Metaphysics, Misc

Presentists have typically argued that the Block View is incapable of explaining our experience of time. In this paper I argue that the phenomenology of our experience of time is, on the contrary, against presentism. My argument is based on a dilemma: presentists must either assume that the metaphysical present has no temporal extension, or that it is temporally extended. The former horn leads to phenomenological problems. The latter renders presentism metaphysically incoherent, unless one posits a discrete present that, however, (...) suffers from the same difficulties that the instantaneous present is prone to. After introducing the main phenomenological models of our experience of time that are discussed in the literature, I show that none of them favors presentism. I conclude by arguing that if even the phenomenology of time sides against presentism, the latter metaphysical theory has no scientific evidence in its favor and ought to be dropped. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that an immortal existence could be desirable. Taking the accounts of Williams and Smuts under careful consideration, I agree with Fischer that an immortal existence could be gratifying. When Fischer argues that it is unfair for Williams to posit that an immortal life must have self-exhausting pleasures and, overall, a better experience than mortal life, he gets to the crux of the argument for immortality: as long as there are positive categorical desires for the individual, (...) then such life-affirming desires will provide an impetus to carry on. In moving past the Teiresias model of a phenomenon that retains memories while changing characters, I argue that a life of intellectual inquiry – which essentially alters the character of the individual while maintaining memories – offers an outward looking existence which provides internal pleasures. Accordingly, with the use of technology, computer simulations have the potential to provide pleasures and experiences that escape reality. In this sense, technology has the potential to supplement an immortal life. We cannot say whether there will be a pinnacle of such learning and pleasure which leads to decreasing returns, but it seems plausible that an immortal being who incorporates learning and pleasure that could potentially lead to innovation and discovery would seek to continue such intellectual inquiry and varied experiences until all learning potentials were exhausted. (shrink)

In this article I interpret resilience and evolution in view of the philosophy of Leibniz. First, I discuss resilience as a substance’s or a monad’s “quantity of essence” — its “degree of perfection” — which I express as the quality of the Whole with respect to the sum of the qualities of the Parts. Then I discuss evolution, which I interpret here as the autopoietic Principle that sets Itself in motion and creates all reality, including Itself. This Principle may be (...) considered as a sort of ante-litteram metaphysical Darwinian Selection. My interpretations provide a different formulation for questions such as “why natural evolution evolves?” and “why is this the best of all possible worlds?” In this article I also provide a geometrical interpretation of a key aspect behind the “divine mathematics” of the autopoietic Principle. (shrink)

This paper presents a new taxonomy of sex/gender concepts based on the idea of starting with a few basic components of the sex/gender system, and exhausting the possible types of simple associations and identities based on these. The resulting system is significantly more fine-grained than most competitors, and helps to clarify a number of points of confusion and conceptual tension in academic and activist conversations about feminism, transgender politics, and the social analysis of gender.

What is it to be a woman? What is it to be a man? We start by laying out desiderata for an analysis of 'woman' and 'man': descriptively, it should link these gender categories to sex biology without reducing them to sex biology, and politically, it should help us explain and combat traditional sexism while also allowing us to make sense of the activist view that gendering should be consensual. Using a Putnam-style 'Twin Earth' example, we argue that none of (...) the existing analyses in the feminist literature succeeds in meeting all of our desiderata. Finally, we propose a positive account that we believe can satisfy all the desiderata outlined. According to our theory, the genders 'woman' and 'man' are individuated not by their contemporary connections to sex biology, but by their historical continuity with classes that were originally closely connected to sex biology. (shrink)

In questa nota storico-critica, anche contestualmente alla nozione di cambio concettuale toulmiano, si vuol riflettere sull'opportunità metodologica di un ritorno, in senso heideggeriano, all'autenticità dell'originario pensiero filosoco greco sia per meglio chiarire i termini dei rapporti fra pensiero scientico e teologia sistematica sia per inquadrare, in maniera più coerente e maggiormente comprensiva, le principali concezioni della dottrina eucaristica della teologia cattolica che, ripensate entro l'impianto ontoteologico heideggeriano, avvaloreranno e giusticheranno le teorie transustanziali rispetto a quelle consustanziali.

In questa nota storico-critica, anche contestualmente alla nozione di cambio concettuale toulmiano, si vuol riflettere sull'opportunità metodologica di un ritorno, in senso heideggeriano, all'autenticità dell'originario pensiero filosoco greco sia per meglio chiarire i termini dei rapporti fra pensiero scientifico e teologia sistematica sia per inquadrare, in maniera più coerente e maggiormente comprensiva, le principali concezioni della dottrina eucaristica della teologia cattolica che, ripensate entro l'impianto ontoteologico heideggeriano, avvaloreranno e giusticheranno le teorie transustanziali rispetto a quelle consustanziali.

Soul substance (jīva dravya) is ubiquitous but unseen. Driving force within each one of us, it has been, since time immemorial, a subject matter of research by philosophers, religious leaders and laity. Still, ambiguity and misconceptions prevail as regard its real nature. Some negate the existence of soul and attribute consciousness to the union of four basic substances – earth (prthvī), water (jala), fire (agni), and air (vāyu); death leads to its annihilation. Some believe it to be momentary, devoid of (...) self-existence. Still others consider it a product of illusion (māyā) or ignorance (avidyā) as all objects are manifestations of Brahma; only the one eternally undivided Brahma exists. All such conceptions are based on absolutism like: existence (bhāvaikānta) and non-existence (abhāvaikānta), non-dualism (advaita-ekānta) and separateness (prthaktva-ekānta), and permanence (nityatva-ekānta) and momentariness (ksanika-ekānta). Jaina epistemology goes beyond the superficial and examines objects of knowledge from all possible points of view. It asserts that the entity (dharmī) and its attributes (dharma) are neither absolutely dependent (āpeksika) nor absolutely independent (anāpeksika). Only an entity which has general (sāmānya – concerning the substance, dravya) and particular (viśesa – concerning the mode, paryāya) attributes can be the subject of knowledge. Substance without its modification and modification without its substance cannot be the subject of valid knowledge; only their combination can be the subject of knowledge. (shrink)

Assuming the absolute nothingness as the most basic object of thought, I present a way to refer to this object, by reducing it onto a primitive object that supersedes and comes right after the absolute nothingness. The new primitive object that is constructed can be regarded as a formal system that can generate some infinite variety of symbols. [The PDF here is outdated, for a recent draft please contact me.].

The UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas between Theise and Menas’ ideas (2016) and my ideas (2002-2008) in Physics and Cognitive Neuroscience and Philosophy (the mind-brain problem, quantum mechanics, etc.) -/- (2016) Theise D. Neil (Department of Pathology, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY, USA) and Kafatos C. Menas (bDepartment of Medicine, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY, USA; cSchmid College of Science & Technology, Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA) (2016), REVIEW - Fundamental awareness: A (...) framework for integrating science, philosophy and metaphysics, in COMMUNICATIVE & INTEGRATIVE BIOLOGY, 2016, VOL. 9, NO. 3, e1155010 (19 pages), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19420889.2016.1155010 -/- A friend of mine indicated me the strike similarities between Theise and Kafatos’ ideas in their book (Fundamental awareness: A framework for integrating science, philosophy and metaphysics) and my ideas in 2002-20008! I do not have access to this book, but I investigate the ideas that are in a review about this work. Let me introduce the abstract of that Review: -/- The ontologic framework of Fundamental Awareness proposed here assumes that non-dual Awareness is foundational to the universe, not arising from the interactions or structures of higher level phenomena. The framework allows comparison and integration of views from the three investigative domains concerned with understanding the nature of consciousness: science, philosophy, and metaphysics. In this framework, Awareness is the underlying reality, not reducible to anything else. Awareness and existence are the same. As such, the universe is non-material, self-organizing throughout, a holarchy of complementary, process driven, recursive interactions. The universe is both its own first observer and subject. Considering the world to be non-material and comprised, a priori, of Awareness is to privilege information over materiality, action over agency and to understand that qualia are not a “hard problem,” but the foundational elements of all existence. These views fully reflect main stream Western philosophical traditions, insights from culturally diverse contemplative and mystical traditions, and are in keeping with current scientific thinking, expressible mathematically. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against grounding being necessarily well-founded, and provide some reasons to think it's actually not well-founded.

It is sometimes supposed that, in principle, we cannot offer an explanation for why there is something rather than nothing. I argue that this supposition is a mistake, and stems from a needlessly myopic conception of the form explanations can legitimately take. After making this more general point, I proceed to offer a speculative suggestion regarding one sort of explanation which can in principle serve as an answer to the question “why is there something rather than nothing?” The suggestion is (...) that there may be something rather than nothing in virtue of the truth of certain sorts of subjunctive conditionals. (shrink)

The four antinomies of Zeno of Elea, especially Achilles and the tortoise, continue to be provoking issues which not always receive adequate treatment. Aristotle himself used this antinomy to develop his understanding of movement: it is a fluent continuum that he considers to be a whole. The parts, if any, are only potentially present. The claim of quantum mechanics is precisely that: movement is quantized; things move or change in non-reducible steps, the so-called quanta. This view is in contrast to (...) classical mechanics, where small infinitesimal steps are permitted. The objective of the present study is to show the merits of the Aristotelian approach. It is a suitable candidate for providing a philosophical framework for understanding fundamental aspects of quantum mechanics. Especially one may mention the influence of the final state in quantum mechanics, which in philosophical terms relates to the final cause. Like in the work of Aristotle, examples from science are also presented in the present study. They serve to illustrate the philosophical statements. However, in contrast to ancient Greek, the examples now relate to issues which are only fully accessible to the scientifically trained reader. It may, therefore, happen that certain parts in the present study miss clarity for the philosopher and other parts for the scientist. One conclusion, therefore, could be that an open dialogue between scientists and philosophers is needed to get a better understanding of the challenging issues at the cross-road of both disciplines. (shrink)

Few have given an extended treatment of the non-statistical sense of normality: a sense captured in sentences like “dogs have four legs,” or “hammers normally have metal heads,” or “it is normal for badgers to take dust baths.” The most direct extant treatment is Bernhard Nickel’s Between Logic and the World, where he claims that the normal or characteristic for a kind is what we can explain by appeal to the right sorts of explanations. Just which explanatory strategies can ground (...) normalities, though, is difficult to determine without inviting circularity into the account. After raising this and other worries for Nickel’s account, I develop my own account according to which normal features are those which are explained by the kind of thing involved. (shrink)

This is to appear in a Festschrift for Hilary Putnam on his 85th birthday. This is a pre-publication, not final, version.

Alex Byrne’s article, “Are Women Adult Human Females?”, asks a question that Byrne treats as nearly rhetorical. Byrne’s answer is, ‘clearly, yes’. Moreover, Byrne claims, 'woman' is a biological category that does not admit of any interpretation as (also) a social category. It is important to respond to Byrne’s argument, but mostly because it is paradigmatic of a wider phenomenon. The slogan “women are adult human females” is a political slogan championed by anti-trans activists, appearing on billboards, pamphlets, and anti-trans (...) online forums. In this paper, I respond to Byrne’s argument, revealing significant problems with its background assumptions, content, and methodology. (shrink)

Aristotle first investigated different modes, or ways of being. Unfortunately, in the modern literature the discussion of this concept has been largely neglected. Only recently, the interest towards the concept of ways increased. Usually, it is explored in connection with the existence of universals and particulars. The approach we are going to follow in this chapter is different. It discusses Wittgenstein’s conception of higher ontological levels as ways of arranging elements of lower ontological levels. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein developed his (...) ontology of ways (Art und Weise) in six steps: (i) Constructing states of affairs out of objects; (ii) Constructing propositions out of states of affairs; (iii) Constructing propositional signs; (iv) Constructing thoughts with the help of propositional signs; (v) Constructing truth / falsity; (vi) Constructing works of art. In Philosophical Investigations he added further five ways of producing new ontological levels: (vii) the meaning of a proposition is the way in which it is verified; (viii) the child gets command on language/calculus in the way it replicates demonstrations of the teacher; (ix) the products of mind are ways of doing something; (x) an action is a way of carrying out the instructions for acting. (shrink)

What’s important about ‘coming out’? Why do we wear business suits or Star Trek pins? Part of the answer, we think, has to do with what we call agential identity. Social metaphysics has given us tools for understanding what it is to be socially positioned as a member of a particular group and what it means to self-identify with a group. But there is little exploration of the general relationship between self-identity and social position. We take up this exploration, developing (...) an account of agential identity—the self-identities we make available to others. Agential identities are the bridge between what we take ourselves to be and what others take us to be. Understanding agential identity not only fills an important gap in the literature, but also helps us explain politically important phenomena concerning discrimination, malicious identities, passing, and code-switching. These phenomena, we argue, cannot be understood solely in terms of self-identity or social position. (shrink)

La doctrina del choque (Anstoß), que Fichte desarrolla ante todo en el Fundamento de toda la Doctrina de la Ciencia, pero también en otros escritos de la época de Jena, ha sido desde antaño objeto de crítica tanto por los admiradores como por los detractores de la filosofía fichteana. Existen al menos dos modos específicamente diferentes y aparentemente contrapuestos de comprender su sentido: según una lectura, el choque sería una autoafección del propio Yo; según otra, un residuo realista, en última (...) instancia incompatible con los compromisos idealistas del pensamiento de Fichte. La tensión entre ambos modos de comprender la tesis del choque pueden reeconcontrarse en la confrontación entre las interpretaciones así llamadas epistemológica y ontológica de la tesis de la “cosa en sí” en la filosofía de Kant –tesis con la que de hecho suele asociarse la tesis fichteana del choque. En este contexto, Hegel parecería a primera vista presentarse –por ejemplo, si se considera el escrito de la Diferencia entre los sistemas de filosofía de Fichte y Schelling– como partidario de una interpretación robusta, ontológica, de la tesis del choque; sin embargo, si se analiza el corpus hegeliano en su conjunto la posición de Hegel resulta ser más matizada y próxima a una interpretación por así llamarla epistemológica de dicha tesis. Con todo, aun así la postura de Hegel sobre el sentido de la tesis fichteana del choque en el contexto de una filosofía idealista continúa siendo crítica. (shrink)

Material from this paper appears in Chap. 7 of my book Reason and Being, but there is also stuff here that isn't in the book. In particular, it discusses the claims that, for Spinoza, conceiving implies explaining and that existence is identical to or reducible to conceivability. So, if you're interested in those issues, this paper might be worth a read.

The natural name theory, recently discussed by Johnson (2018), is proposed as an explanation of pure quotation where the quoted term(s) refers to a linguistic object such as in the sentence ‘In the above, ‘bank’ is ambiguous’. After outlining the theory, I raise a problem for the natural name theory. I argue that positing a resemblance relation between the name and the linguistic object it names does not allow us to rule out cases where the natural name fails to resemble (...) the linguistic object it names. I argue that to avoid this problem, we can combine the natural name theory with a type-realist metaphysics of language, and hold that the name is natural because the name is an instance of the kind that it names. I conclude by reflecting on the importance of the metaphysics of language for questions in the philosophy of language. (shrink)

The idea that two words can be instances of the same word is a central intuition in our conception of language. This fact underlies many of the claims that we make about how we communicate, and how we understand each other. Given this, irrespective of what we think words are, it is common to think that any putative ontology of words, must be able to explain this feature of language. That is, we need to provide criteria of identity for word-types (...) which allow us to individuate words such that it can be the case that two particular word-instances are instances of the same word-type (on the assumption that there are such types). One solution, recently further developed by Irmak (2018), holds that words are individuated by their history. In this paper, I argue that this view either fails to account for our intuitions about word identity, or is too vague to be a plausible answer to the problem of word individuation. (shrink)

Gender classifications often are controversial. These controversies typically focus on whether gender classifications align with facts about gender kind membership: Could someone really be nonbinary? Is Chris Mosier really a man? I think this is a bad approach. Consider the possibility of ontological oppression, which arises when social kinds operating in a context unjustly constrain the behaviors, concepts, or affect of certain groups. Gender kinds operating in dominant contexts, I argue, oppress trans and nonbinary persons in this way: they marginalize (...) trans men and women, and exclude nonbinary persons. As a result, facts about membership in dominant gender kinds should not settle gender classification practices. (shrink)

From the very beginning of ancient Greek philosophy up to the present day a puzzling correlation is found between rationality and reality. In this study this relation is examined with emphasis on the philosophical tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas. A comparison is made with the virtual reality created by computers and actual reality of our universe. The view expressed in the scientific neopositivism of Jordan and Mach is found to be an adequate approach to avoid contradictions in the interpretation of (...) modern physics. A challenging hypothesis is made by updating the Laplacian Demon by a powerful creative intellect in line with Judeo-Christian tradition. With this hypothesis a new light is shed on several fundamental issues in modern science. (shrink)

Die zweckmäßige Einheit der Dinge, nach der die Ordnung in der Welt so angesehen wird, als ob sie aus der Absicht eines vernünftigen Höchstwesens entstanden wäre, ist für Kant nur die höchste formale Einheit unseres Erkenntnisvermögens. Die Voraussetzung einer Intelligenz als der Ursache des Weltganzen ist aber nur ein heuristisches Prinzip, den besonderen Gesetzen der Natur nachzuforschen. Im Element des Subjekt-Objekt-Unterschieds ist die für Hegel implizite Unendlichkeit der Zweckmäßigkeit nicht begreifbar. Nur im logischen Raum der Vernünftigkeit als Identität der Bestimmtheit (...) und des Seins kann die wahrhafte Bestimmung der Teleologie zum Ausdruck kommen. Diese Bestimmung ist, dass die Welt als ein systematisches Ganzes gemäß der Analogie der Lebewesen nicht mehr in der Weise der unreflektierten Selbständigkeit ihrer verschiedenen Komponenten vorgestellt wird, sondern dass der rein ideelle Charakter dieser Komponenten erst im logischen Raum des Begreifens zum Vorschein kommt. (shrink)

As with most other areas of reproduction, surrogacy is highly regulated. But the legislation and policies on surrogacy are written in such ways that make large (and possibly mistaken) assumptions about the metaphysical relationship between the mother and the fetus – whether the fetus is a part of, or contained by, the mother. It is the purpose of this chapter to highlight these assumptions, and to demonstrate the impact that alternative metaphysical views can have on our conceptualization of surrogacy. With (...) that in mind, I recommend that our public policies on surrogacy be at least neutral or otherwise responsive to metaphysics rather than presupposing it, such that the regulation and legislation of surrogacy will be metaphysically informed. (shrink)

The impetus theory of motion states that to be in motion is to have a non-zero velocity. The at-at theory of motion states that to be in motion is to be at different places at different times, which in classical physics is naturally understood as the reduction of velocities to position developments. I first defend the at-at theory against the criticism raised by Arntzenius that it renders determinism impossible. I then develop a novel impetus theory of motion that reduces positions (...) to velocity developments. As this impetus theory of motion is by construction a mirror image of the at-at theory of motion, I claim that the two theories of motion are in fact epistemically on par—despite the unfamiliar metaphysical picture of the world furnished by the impetus version. (shrink)

Primitives are both important and unavoidable, and which set of primitives we endorse will greatly shape our theories and how those theories provide solutions to the problems that we take to be important. After introducing the notion of a primitive posit, I discuss the different kinds of primitives that we might posit. Following Cowling (2013), I distinguish between ontological and ideological primitives, and, following Benovsky (2013) between functional and content views of primitives. I then propose that these two distinctions cut (...) across each other leading to four types of primitive posits. I then argue that theoretical virtues should be taken to be meta-theoretical ideological primitives. I close with some reflections on the global nature of comparing sets of primitives. (shrink)

Many ideas of this paper are UNBELIEVABLE similar to my ideas published long time ago! Let me introduce paragraphs.

Many ideas of this paper are UNBELIEVABLE similar to my ideas published long time ago! Let me introduce paragraphs.

My primary aim is to defend a nonreductive solution to the problem of action. I argue that when you are performing an overt bodily action, you are playing an irreducible causal role in bringing about, sustaining, and controlling the movements of your body, a causal role best understood as an instance of agent causation. Thus, the solution that I defend employs a notion of agent causation, though emphatically not in defence of an account of free will, as most theories of (...) agent causation are. Rather, I argue that the notion of agent causation introduced here best explains how it is that you are making your body move during an action, thereby providing a satisfactory solution to the problem of action. (shrink)

Attributions of omnipresence, most familiar within the philosophy of religion, typically take the omnipresence of an entity to either consist in that entity's occupation of certain regions or be dependent upon other of that entity's attributes, such as omnipotence or omniscience. This paper defends an alternative conception of omnipresence that is independent of other purported divine attributes and dispenses with occupation. The resulting view repurposes the metaphysics of necessitism and permanentism, taking omnipresent entities to be those entities that exist at (...) all regions. This view is then shown to best accommodate attributions of omnipresence to a diverse range of metaphysical posits, like abstract entities, and a more diverse class of religious posits. (shrink)

The purpose of this book is to address the controversial issues of whether we have a fixed set of ontological categories and if they have some epistemic value at all. Which are our ontological categories? What determines them? Do they play a role in cognition? If so, which? What do they force to presuppose regarding our world-view? If they constitute a limit to possible knowledge, up to what point is science possible? Does their study make of philosophy a science? Departing (...) from the novelty –but no exclusively- of considering distinctions to be the subject matter of thought and language -that is, of reference and meaning- the author arrives at a radical novel conception of the ontological categories. The observations and arguments presented in it constitute a strong case against established and well-rooted tenets, if not paradigms, of contemporary philosophy, beyond ontology and epistemology. The entailing conclusions, open the door to a revival of the discipline and the importance of its studies, as the science of the constitutive elements of knowledge of a non-empirical nature. (shrink)

C.D. Broad pointed out that philosophy in the Twentieth Century radically reduced its scope by contracting the methods it deployed. While traditionally philosophers had used analysis, synopsis and synthesis to reveal and overcome the inconsistencies of culture, critical philosophers reduced the role accorded to synopsis and eliminated any role for synthesis. This, it is argued, was a disastrous wrong turn that has led philosophers to embrace scientism, equated with naturalism, which has marginalized and reduced to irrelevance not only most of (...) philosophy, but most of the humanities. Showing how such philosophy evolved from one branch of neo-Kantian philosophy, it is argued there was no reason to constrict philosophy in this way. An alternative, more fruitful but largely misrepresented and submerged tradition of philosophical naturalism deriving from Kant is identified, a tradition which can best be characterized as “speculative naturalism”. This tradition, unlike the tradition of analytic philosophy, has made major contributions to science, and is allying science and the humanities. As Michail Epstein pointed out, while the practical outcome of natural science is technology, the practical outcome of the humanities is the transformation of culture, and ourselves. It is central to the creation of the future. Philosophy associated with speculative naturalism promises to play a major role in the transformation of culture required to overcome the current global ecological crisis. It could provide the foundation for a new “ecological civilization”. (shrink)

Concept Progress is a fusion of science fiction and philosophy. It is a thesis on metaphysics that stretches beyond the scope of modern science and scratches many of our curious itches. The thesis is complemented by short and loosely tied sci-fi stories that make its conceptualizations come to life. ​ The central theme throughout is that progress is a driving force in human evolution. This recurring viewpoint has previously stirred much debate. However, as we escalate through the twenty-first century, the (...) evidence is plentiful. Concept Progress offers a fresh perspective into the topic, citing humanity's ongoing accomplishments as a convincing piece of that evidence. In the book, we celebrate ourselves for our achievements, challenge our perceived limits, and conclude that progress will eventually produce the most evolved life form. In so doing, we look back to the beginning of time and circle forward to a time that is farther away than the current age of the universe. ​ While the tone of the book's body resembles that of a philosophical prose, with each chapter, the reader realizes more and more that the narrative is actually one of science fiction. The intent of the book's structure and approach is manifold. ​ First, it is safe to say that any literature that points to the future is already, by definition, a work of fiction—no matter how serious it tries to sound. Imagining future technologies, foreseeing the next stages of human evolution, and exploring the realm of the highest dimension surely makes it a science fiction. ​ Second, the book is a collection of concepts—abstract notions of the mind that reflect our grasp on certain aspects of reality. It is also a play on those concepts, exposing how our progressive understanding of these notions can gradually be transcended. Each chapter starts with a sketch of a particular concept whose humanistic yet quantum mechanical context lets us identify with it and be mystified by it. From the concepts of sound and light to the concepts of consciousness and coexistence, each concept tale depicts a personal expression of our mutual worldview. ​ Third, each one of the ten chapters concludes with a science fiction story. These stories project the theme further and subtly point to each other. As we connect the dots from one story to another, the outline reveals a world that makes us wonder whether we are headed toward its future or whether we will bypass it as an alternate universe. In one story, we meet the inventor of mind-reading technology while in another story, we meet an artificial life form that will be made possible by this technology. Yet another story is about the time-traveling mind of an astrophysicist whose life's work has impacts on whole timelines, as revealed by a different story. In the end, it all comes together with the final piece of the puzzle completing not only the short story series, but also the novel as a whole. ​ Each three-part chapter is a triad with a distinct purpose in mind. We begin the journey with our own curiosity. This basic emotion allows us to open the door to that which we are so curiously seeking. Essentially, that covers everything. In questioning the entirety of existence, we commence with the premise that it is the element of life that sends us on a quest for meaning. So we review the trend of life's evolution on Earth from its roots to the present day and follow this trend into the distant future. The process of evolutionary development leads us to a recipe for one's own personal progress, which is comprised of physical, mental, and spiritual ingredients. It soon becomes clear that a species can change only insofar as its individual members embrace this change. And we realize that our choice in the matter has impacts not only on our own future, but also on the future of everyone who shares our timeline. ​ In some ways, Concept Progress is a modern reflection of Charles Darwin's revolutionary theory of evolution. In other ways, it is an encouraging observation of our humble human existence. As we widen the time scale and follow this evolutionary trend from biological, social, and cosmic angles, the concepts of evolution and progress slowly but surely become synonymous. (shrink)

The Author proposes to describe the possible foundations of a Trinitarian theism that may be a philosophically adequate translation of the Johannine declaration: “God is love”, introduced by some contemporary thinkers as a key to resolving some aporias within classic theism. This is done by way of analysis of Trinitarian ontology and relational ontology, for which there is an attempt to provide a shareable phenomenological basis. The paper then goes on to questions of epistemology (hyperphatic theology) linked to the ability (...) of human reason and human language to express the categories introduced in this analysis, categories that are nothing else but a renewed philosophical appreciation of the terminology proper to Trinitarian speculation. (shrink)

This paper argues for a particular view about in what metaphysical equivalence consists: namely, that any two metaphysical theories are metaphysically equivalent if and only if those theories are strongly hyperintensionally equivalent. It is consistent with this characterisation that said theories are weakly hyperintensionally distinct, thus affording us the resources to model the content of propositional attitudes directed towards metaphysically equivalent theories in such a way that non-ideal agents can bear different propositional attitudes towards metaphysically equivalent theories.

Descartes développe, dans ses Principes de la Philosophie, les principes fondateurs de son système construit sur l’identification de la matière à l’espace. L’analyse de ses principes nous invite à repenser le rôle de la métaphysique dans la constitution de la science et permet aussi de comprendre comment les concepts de matière, substance, espace, étendue géométrique, mouvement, infini et vide sont devenus les questions centrales de la science du XVIIe siècle.

Multiplicity of Beings according to Saint Thomas Aquinas is a book that aimed to find an explanation of beings' diversity on the grounds of the metaphysical intrinsic principles of beings identified by Aristótle. Are matter and form causes of identity, individuation and diversity of substances? Aquinas answers this question by means of some demonstrations grounded on the very nature of matter and form, in the line of the doctrines contained in book 7 of the Aristotle's Metaphysics.

This volume covers a great range of topics within general metaphysics, featuring contributions by experts in the respective areas. The information contained is suitable for introductory as well as research purposes. The book equally targets laymen, students, and experts in their own right. Subjects range from the history of metaphysics, properties, objects, modality, structure, truth, etc. to methodological concerns of metaphysics.

A lot of words investigated by philosophers get their inception for conventional or extra-philosophical dialect. Yet the idea of substance is basically a philosophical term of art. Its employments in normal dialect tend to derive, often in a twisted way, different from its philosophical usage. Despite this, the idea of substance differs from philosophers, reliant upon the school of thought in which it is been expressed. There is an ordinary concept in play when philosophers discuss “substance”, and this is seen (...) in the concept of object, or thing when this is contrasted with properties, attributes or events. There is also a difference in view when in the sense that while the realists would develop a materialistic theory of substance, the idealist would develop a metaphysical theory of substance. The problem surrounding substance spans through the history of philosophy. The queries have often been what is substance of? And can there be substance without its attributes? This paper tends to expose the historical problems surrounding substance. This paper criticizes the thinking which presupposes that there could be a substance without its attributes or substance existing alone. This paper adopts complimentary ontology principles which state that for anything to exist, it must serve as a missing connection to reality. This suggests that everything interconnects to each other and substance cannot exist in isolation. (shrink)

In the Transcendental Dialectic (KrV, A 599-560/B 627-628), Kant presents the argument of the hundred talers as a concrete example of his general claim against conceiving existence as a real predicate. According to Kant, the content of concepts can be completely determined as merely possible content; in the existential judgment, the subject then relates the completely determined content of his internal thoughts with perception: it is only through perception that the subject knows the content of his concepts as real things (...) of the world. Thus, although in his epistemology conceptual activity plays a crucial role in perceptual activity, Kant still offers an empiricist account of empirical knowledge. Hegel criticizes Kant´s theory of perception by distinguishing representation (Vorstellen) from comprehension (Begreifen) and by developing on that basis a more complex theory of the relation between concept, existence, and empirical knowledge. From the standpoint of representation, concept and existence, being-determined and being-real exclude each other; in comprehension, on the contrary, representation and perception are no longer unilateral forms of knowing: for the mind that comprehends what it perceives, the existence of what it perceives is –when abstractly considered as such– only a collateral product of the way it knows the real world. According to Hegel, comprehension develops the internal necessity of the contents of knowledge and, by doing so, grasps the individual objects that constitute our world. (shrink)

Kant claims that existence is not a real predicate that can be added to the concept of a thing, but that it is the mere positing of the thing. Kant considers this thesis to be evident for itself and therefore thinks that its rejection is the result of an " over-subtle argumentation ". In this paper I will show that the claim that existence is the positing of the content of mental concepts, far from being evident, rests on numerous philosophical (...) presuppositions. In this regard, I will defend the claim that the thought experiment of the nothingness of the existing world is what leads Kant to conceive existence as absolute positing. Furthermore, I will try to show that it is possible to accept the claim that existence is not a real predicate, without having to accept at the same time that it is the positing of the concept. With this purpose in view, I will focus specifically on Hegel´s claim that, in the general frame of a radically antiempiricist and coherentist epistemology, being resolves and dissolves into the determinate concept of the objects of knowledge. (shrink)

Title in English translation: Metametaphysics - with and without Categories. A comment paper on An Introduction to Metametaphysics by Tuomas Tahko. Ehdotan artikkelissa uutta olevan ja sen muodon välistä erottelua. Erottelun avulla voidaan antaa täsmällinen käsitys ontologisen kategorian käsitteestä ja metafysiikan tutkimuskohteesta. Argumentoin myös, että metafysiikan epistemologiaa ja semantiikkaa sekä metafyysistä selitttämistä pitää lähestyä kategorianäkökulmasta. Artikkeli on kommentti Tuomas Tahkon oppikirjaan An Introduction to Metametaphysics.