From Experience to Metaphysics: On Experience‐based Intuitions and their Role in Metaphysics

Noûs 49 (3):684-697 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Metaphysical theories are often counter-intuitive. But they also often are strongly supported and motivated by intuitions. One way or another, the link between intuitions and metaphysics is a strong and important one, and there is hardly any metaphysical discussion where intuitions do not play a crucial role. In this article, I will be interested in a particular kind of such intuitions, namely those that come, at least partly, from experience. There seems to be a route from experience to metaphysics, and this is the core of my interest here. In order to better understand such ‘arguments from experience’ and the kind of relationship there is between this type of intuitions and metaphysical theories, I shall examine four particular cases where a kind of experience-based intuition seems to motivate or support a metaphysical theory. At the end of the day, I shall argue that this route is a treacherous one, and that in all of the four cases I shall concentrate on, phenomenological considerations are in fact orthogonal to the allegedly ‘corresponding’ metaphysical claims. An anti-realist view of metaphysics will emerge
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BENFET
Revision history
Archival date: 2013-08-01
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Word and Object.Quine, W. V.

View all 30 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2013-03-09

Total views
502 ( #4,925 of 39,657 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
36 ( #13,547 of 39,657 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.