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  1. IS ONTOLOGY MAKING US STUPID?Terence Blake - manuscript
    I begin by “deconstructing” the title and explaining that Feyerabend does not really use the word “ontology”, though he does call his position sometimes (and the “sometimes” is important) ontological realism. I explain that he talks about his position as indifferently a “general methodology” or a “general cosmology”, and that he seems to be be hostile to the very enterprise of ontology, conceived of as “school philosophy”. I then go on to say that there is perhaps a concept of a (...)
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  2. Frankenstein, o los traumas de la ciencia.Aida Míguez Barciela - manuscript
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  3. A Defense of Explanationism against Recent Objections.Tomas Bogardus & Will Perrin - forthcoming - Episteme:1-12.
    In the recent literature on the nature of knowledge, a rivalry has emerged between modalism and explanationism. According to modalism, knowledge requires that our beliefs track the truth across some appropriate set of possible worlds. Modalists tend to focus on two modal conditions: sensitivity and safety. According to explanationism, knowledge requires only that beliefs bear the right sort of explanatory relation to the truth. In slogan form: knowledge is believing something because it’s true. In this paper, we aim to vindicate (...)
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  4. Representation and Misrepresentation of Knowledge.Mikkel Gerken - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
    I argue for three points: First, evidence of the primacy of knowledge representation is not evidence of primacy of knowledge. Second, knowledge-oriented mindreading research should also focus on misrepresentations and biased representations of knowledge. Third, knowledge-oriented mindreading research must confront the problem of the gold standard that arises when disagreement about knowledge complicates the interpretation of empirical findings.
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  5. Proof That Knowledge Entails Truth.Brent G. Kyle - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    Despite recent controversies surrounding the principle that knowledge entails truth (KT), this paper aims to prove that the principle is true. It offers a proof of (KT) in the following sense. It advances a deductively valid argument for (KT), whose premises are, by most lights, obviously true. Moreover, each premise is buttressed by at least two supporting arguments. And finally, all premises and supporting arguments can be rationally accepted by people who don’t already accept (KT).
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  6. Knowledge and Action: What Depends on What?Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.
    Some philosophers think that knowledge or justification is both necessary and sufficient for rational action: they endorse knowledge-action or justification-action biconditionals. This paper offers a novel, metaphysical challenge to these biconditionals, which proceeds with a familiar question: What depends on what? If you know that p iff it is rational for you to act on p, do you know that p partly because it is rational for you to act on p, or is it rational for you to act on (...)
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  7. The Epistemology of Interpersonal Relations.Matthew A. Benton - 2024 - Noûs:1-20.
    What is it to know someone? Epistemologists rarely take up this question, though recent developments make such inquiry possible and desirable. This paper advances an account of how such interpersonal knowledge goes beyond mere propositional and qualitative knowledge about someone, giving a central place to second-personal treatment. It examines what such knowledge requires, and what makes it distinctive within epistemology as well as socially. It assesses its theoretic value for several issues in moral psychology, epistemic injustice, and philosophy of mind. (...)
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  8. An Explanationist Defense of Proper Functionalism.Kenneth Boyce & Andrew Moon - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In this chapter, we defend an explanationist version of proper functionalism. After explaining proper functionalism’s initial appeal, we note two major objections to proper functionalism: creatures with no design plan who appear to have knowledge (Swampman) and creatures with malfunctions that increase reliability. We then note how proper functionalism needs to be clarified because there are cases of what we call warrant-compatible malfunction. We then formulate our own view: explanationist proper functionalism, which explains the warrant-compatible malfunction cases and helps to (...)
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  9. Entitlement, Leaching and Counter-Closure.Federico Luzzi - 2023 - In Rodrigo Borges & Ian Schnee (eds.), Illuminating Errors: New Essays on Knowledge from Non-Knowledge. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 231-256.
    Crispin Wright has articulated and defended the view that by incorporating non-evidential entitlements into our theory of knowledge, we can achieve a satisfactory reply to key skeptical challenges. Crucial to this view is the thesis that regions of thought are underpinned by ‘cornerstone’ propositions— propositions for which warrant is antecedently required in order for ordinary beliefs in that region to be supported by experiential evidence. Critics have noted that because cornerstone propositions are entailed by ordinary propositions, Closure delivers two unwelcome (...)
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  10. Etiological Proper Function and the Safety Condition.Dario Mortini - 2023 - Synthese 202 (6):1-22.
    In this paper, I develop and motivate a novel formulation of the safety condition in terms of etiological proper function. After testing this condition against the most pressing objections to safety-theoretic accounts of knowledge in the literature, my conclusion will be the following: once safety is suitably understood in terms of etiological proper function, it stands a better chance as the right anti-Gettier condition on knowledge.
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  11. The Unobserved Anatomy: Negotiating the Plausibility of AI-Based Reconstructions of Missing Brain Structures in Clinical MRI Scans.Paula Muhr - 2023 - In Antje Flüchter, Birte Förster, Britta Hochkirchen & Silke Schwandt (eds.), Plausibilisierung und Evidenz: Dynamiken und Praktiken von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart. Bielefeld University Press. pp. 169-192.
    Vast archives of fragmentary structural brain scans that are routinely acquired in medical clinics for diagnostic purposes have so far been considered to be unusable for neuroscientific research. Yet, recent studies have proposed that by deploying machine learning algorithms to fill in the missing anatomy, clinical scans could, in future, be used by researchers to gain new insights into various brain disorders. This chapter focuses on a study published in2019, whose authors developed a novel unsupervised machine learning algorithm for synthesising (...)
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  12. Justified Faith without Reasons?: A Comparison between Søren Kierkegaard’s and Alvin Plantinga’s Epistemologies.Valentin Teodorescu - 2023 - Frankfurt am Main: De Gruyter.
    This study intends to show that the question whether faith can be justified without proofs can be resolved by importing ideas from Kierkegaard’s and Plantinga’s affirmative take on the matter. There is a deep similarity between the way they understand belief in God and belief in Christianity: for both the first is considered universal human knowledge and the second seen as a gift from God. Against the charge that such an understanding is irrational Plantinga offers an externalist epistemological model which (...)
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  13. Addressing two recent challenges to the factive account of knowledge.Esther Goh & Frederick Choo - 2022 - Synthese 200 (435):1-14.
    It is widely thought that knowledge is factive – only truths can be known. However, this view has been recently challenged. One challenge appeals to approximate truths. Wesley Buckwalter and John Turri argue that false-but-approximately-true propositions can be known. They provide experimental findings to show that their view enjoys intuitive support. In addition, they argue that we should reject the factive account of knowledge to avoid widespread skepticism. A second challenge, advanced by Nenad Popovic, appeals to multidimensional geometry to build (...)
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  14. Are There Any Epistemic Consequentialists?Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):220-230.
    Selim Berker argues that epistemic consequentialism is pervasive in epistemology and that epistemic consequentialism is structurally flawed. is incorrect, however. I distinguish between epistemic consequentialism and epistemic instrumentalism and argue that most putative consequentialists should be considered instrumentalists. I also identify the structural problem of epistemic consequentialism Berker attempts to pinpoint and show that epistemic instrumentalism does not have the consequentialist problem.
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  15. Institutional Review Boards and Public Justification.Anantharaman Muralidharan & G. Owen Schaefer - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 26 (3):405-423.
    Ethics committees like Institutional Review Boards and Research Ethics Committees are typically empowered to approve or reject proposed studies, typically conditional on certain conditions or revisions being met. While some have argued this power should be primarily a function of applying clear, codified requirements, most institutions and legal regimes allow discretion for IRBs to ethically evaluate studies, such as to ensure a favourable risk-benefit ratio, fair subject selection, adequate informed consent, and so forth. As a result, ethics committees typically make (...)
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  16. No Justification for Smith’s Incidentally True Beliefs.Alfred Schramm - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (2):273–292.
    Edmund Gettier (1963) argued that there can be justified true belief (JTB) that is not knowledge. I question the correctness of his argument by showing that Smith of Gettier’s famous examples does not earn justification for his incidentally true beliefs, while a doxastically more conscientious person S would come to hold justified but false beliefs. So, Gettier’s (and analogous) cases do not result in justified _and_ true belief. This is due to a tension between deductive closure of justification and evidential (...)
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  17. A Peculiar and Perpetual Tendency: An Asymmetry in Knowledge Attributions for Affirmations and Negations.John Turri - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1795-1808.
    From antiquity through the twentieth century, philosophers have hypothesized that, intuitively, it is harder to know negations than to know affirmations. This paper provides direct evidence for that hypothesis. In a series of studies, I found that people naturally view negations as harder to know than affirmations. Participants read simple scenarios and made judgments about truth, probability, belief, and knowledge. Participants were more likely to attribute knowledge of an outcome when framed affirmatively than when framed negatively. Participants did this even (...)
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  18. Knowledge, Hope, and Fallibilism.Matthew A. Benton - 2021 - Synthese 198:1673-1689.
    Hope, in its propositional construction "I hope that p," is compatible with a stated chance for the speaker that not-p. On fallibilist construals of knowledge, knowledge is compatible with a chance of being wrong, such that one can know that p even though there is an epistemic chance for one that not-p. But self-ascriptions of propositional hope that p seem to be incompatible, in some sense, with self-ascriptions of knowing whether p. Data from conjoining hope self-ascription with outright assertions, with (...)
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  19. Hope, Worry, and Suspension of Judgment.James Fritz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (8):573-587.
    In this paper, I defend an epistemic requirement on fitting hopes and worries: it is fitting to hope or to worry that p only if one’s epistemic position makes it rational to suspend judgment as to whether p. This view, unlike prominent alternatives, is ecumenical; it retains its plausibility against a variety of different background views of epistemology. It also has other important theoretical virtues: it is illuminating, elegant, and extensionally adequate. Fallibilists about knowledge have special reason to be friendly (...)
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  20. Knowledge from Knowledge.Rodrigo Borges - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (3):283 - 297.
    This paper argues that a necessary condition on inferential knowledge is that one knows all the propositions that knowledge depends on. That is, I will argue in support of a principle I call the Knowledge from Knowledge principle: (KFK) S knows that p via inference or reasoning only if S knows all the propositions on which p depends. KFK meshes well with the natural idea that (at least with respect to deductively valid or induc- tively strong arguments) the epistemic status (...)
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  21. Reliable Knowledge: A Reply to Turri.Jonathan Dixon - 2020 - Dialectica 74 (3):495-509.
    Recently John Turri (2015b) has argued, contra the orthodoxy amongst epistemologists, that reliability is not a necessary condition for knowledge. From this result, Turri (2015a, 2017, 2016a, 2019) defends a new account of knowledge - called abilism - that allows for unreliable knowledge. I argue that Turri's arguments fail to establish that unreliable knowledge is possible and argue that Turri's account of knowledge is false because reliability must be a necessary condition for knowledge.
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  22. Intellectual Humility and the Curse of Knowledge.Michael Hannon - 2020 - In Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. London, UK: Routledge.
    This chapter explores an unappreciated psychological dimension of intellectual humility. In particular, I argue there is a plausible connection between intellectual humility and epistemic egocentrism. Epistemic egocentrism is a well-known cognitive bias – often called ‘the curse of knowledge’ – whereby an agent attributes his or her own mental states to other people. I hypothesize that an individual who exhibits this bias is more likely to possess a variety of traits that are characteristic of intellectual humility. This is surprising because (...)
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  23. Common Sense and Ordinary Language: Wittgenstein and Austin.Krista Lawlor - 2020 - In Rik Peels & René van Woudenberg (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
    What role does ‘ordinary language philosophy’ play in the defense of common sense beliefs? J.L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein each give central place to ordinary language in their responses to skeptical challenges to common sense beliefs. But Austin and Wittgenstein do not always respond to such challenges in the same way, and their working methods are different. In this paper, I compare Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical positions, and show that they share many metaphilosophical commitments. I then examine Austin and Wittgenstein’s (...)
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  24. Knowledge and reasonableness.Krista Lawlor - 2020 - Synthese 199:1435-1451.
    The notion of relevance plays a role in many accounts of knowledge and knowledge ascription. Although use of the notion is well-motivated, theorists struggle to codify relevance. A reasonable person standard of relevance addresses this codification problem, and provides an objective and flexible standard of relevance; however, treating relevance as reasonableness seems to allow practical factors to determine whether one has knowledge or not—so-called “pragmatic encroachment.” I argue that a fuller understanding of reasonableness and of the role of practical factors (...)
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  25. Language and its commonsense: Where formal semantics went wrong, and where it can (and should) go.Walid Saba - 2020 - Journal of Knowledge Structures and Systems 1 (1):40-62.
    Abstract The purpose of this paper is twofold: (i) we will argue that formal semantics might have faltered due to its failure in distinguishing between two fundamentally very different types of concepts, namely ontological concepts, that should be types in a strongly-typed ontology, and logical concepts, that are predicates corresponding to properties of, and relations between, objects of various ontological types; and (ii) we show that accounting for these differences amounts to a new formal semantics; one that integrates lexical and (...)
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  26. Introduction to Positivism and the External Real World and Positivism and Realism.Michael Shaffer - 2020 - In Michael J. Shaffer (ed.), Positivism and the External Real World and Positivism and Realism.
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  27. Non‐epistemic perception as technology.Kurt Sylvan - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):324-345.
    Some epistemologists and philosophers of mind hold that the non-epistemic perceptual relation of which feature-seeing and object-seeing are special cases is the foundation of perceptual knowledge. This paper argues that such relations are best understood as having only a technological role in explaining perceptual knowledge. After introducing the opposing view in §1, §2 considers why its defenders deny that some cases in which one has perceptual knowledge without the relevant acquaintance relations are counterexamples, detailing their case for lurking inferential epistemology. (...)
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  28. Truth, fallibility, and justification: new studies in the norms of assertion.John Turri - 2020 - Synthese (9):1-12.
    This paper advances our understanding of the norms of assertion in two ways. First, I evaluate recent studies claiming to discredit an important earlier finding which supports the hypothesis that assertion has a factive norm. In particular, I evaluate whether it was due to stimuli mentioning that a speaker’s evidence was fallible. Second, I evaluate the hypothesis that assertion has a truth-insensitive standard of justification. In particular, I evaluate the claim that switching an assertion from true to false, while holding (...)
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  29. Young Schoolchildren’s Epistemic Development: A Longitudinal Qualitative Study.Michael Weinstock, Vardit Israel, Hadas Fisher Cohen, Iris Tabak & Yifat Harari - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    How children seek knowledge and evaluate claims may depend on their understanding of the source of knowledge. What shifts in their understandings about why scientists might disagree and how claims about the state of the world are justified? Until about the age of 41/2, knowledge is seen as self-evident. Children believe that knowledge of reality comes directly through our senses and what others tell us. They appeal to these external sources in order to know. The attainment of Theory of Mind (...)
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  30. Knowledge requires belief – and it doesn’t? On belief as such and belief necessary for knowledge.Peter Baumann - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):151-167.
    ABSTRACTDoes knowledge entail belief? This paper argues that the answer depends on how one interprets ‘belief’. There are two different notions of belief: belief as such and belief for knowledge. They often differ in their degrees of conviction such that one but not both might be present in a particular case. The core of the paper is dedicated to a defense of this overlooked distinction. The beginning of the paper presents the distinction. It then presents two cases which are supposed (...)
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  31. Noncognitivism and Epistemic Evaluations.Bob Beddor - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    This paper develops a new challenge for moral noncognitivism. In brief, the challenge is this: Beliefs — both moral and non-moral — are epistemically evaluable, whereas desires are not. It is tempting to explain this difference in terms of differences in the functional roles of beliefs and desires. However, this explanation stands in tension with noncognitivism, which maintains that moral beliefs have a desire-like functional role. After critically reviewing some initial responses to the challenge, I suggest a solution, which involves (...)
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  32. Epistemological Aspects of Hope.Matthew A. Benton - 2019 - In Claudia Blöser & Titus Stahl (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Hope: An Introduction (The Moral Psychology of the Emotions). Rowman & Littlefield International. pp. 135-151.
    Hope is an attitude with a distinctive epistemological dimension: it is incompatible with knowledge. This chapter examines hope as it relates to knowledge but also to probability and inductive considerations. Such epistemic constraints can make hope either impossible, or, when hope remains possible, they affect how one’s epistemic situation can make hope rational rather than irrational. Such issues are especially relevant to when hopefulness may permissibly figure in practical deliberation over a course of action. So I consider cases of second-order (...)
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  33. Varieties of Cognitive Integration.J. Adam Carter & Jesper Kallestrup - 2019 - Noûs (4):867-890.
    Extended cognition theorists argue that cognitive processes constitutively depend on resources that are neither organically composed, nor located inside the bodily boundaries of the agent, provided certain conditions on the integration of those processes into the agent’s cognitive architecture are met. Epistemologists, however, worry that in so far as such cognitively integrated processes are epistemically relevant, agents could thus come to enjoy an untoward explosion of knowledge. This paper develops and defends an approach to cognitive integration—cluster-model functionalism—which finds application in (...)
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  34. Conspiracy theories on the basis of the evidence.M. R. X. Dentith - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2243-2261.
    Conspiracy theories are often portrayed as unwarranted beliefs, typically supported by suspicious kinds of evidence. Yet contemporary work in Philosophy argues provisional belief in conspiracy theories is—at the very—least understandable (because conspiracies occur) and if we take an evidential approach—judging individual conspiracy theories on their particular merits—belief in such theories turns out to be warranted in a range of cases. Drawing on this work, I examine the kinds of evidence typically associated with conspiracy theories, showing that the evidential problems typically (...)
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  35. Against the iterated knowledge account of high-stakes cases.Jie Gao - 2019 - Episteme 16 (1):92-107.
    One challenge for moderate invariantists is to explain why we tend to deny knowledge to subjects in high stakes when the target propositions seem to be inappropriate premises for practical reasoning. According to an account suggested by Williamson, our intuitive judgments are erroneous due to an alleged failure to acknowledge the distinction between first-order and higher-order knowledge: the high-stakes subject lacks the latter but possesses the former. In this paper, I provide three objections to Williamson’s account: i) his account delivers (...)
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  36. A Corpus Study of "Know": On the Verification of Philosophers' Frequency Claims about Language.Nat Hansen, J. D. Porter & Kathryn Francis - 2019 - Episteme 18 (2):242-268.
    We investigate claims about the frequency of "know" made by philosophers. Our investigation has several overlapping aims. First, we aim to show what is required to confirm or disconfirm philosophers’ claims about the comparative frequency of different uses of philosophically interesting expressions. Second, we aim to show how using linguistic corpora as tools for investigating meaning is a productive methodology, in the sense that it yields discoveries about the use of language that philosophers would have overlooked if they remained in (...)
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  37. Hierarchical Inconsistencies: A Critical Assessment of Justification.Juozas Kasputis - 2019 - Economic Thought 8 (2):1-12.
    The existential insecurity of human beings has induced them to create protective spheres of symbols: myths, religions, values, belief systems, theories, etc. Rationality is one of the key factors contributing to the construction of civilisation in technical and symbolic terms. As Hankiss (2001) has emphasised, protective spheres of symbols may collapse – thus causing a profound social crisis. Social and political transformations had a tremendous impact at the end of the 20th century. As a result, management theories have been revised (...)
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  38. You Can’t Handle the Truth: Knowledge = Epistemic Certainty.Moti Mizrahi - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (2):225-227.
    In this discussion note, I put forth an argument from the factivity of knowledge for the conclusion that knowledge is epistemic certainty. If this argument is sound, then epistemologists who think that knowledge is factive are thereby also committed to the view that knowledge is epistemic certainty.
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  39. Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Internalist Challenge.Kegan Shaw - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4):385-396.
    The paper highlights how a popular version of epistemological disjunctivism labors under a kind of 'internalist challenge'—a challenge that seems to have gone largely unacknowledged by disjunctivists. This is the challenge to vindicate the supposed 'internalist insight' that disjunctivists claim their view does well to protect. The paper argues that if we advance disjunctivism within a context that recognizes a distinction between merely functional and judgmental belief, we get a view that easily overcomes the internalist challenge.
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  40. Endless Incoherence— A Review of Shoemaker's Physical Realization (2009)(review revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 Michael Starks 3rd Edition. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 284-301.
    Over 40 years ago I read a small grey book with metaphysics in the title which began with the words “Metaphysics is dead. Wittgenstein has killed it.” I am one of many who agree but sadly the rest of the world has not gotten the message. Shoemaker’s work is nonsense on stilts but is unusual only in that it never deviates into sense from the first paragraph to the last. At least with Dennett, Carruthers, Churchland etc. one gets a breath (...)
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  41. Knowledge from Falsehood: An Experimental Study.John Turri - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):167-178.
    Philosophers have debated whether it is possible to knowledgeably infer a conclusion from a false premise. For example, if a fan believes that the actress’s dress is blue, but the dress is actually green, can the fan knowledgeably infer “the dress is not red” from “the dress is blue”? One aspect of this debate concerns what the intuitively correct verdict is about specific cases such as this. Here I report a simple behavioral experiment that helps answer this question. The main (...)
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  42. Epistemic Closure in Folk Epistemology.James R. Beebe & Jake Monaghan - 2018 - In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume Two. Oxford University Press. pp. 38-70.
    We report the results of four empirical studies designed to investigate the extent to which an epistemic closure principle for knowledge is reflected in folk epistemology. Previous work by Turri (2015a) suggested that our shared epistemic practices may only include a source-relative closure principle—one that applies to perceptual beliefs but not to inferential beliefs. We argue that the results of our studies provide reason for thinking that individuals are making a performance error when their knowledge attributions and denials conflict with (...)
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  43. Overcoming Intellectualism about Knowledge and Understanding: A Unified Approach.Eros Carvalho - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (1):7-26.
    In this paper I defend a unified approach to knowledge and understanding. Both are achievements due to cognitive abilities or skills. The difference between them is a difference of aspects. Knowledge emphasizes the successful aspect of an achievement and the exclusion of epistemic luck, whereas understanding emphasizes the agent's contribution in bringing about an achievement through the exercise of one's cognitive skills. Knowledge and understanding cannot be separated. I argue against the claim that understanding is distinct from knowledge because the (...)
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  44. Expertise and Conspiracy Theories.M. R. X. Dentith - 2018 - Social Epistemology 32 (3):196-208.
    Judging the warrant of conspiracy theories can be difficult, and often we rely upon what the experts tell us when it comes to assessing whether particular conspiracy theories ought to be believed. However, whereas there are recognised experts in the sciences, I argue that only are is no such associated expertise when it comes to the things we call `conspiracy theories,' but that the conspiracy theorist has good reason to be suspicious of the role of expert endorsements when it comes (...)
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  45. Review of Avner Baz, The Crisis of Method in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy. [REVIEW]Nat Hansen - 2018 - Mind 128 (511):963-970.
    This is the second book by Baz that aims to show that a big chunk of contemporary philosophy is fundamentally misguided. His first book, When Words Are Called For: A Defense of Ordinary Language Philosophy (2012) adopted a therapeutic approach (in the Wittgensteinian style) to problems in contemporary epistemology, arguing that when properly thought through, the way philosophers talk about ‘knowing’ that something is the case ultimately does not make sense. Baz’s goal in his second book is less therapeutic and (...)
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  46. Conocimiento y justificación en la epistemología democrática.Marc Jiménez Rolland - 2018 - In Ana Estanny & Mario Gensollen (eds.), Democracia y conocimiento. Univerisdad Autónoma de Aguascalientes, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, IMAC. pp. 153-182.
    Una de las bifurcaciones en el debate contemporáneo sobre la legitimidad de la democracia explora si ésta ofrece ventajas distintivamente epistémicas frente a otras alternativas políticas. Quienes defienden la tesis de la democracia epistémica afirman que la democracia es instrumentalmente superior o equiparable a otras formas de organización política en lo que concierne a la obtención de varios bienes epistémicos. En este ensayo presento dos (grupos de) argumentos a favor de la democracia epistémica, que se inspiran en resultados formales: el (...)
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  47. Revisiting norms of assertion.John Turri - 2018 - Cognition 177 (C):8-11.
    A principal conclusion supported by convergent evidence from cognitive science, life science, and philosophy is that knowledge is a central norm of assertion—that is, according to the rules of the practice, assertions should express knowledge. That view has recently been challenged with new experiments. This paper identifies a critical confound in the experiments. In the process, a new study is reported that provides additional support for the view that knowledge is a central norm of assertion.
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  48. Vías de aprehensión de lo cognoscible.Paulo Vélez-León - 2018 - In David G. Murray (ed.), Metaphysics 2015. Proceedings of the Sixth World Conference. Madrid: pp. 999-1012.
    El proceso de aprehensión de lo cognoscible, en la filosofía contemporánea, ha sido tratado desde diversas perspectivas, entre ellas la fenomenológica y la analítica. Cada una de estas perspectivas aportan unos presupuestos filosóficos y procesos metodológicos que nos proporcionan marcos de trabajo para indagar en las vías de aprehensión del conocimiento; sin embargo, empleadas por separado son insuficientes y limitadas. En absoluto se trata de procurar un método universal, sino de integrar e indagar sobre diversos presupuestos, procesos, patrones y estructuras (...)
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  49. The Objectivity of Truth, Morality, and Beauty.Steven James Bartlett - 2017 - Willamette University Faculty Research Website.
    Whether truth, morality, and beauty have an objective basis has been a perennial question for philosophy, ethics, and aesthetics, while for a great many relativists and skeptics it poses a problem without a solution. In this essay, the author proposes an innovative approach that shows how cognitive intelligence, moral intelligence, and aesthetic intelligence provide the basis needed for objective judgments about truth, morality, and beauty.
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  50. Assertion, Uniqueness and Epistemic Hypocrisy.J. Adam Carter - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).
    Pascal Engel (2008) has insisted that a number of notable strategies for rejecting the knowledge norm of assertion are put forward on the basis of the wrong kinds of reasons. A central aim of this paper will be to establish the contrast point: I argue that one very familiar strategy for defending the knowledge norm of assertion—viz., that it is claimed to do better in various respects than its competitors (e.g. the justification and the truth norms)— relies on a presupposition (...)
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