusion argument: a two-part system composed of a set of sentences—the premises—and a single sentence—the conclusion. In another sense it denotes a premise-conclusion-mediation argument—later called an argumentation: a three-part system composed of a set of sentences—the premises—a single sentence—the conclusion—and complex of sentences—the mediation. The latter is often intended to show that the conclusion follows from (...)
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  39. Formalizing Euclid’s First Axiom.John Corcoran - 2014 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 20 (3):404-405.
    Formalizing Euclid’s first axiom. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. 20 (2014) 404–5. (Coauthor: Daniel Novotný) -/- Euclid [fl. 300 BCE] divides his basic principles into what came to be called ‘postulates’ and ‘axioms’—two words that are synonyms today but which are commonly used to translate Greek words meant by Euclid as contrasting terms. -/- Euclid’s postulates are specifically geometric: they concern geometric magnitudes, shapes, figures, etc.—nothing else. The first: “to draw a line from any point to any point”; the last: the (...)
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  40. The Semantic Theory of Truth: Field’s Incompleteness Objection.Glen A. Hoffmann - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (2):161-170.
    According to Field’s influential incompleteness objection, Tarski’s semantic theory of truth is unsatisfactory since the definition that forms its basis is incomplete in two distinct senses: (1) it is physicalistically inadequate, and for this reason, (2) it is conceptually deficient. In this paper, I defend the semantic theory of truth against the incompleteness objection by conceding (1) but rejecting (2). After arguing that Davidson and McDowell’s reply to the incompleteness objection fails to pass muster, I argue that, within the (...)
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  41. CORCORAN'S 27 ENTRIES IN THE 1999 SECOND EDITION.John Corcoran - 1999 - In Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. CAMBRIDGE UP. pp. 65-941.
    Corcoran’s 27 entries in the 1999 second edition of Robert Audi’s Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy [Cambridge: Cambridge UP]. -/- ancestral, axiomatic method, borderline case, categoricity, Church (Alonzo), conditional, convention T, converse (outer and inner), corresponding conditional, degenerate case, domain, De Morgan, ellipsis, laws of thought, limiting case, logical form, logical subject, material adequacy, mathematical analysis, omega, proof by recursion, recursive function theory, scheme, scope, Tarski (Alfred), tautology, universe of discourse. -/- The entire work is available online free at more (...)
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  42.  33
    Gómez-Torrente on Modality and Tarskian Logical Consequence.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2010 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 18 (2):159-170.
    Gómez-Torrente’s papers have made important contributions to vindicate Tarski’s model-theoretic account of the logical properties in the face of Etchemendy’s criticisms. However, at some points his vindication depends on interpreting the Tarskian account as purportedly modally deflationary, i.e., as not intended to capture the intuitive modal element in the logical properties, that logical consequence is (epistemic or alethic) necessary truth-preservation. Here it is argued that the views expressed in Tarski’s seminal work do not support this modally deflationary interpretation, (...)
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  43. Truthmakers, Truthbearers and the Objectivity of Truth.Artur Rojszczak & Barry Smith - 2003 - In Jaako Hintikka (ed.), Philosophy and Logic: In Search of the Polish Tradition. Boston: Kluwer. pp. 229-268.
    The aim of this paper is to show that the account of objective truth taken for granted by logicians at least since the publication in 1933 of Tarski’s “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages” arose out of a tradition of philosophical thinking initiated by Bolzano and Brentano. The paper shows more specifically that certain investigations of states of affairs and other objectual correlates of judging acts, investigations carried out by Austrian and Polish philosophers around the turn of the (...)
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  44. Equality and Identity.John Corcoran & Anthony Ramnauth - 2013 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 19 (3):255-256.
    Equality and identity. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. 19 (2013) 255-6. (Coauthor: Anthony Ramnauth) Also see https://www.academia.edu/s/a6bf02aaab This article uses ‘equals’ [‘is equal to’] and ‘is’ [‘is identical to’, ‘is one and the same as’] as they are used in ordinary exact English. In a logically perfect language the oxymoron ‘the numbers 3 and 2+1 are the same number’ could not be said. Likewise, ‘the number 3 and the number 2+1 are one number’ is just as bad from a logical point (...)
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  45.  72
    Truth-Makers and Convention T.Jan Woleński - 2011 - Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan.
    This papers discuss the place, if any, of Convention T (the condition of material adequacy of the proper definition of truth formulated by Tarski) in the truth-makers account offered by Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons and Barry Smith. It is argued that although Tarski’s requirement seems entirely acceptable in the frameworks of truth-makers theories for the first-sight, several doubts arise under a closer inspection. In particular, T-biconditionals have no clear meaning as sentences about truth-makers. Thus, truth-makers theory cannot be (...)
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  46. Liar-Like Paradoxes and Metalanguage Features.Klaus Ladstaetter - 2013 - Southwest Philosophy Review 29 (1):61-70.
    In their (2008) article Liar-Like Paradox and Object Language Features C.S. Jenkins and Daniel Nolan (henceforth, JN) argue that it is possible to construct Liar-like paradox in a metalanguage even though its object language is not semantically closed. I do not take issue with this claim. I find fault though with the following points contained in JN’s article: First, that it is possible to construct Liar-like paradox in a metalanguage, even though this metalanguage is not semantically closed. Second, that the (...)
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  47.  98
    Surprises in Logic.John Corcoran & William Frank - 2013 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 19 (3):253.
    JOHN CORCORAN AND WILIAM FRANK. Surprises in logic. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. 19 253. Some people, not just beginning students, are at first surprised to learn that the proposition “If zero is odd, then zero is not odd” is not self-contradictory. Some people are surprised to find out that there are logically equivalent false universal propositions that have no counterexamples in common, i. e., that no counterexample for one is a counterexample for the other. Some people would be surprised to (...)
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  48.  59
    Truth and Existence.Jan Heylen & Leon Horsten - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):106-114.
    Halbach has argued that Tarski biconditionals are not ontologically conservative over classical logic, but his argument is undermined by the fact that he cannot include a theory of arithmetic, which functions as a theory of syntax. This article is an improvement on Halbach's argument. By adding the Tarski biconditionals to inclusive negative free logic and the universal closure of minimal arithmetic, which is by itself an ontologically neutral combination, one can prove that at least one thing exists. The (...)
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  49.  95
    Tarskian Truth and the Two Provinces of Semantics.Ricardo Santos - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):26-37.
    In this paper, I argue that the cleavage between the theory of reference and the theory of meaning, which under the influence of Quine has dominated a large part of the philosophy of language of the last fifty years, is based on a misrepresentation of Tarski's achievement and on an overestimation of the scope and value of disquotation. In particular, I show that, if we accept Davidson's critique of disquotation, the same kind of reasons that Quine offered in opposition (...)
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  50. Truth, Proof and Gödelian Arguments: A Defence of Tarskian Truth in Mathematics.Markus Pantsar - 2009 - Dissertation, University of Helsinki
    One of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the relation between truth and formal proof. The position according to which the two concepts are the same is called deflationism, and the opposing viewpoint substantialism. In an important result of mathematical logic, Kurt Gödel proved in his first incompleteness theorem that all consistent formal systems containing arithmetic include sentences that can neither be proved nor disproved within that system. However, such undecidable Gödel sentences can be established to (...)
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