Metaethical Deflationism, Access Worries and Motivationally Grasped Oughts

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (forthcoming)
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Mathematical knowledge and moral knowledge (or normative knowledge more generally) can seem intuitively puzzling in similar ways. For example, taking apparent human knowledge of either domain at face value can seem to require accepting that we benefited from some massive and mysterious coincidence. In the mathematical case, a pluralist partial response to access worries has been widely popular. In this paper, I will develop and address a worry, suggested by some works in the recent literature like (Clarke-Doane, 2020), that connections between ought facts and action prevent us from giving a similarly pluralist response to moral access worries.

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Sharon Berry
Indiana University, Bloomington


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