What Types Should Not Be

Philosophia Mathematica 28 (1):60-76 (2020)
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Abstract

In a series of papers Ladyman and Presnell raise an interesting challenge of providing a pre-mathematical justification for homotopy type theory. In response, they propose what they claim to be an informal semantics for homotopy type theory where types and terms are regarded as mathematical concepts. The aim of this paper is to raise some issues which need to be resolved for the successful development of their types-as-concepts interpretation.

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Bruno Bentzen
Zhejiang University

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