Evil and Evidence

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 7:1-31 (2016)
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Abstract

The problem of evil is the most prominent argument against the existence of God. Skeptical theists contend that it is not a good argument. Their reasons for this contention vary widely, involving such notions as CORNEA, epistemic appearances, 'gratuitous' evils, 'levering' evidence, and the representativeness of goods. We aim to dispel some confusions about these notions, in particular by clarifying their roles within a probabilistic epistemology. In addition, we develop new responses to the problem of evil from both the phenomenal conception of evidence and the knowledge-first view of evidence.

Author Profiles

Matthew A. Benton
Seattle Pacific University
John Hawthorne
University of Southern California
Yoaav Isaacs
Baylor University

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