Questionable Peers and Spinelessness

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):425-444 (2015)
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Abstract
The Equal Weight View holds that, when we discover we disagree with an epistemic peer, we should give our peer’s judgment as much weight as our own. But how should we respond when we cannot tell whether those who disagree with us are our epistemic peers? I argue for a position I will call the Earn-a-Spine View. According to this view, parties to a disagreement can remain confdent, at least in some situations, by fnding justifable reasons to think their opponents are less credible than themselves, even if those reasons are justifable only because they lack information about their opponents.
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Archival date: 2017-09-12
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