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  1. added 2019-01-03
    The Problem of the Criterion and Hegel's Model for Epistemic Infinitism.Scott F. Aikin - 2010 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (4).
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  2. added 2018-12-19
    On the Nature of Hinge Commitments.Eros Carvalho - manuscript
    This is a critical commentary on Pritchard's book Epistemic Angst. In Section 2, I present the closure-based radical skeptical paradox. Then in Section 3, I sketch Pritchard’s undercutting response to this paradox. Finally, in Section 4, I put forward two concerns about Pritchard’s response and I also propose a reading of hinge commitments, the ability reading, that might put some pressure on Pritchard’s own reading of these commitments.
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  3. added 2018-06-12
    A New Epistemic Argument for Idealism.Robert Smithson - 2018 - In Tyron Goldschmidt & Kenneth Pearce (eds.), Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 17-33.
    Many idealists have thought that realism raises epistemological problems. The worry is that, if it is possible for truths about ordinary objects to outstrip our experiences in the ways that realists typically suppose, we could never be justified in our beliefs about objects. Few contemporary theorists find this argument convincing; philosophers have offered a variety of responses to defend the epistemology of our object judgments under the assumption of realism. But in this paper, I offer a new type of epistemic (...)
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  4. added 2018-06-03
    Entitlement, Epistemic Risk and Scepticism.Luca Moretti - manuscript
    Crispin Wright maintains that we can acquire justification for our perceptual beliefs only if we have antecedent justification for ruling out any sceptical alternative. Wright contends that this fact doesn’t elicit scepticism, for we are non-evidentially entitled to accept the negation of any sceptical alternative. Sebastiano Moruzzi has challenged Wright’s contention by arguing that since our non-evidential entitlements don’t remove the epistemic risk of our perceptual beliefs, they don’t actually enable us to acquire justification for these beliefs. In this paper (...)
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  5. added 2018-06-03
    Disjuntivismo epistemológico e ceticismo radical - uma proposta anticética conciliatória.Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos - 2017 - Dissertation,
    This work aims to present and discuss recent developments in epistemology that seek for satisfactory formulations and responses to the problem of radical skepticism. Its main goal is to understand how the skeptical problem can be properly characterized, how it can be viewed as inserted in the traditional dispute in epistemology between externalism and internalism, and to which extent antiskeptical theories are situated within this dispute. After identifying their place in the dispute, another antiskeptical proposal is discussed, one that suggests (...)
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  6. added 2018-03-02
    The Impossibility of Local Skepticism.Stephen Maitzen - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (4):453-464.
    According to global skepticism, we know nothing. According to local skepticism, we know nothing in some particular area or domain of discourse. Unlike their global counterparts, local skeptics think they can contain our invincible ignorance within limited bounds. I argue that they are mistaken. Local skepticism, particularly the kinds that most often get defended, cannot stay local: if there are domains whose truths we cannot know, then there must be claims outside those domains that we cannot know even if they (...)
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  7. added 2018-03-02
    Humen pyrrhonismin kielto.Jani Hakkarainen - 2004 - In Heta Gylling, S. Albert Kivinen & Risto Vilkko (eds.), Kielto. Helsinki: Helsinki University Press. pp. 29-35.
    Title in English: Hume's Denial of Pyrrhonism.
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  8. added 2018-03-02
    Skepticism and Epistemic Agency.Jill Claudia Rusin - 2002 - Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University
    Epistemic contextualists like David Lewis allow that we have substantially infallibilist reflective intuitions about knowledge even though our everyday talk accepts fallibilist attributions of knowledge. They give serious weight to both our everyday talk and our propensity to assent to the skeptic's conclusions, and give us a concept of knowledge that accommodates both. The skeptic would, of course, leverage such infallibilist intuitions in order to undermine the legitimacy of our everyday attributions. Most contemporary epistemologists would simply argue that our concept (...)
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  9. added 2018-02-13
    Neutralism and Conceptual Engineering.Patrick Greenough - forthcoming - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Conceptual Engineering alleges that philosophical problems are best treated via revising or replacing our concepts (or words). The goal here is not to defend Conceptual Engineering but rather show that it can (and should) invoke Neutralism—the broad view that philosophical progress can take place when (and sometimes only when) a thoroughly neutral, non-specific theory, treatment, or methodology is adopted. A neutralist treatment of one form of skepticism is used as a case study and is compared with various non-neutral rivals. Along (...)
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  10. added 2017-07-05
    Reliabilism and Demon World Victims.Jennifer Wilson Mulnix - 2013 - Tópicos 44:35-82.
    This paper defends reliabilism against the classic demon world victim thought experiment. In doing so, I underscore two of its key alleged intuitions. I then articulate a host of varied responses open to the reliabilist, arguing that these readily available responses provide the reliabilist with a way to either accommodate or reject these initial intuitions about the demon world victim thought experiment, and in a way consistent with reliabilism. Thus, I conclude that the demon world thought experiment does not undercut (...)
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  11. added 2017-05-24
    Inferential Seemings and the Problem of Reflective Awareness.Luca Moretti - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-19.
    Phenomenal conservatism (PC) is the internalist view that non-inferential justification rests on appearances. PC’s advocates have recently argued that seemings are also required to explain inferential justification. The most general and developed view to this effect is Huemer (2016)’s theory of inferential seemings (ToIS). Moretti (2018) has shown that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness, which makes PC open to sceptical challenges. In this paper I argue that ToIS is afflicted by a version of the same problem (...)
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  12. added 2017-05-22
    What to Believe About Your Belief That You're in the Good Case.Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
    Going about our daily lives in an orderly manner requires us, once we are aware of them, to dismiss many metaphysical possibilities. We take it for granted that we are not brains in vats, or living in the Matrix, or in an extended dream. Call these things that we take for granted “anti-skeptical assumptions”. What should a reflective agent who believes these things think of these beliefs? For various reasons, it can seem that we do not have evidence for such (...)
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  13. added 2017-02-09
    Reassessing the Case Against Evidential Externalism.Giada Fratantonio & Aidan McGlynn - forthcoming - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    This paper reassesses the case against Evidential Externalism, the thesis that one's evidence fails to supervene on one's non-factive mental states, focusing on two objections to Externalism due by Nicholas Silins: the armchair access argument and the supervenience argument. It also examines Silins's attempt to undermine the force of one major source of motivation for Externalism, namely that the rival Internalist picture of evidence is implicated in some central arguments for scepticism. While Silins concludes that the case against Evidential Externalism (...)
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  14. added 2017-02-06
    A Dilemma for Skeptics.Stephen Maitzen - 2010 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):23-34.
    Some of the most enduring skeptical arguments invoke stories of deception -- the evil demon, convincing dreams, an envatted brain, the Matrix -- in order to show that we have no first-order knowledge of the external world. I confront such arguments with a dilemma: either (1) they establish no more than the logical possibility of error, in which case they fail to threaten fallible knowledge, the only kind of knowledge of the external world most of us think we have anyway; (...)
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  15. added 2017-01-13
    Another Failed Refutation of Scepticism.Tom Stoneham & Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):19-30.
    Jessica Wilson has recently offered a more sophisticated version of the self-defeat objection to Cartesian scepicism. She argues that the assertion of Cartesian scepticism results in an unstable vicious regress. The way out of the regress is to not engage with the Cartesian sceptic at all, to stop the regress before it starts, at the warranted assertion that the external world exists. We offer three reasons why this objection fails: first, the sceptic need not accept Wilson’s characterization of the sceptical (...)
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  16. added 2017-01-08
    Limiting Skepticism.Vincent F. Hendricks & John Symons - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (2):211–224.
    Skeptics argue that the acquisition of knowledge is impossible given the standing possibility of error. We present the limiting convergence strategy for responding to skepticism and discuss the relationship between conceivable error and an agent’s knowledge in the limit. We argue that the skeptic must demonstrate that agents are operating with a bad method or are in an epistemically cursed world. Such demonstration involves a significant step beyond conceivability and commits the skeptic to potentially convergent inquiry.
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  17. added 2016-11-08
    Why Moore Matters.Adam Leite - manuscript
    G.E. Moore’s writings on external world skepticism show us, in broad outline, how to dispense with external world skepticism in a way that is satisfying, intellectually responsible, and yet avoids engaging in constructive epistemological theory-building altogether. His work thus reveals something very important about the relation between epistemology and ordinary life, and also about what it would take to reach a satisfying resolution of certain sorts of perennial philosophical problems.
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  18. added 2016-09-02
    The Primacy of Knowledge: A Critical Survey of Timothy Williamson's Views on Knowledge, Assertion and Scepticism.Heine A. Holmen - 2007 - Dissertation, University of Oslo
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  19. added 2016-08-27
    Disbelieving the Sceptics Without Proving Them Wrong.Philipp Keller - unknown
    It is true of many truths that I do not believe them. It is equally true, however, that I cannot rationally assert of any such truth both that it is true and that I do not believe it. To explain why this is so, I will distinguish absence of belief from disbelief and argue that an assertion of “p, but I do not believe that p” is paradoxical because it is indefensible, i.e. for reasons internal to it unable to convince. (...)
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  20. added 2016-06-03
    Bifurcated Sceptical Invariantism.Christos Kyriacou - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:27-44.
    I present an argument for a sophisticated version of sceptical invariantism that has so far gone unnoticed: Bifurcated Sceptical Invariantism (BSI). I argue that it can, on the one hand, (dis)solve the Gettier problem, address the dogmatism paradox and, on the other hand, show some due respect to the Moorean methodological incentive of ‘saving epistemic appearances’. A fortiori, BSI promises to reap some other important explanatory fruit that I go on to adduce (e.g. account for concessive knowledge attributions). BSI can (...)
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  21. added 2016-03-08
    Against the Conditional Correctness of Scepticism.Kaplan Hasanoglu - 2016 - South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):82-91.
    Stroud has argued for many years that skepticism is conditionally correct. We cannot, he claims, both undergo a Cartesian-style examination of the extent of our knowledge as well as avoid skepticism. One reason Stroud's position appears quite plausible is the so-called "totality condition" imposed for this kind of examination: as inquiring philosophers we are called upon to assess all of our knowledge, all at once. However, in this paper I argue that Stroud's apparent understanding of the totality condition is mistaken. (...)
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  22. added 2016-02-01
    Russell’s Logical Construction of the World.Peter J. Graham - forthcoming - In Diego Machua & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Continuum.
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  23. added 2016-01-23
    The Basing Relation and the Impossibility of the Debasing Demon.Patrick Bondy & J. Adam Carter - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):203-216.
    Descartes' demon is a deceiver: the demon makes things appear to you other than as they really are. However, as Descartes famously pointed out in the Second Meditation, not all knowledge is imperiled by this kind of deception. You still know you are a thinking thing. Perhaps, though, there is a more virulent demon in epistemic hell, one from which none of our knowledge is safe. Jonathan Schaffer thinks so. The "debasing demon" he imagines threatens knowledge not via the truth (...)
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  24. added 2015-09-12
    A Justification of Empirical Thinking.Arnold Zuboff - 2014 - Philosophy Now 102:22-24.
    Imagine two urns, each with a thousand beads - in one all the beads are blue while in the other only one of the thousand is blue. If one of these urns is pushed forward (based on the toss of a fair coin) and the single bead then randomly drawn from it is blue, we must infer that it is a thousand times more probable that the urn pushed forward is the purely blue one. The hypothesis that this was instead (...)
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  25. added 2015-07-22
    Full Blooded Entitlement.Martin Smith - forthcoming - In Nikolaj Pedersen & Peter Graham (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford University Press.
    Entitlement is defined as a sort of epistemic justification that one can possess by default – a sort of epistemic justification that does not need to be earned or acquired. Epistemologists who accept the existence of entitlement generally have a certain anti-sceptical role in mind for it – entitlement is intended to help us resist what would otherwise be compelling radical sceptical arguments. But this role leaves various details unspecified and, thus, leaves scope for a number of different potential conceptions (...)
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  26. added 2015-07-06
    Scepticism and Reliable Belief, Written by José L. Zalabardo. [REVIEW]Jack C. Lyons - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (4):412-417.
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  27. added 2015-06-22
    Problems of Wright's Entitlement Theory.Luca Moretti - forthcoming - In Nikolaj Pedersen & Luca Moretti (eds.), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Brill.
    I am concerned with Crispin Wright (2004, 2007, 2012 and 2014)’s entitlement theory, according to which (1) we have non-evidential justification for accepting propositions of a general type, which Wright calls cornerstones, and (2) this non-evidential justification for cornerstones can secure evidential justification for believing many other propositions––those we take to be true on the grounds of ordinary evidence. I initially focus on strategic entitlement, which is one of the types of entitlement that Wright has described in more detail. Wright (...)
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  28. added 2015-06-15
    McDowell's Conceptualist Therapy for Skepticism.Santiago Echeverri - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):357-386.
    Abstract: In Mind and World, McDowell conceives of the content of perceptual experiences as conceptual. This picture is supposed to provide a therapy for skepticism, by showing that empirical thinking is objectively and normatively constrained. The paper offers a reconstruction of McDowell's view and shows that the therapy fails. This claim is based on three arguments: 1) the identity conception of truth he exploits is unable to sustain the idea that perception-judgment transitions are normally truth conducing; 2) it could be (...)
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  29. added 2015-06-06
    Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts.Luca Moretti & Tomoji Shogenji - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1):1-25.
    This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we consider rejects the third intuition (...)
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  30. added 2015-03-09
    Skeptische Antinomie und Anerkennung beim jungen Hegel.Italo Testa - 2003 - In Klaus Vieweg & Brady Bowman (eds.), “Kritisches Jahrbuch der Philosophie”, 8 (2003). Königshausen und Neumann. pp. 171-178.
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  31. added 2015-02-08
    Reasoning One's Way Out of Skepticism.Susanna Rinard - forthcoming - In Brill Studies in Skepticism.
    Many have thought that it is impossible to rationally persuade an external world skeptic that we have knowledge of the external world. This paper aims to show how this could be done. I argue, while appealing only to premises that a skeptic could accept, that it is not rational to believe external world skepticism, because doing so commits one to more extreme forms of skepticism in a way that is self-undermining. In particular, the external world skeptic is ultimately committed to (...)
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  32. added 2014-03-28
    Skepticism and Rationality: Ghazali, Hume, and Kant.Khosrow Bagheri Noaparast - 2013 - Journal of Religious Though 13 (2):3-18.
    Considering three philosophers – Ghazali , Hume, and Kant – we perceive that they were at grips with skepticism and each had a different attitude towards it. While Hume remains in a skeptical sphere, Ghazali and Kant offer solutions for skepticism, although their solutions differ largely. Criticizing Aristotle’s view on essential necessity, Ghazali expands Avicenna’s emphasis on experimentation and, in effect, negates the necessary relation between cause and effect. Ghazali preceded Hume in this regard for some 6 centuries and put (...)
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  33. added 2014-03-06
    Blind Man's Bluff: Examining the Basic Belief Apologetic.Guy Axtell - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):131--152.
    Today we find philosophical naturalists and Christian theists both expressing an interest in virtue epistemology, while starting out from vastly different assumptions. What can be done to increase fruitful dialogue among these divergent groups of virtue-theoretic thinkers? The primary aim of this paper is to uncover more substantial common ground for dialogue by wielding a double-edged critique of certain assumptions shared by `scientific' and `theistic' externalisms, assumptions that undermine proper attention to epistemic agency and responsibility. I employ a responsibilist virtue (...)
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  34. added 2014-03-04
    The Skeptic and the Naïve Realist.Heather Logue - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):268-288.
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  35. added 2014-02-10
    Antiskeptical Conditionals.Theodore J. Everett - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):505–536.
    Empirical knowledge exists in the form of antiskeptical conditionals, which are propositions like [if I am not undetectably deceived, then I am holding a pen]. Such conditionals, despite their trivial appearance, have the same essential content as the categorical propositions that we usually discuss, and can serve the same functions in science and practical reasoning. This paper sketches out two versions of a general response to skepticism that employs these conditionals. The first says that our ordinary knowledge attributions can safely (...)
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  36. added 2014-02-10
    Ontology, Epistemology, and Private Ostensive Definition.Irwin Goldstein - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):137-147.
    People see five kinds of views in epistemology and ontology as hinging on there being words a person can learn only by private ostensive definitions, through direct acquaintance with his own sensations: skepticism about other minds, 2. skepticism about an external world, 3. foundationalism, 4. dualism, and 5. phenomenalism. People think Wittgenstein refuted these views by showing, they believe, no word is learnable only by private ostensive definition. I defend these five views from Wittgenstein’s attack.
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  37. added 2013-09-13
    Gupta's Gambit.Selim Berker - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):17-39.
    After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book _Empiricism and Experience_, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.
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  38. added 2013-03-08
    Constructing the World.David Chalmers - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Inspired by Rudolf Carnap's Der Logische Aufbau Der Welt, David J. Chalmers argues that the world can be constructed from a few basic elements. He develops a scrutability thesis saying that all truths about the world can be derived from basic truths and ideal reasoning. This thesis leads to many philosophical consequences: a broadly Fregean approach to meaning, an internalist approach to the contents of thought, and a reply to W. V. Quine's arguments against the analytic and the a priori. (...)
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  39. added 2012-12-23
    Lewis and His Critics on Putnam´s Paradox.Daniel Dohrn - unknown
    The model-theoretic argument known as Putnam´s paradox threatens our notion of truth with triviality: Almost any world can satisfy almost any theory. Formal argument and intuition are at odds. David Lewis devised a solution according to which the very stucture of the world fixes how it is to be divided into elite classes which determine the reference of any true theory. Three claims are defended: Firstly, Lewis´ proposal must be completed by an account of successful referential intentions. Secondly, contrary to (...)
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  40. added 2012-11-21
    Global Scepticism, Underdetermination and Metaphysical Possibility.Luca Moretti - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (2):381-403.
    I focus on a key argument for global external world scepticism resting on the underdetermination thesis: the argument according to which we cannot know any proposition about our physical environment because sense evidence for it equally justifies some sceptical alternative (e.g. the Cartesian demon conjecture). I contend that the underdetermination argument can go through only if the controversial thesis that conceivability is per se a source of evidence for metaphysical possibility is true. I also suggest a reason to doubt that (...)
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  41. added 2012-08-26
    Idealism and Scepticism: A Reply to Brueckner.Stephen Puryear - 2013 - Theoria 79 (1):290-293.
    Anthony Brueckner argues that Berkeleyan idealism lacks anti-sceptical force because of the way Berkeley draws the appearance/reality distinction. But Brueckner's case rests on a misunderstanding of Berkeley's view. Properly understood, Berkeleyan idealism does indeed have anti-sceptical force.
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  42. added 2011-02-17
    The Poetic Experience of the World.Mathew Abbott - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (4):493-516.
    In this article I develop Heidegger's phenomenology of poetry, showing that it may provide grounds for rejecting claims that he lapses into linguistic idealism. Proceeding via an analysis of the three concepts of language operative in the philosopher's work, I demonstrate how poetic language challenges language's designative and world-disclosive functions. The experience with poetic language, which disrupts Dasein's absorption by emerging out of equipmentality in the mode of the broken tool, brings Dasein to wonder at the world's existence in such (...)
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  43. added 2010-06-19
    Peacocke’s A Priori Arguments Against Scepticism.B. J. C. Madison - 2011 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 83 (1):1-8.
    In The Realm of Reason (2004), Christopher Peacocke develops a “generalized rationalism” concerning, among other things, what it is for someone to be “entitled”, or justified, in forming a given belief. In the course of his discussion, Peacocke offers two arguments to the best explanation that aim to undermine scepticism and establish a justification for our belief in the reliability of sense perception, respectively. If sound, these ambitious arguments would answer some of the oldest and most vexing epistemological problems. In (...)
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  44. added 2010-01-11
    Skepticism and the Value of Knowledge.Patrick Hawley - 2007 - In Chienkuo Mi Ruey-lin Chen (ed.), Naturalized Epistemology and Philosophy of Science.
    The main claim of this essay is that knowledge is no more
    valuable than lasting true belief.
    This claim is surprising. Doesn't knowledge have a unique
    and special value? If the main claim is correct and if, as it seems,
    knowledge is not lasting true belief, then knowledge does not have a unique value:
    in whatever way knowledge is valuable, lasting true belief is just as valuable.
    However, this result does not show that knowledge is worthless, nor does it undermine
    our knowledge gathering practices. There (...)
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  45. added 2009-10-02
    Cogito Ergo Sum.Jim Stone - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (9):462-468.
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  46. added 2009-10-02
    Dreaming and Certainty.Jim Stone - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 45 (May):353-368.
    I argue that being wide awake is an epistemic virtue which enables me to recognize immediately that I'm wide awake. Also I argue that dreams are imaginings and that the wide awake mind can immediately discern the difference between imaginings and vivid sense experience. Descartes need only pinch himself.
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  47. added 2009-07-24
    Smells Like Pragmatism: Wittgenstein's Anti-Sceptical Weapons.Kristijan Krkac - 2003 - Prolegomena 2 (1):41-60.
    In the text the author tries to investigate Wittgenstein’s notions of action, practice and pragmatism in his book On Certainty. An attempt is made to sketch the criterion of Wittgenstein’s analysis of certainty and to define the crucial concepts such as world-picture, practice, certainty and justification. The analysis shows that Wittgenstein applies a specific form of pragmatic solution to the problem of justification, which after all, can and should be called a kind of pragmatismus. This is the subject of the (...)
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  48. added 2009-04-21
    Transfer of Warrant, Begging the Question, and Semantic Externalism.Helen Beebee - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):356-74.
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