External World Skepticism, Confidence and Psychologism about the Problem of Priors

Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):324-346 (2019)
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In this paper I will draw attention to an important route to external world skepticism, which I will call confidence skepticism. I will argue that we can defang confidence skepticism (though not a meeker ‘argument from might’ which has got some attention in the 20th century literature on external world skepticism) by adopting a partially psychologistic answer to the problem of priors. And I will argue that certain recent work in the epistemology of mathematics and logic provides independent support for such psychologism.

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Sharon Berry
Indiana University, Bloomington


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