Knowledge, Hope, and Fallibilism

Synthese:1-17 (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Hope, in its propositional construction "I hope that p," is compatible with a stated chance for the speaker that not-p. On fallibilist construals of knowledge, knowledge is compatible with a chance of being wrong, such that one can know that p even though there is an epistemic chance for one that not-p. But self-ascriptions of propositional hope that p seem to be incompatible, in some sense, with self-ascriptions of knowing whether p. Data from conjoining hope self-ascription with outright assertions, with first- and third-person knowledge ascriptions, and with factive predicates suggest a problem: when combined with a plausible principle on the rationality of hope, they suggest that fallibilism is false. By contrast, the infallibilist about knowledge can straightforwardly explain why knowledge would be incompatible with hope, and can offer a simple and unified explanation of all the linguistic data introduced here. This suggests that fallibilists bear an explanatory burden which has been hitherto overlooked.
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First archival date: 2018-04-09
Latest version: 2 (2018-04-09)
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.
Norms of Assertion.Lackey, Jennifer
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

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