(Probably) Not companions in guilt

Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2285-2308 (2018)
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In this paper, I will attempt to develop and defend a common form of intuitive resistance to the companions in guilt argument. I will argue that one can reasonably believe there are promising solutions to the access problem for mathematical realism that don’t translate to moral realism. In particular, I will suggest that the structuralist project of accounting for mathematical knowledge in terms of some form of logical knowledge offers significant hope of success while no analogous approach offers such hope for moral realism.
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First archival date: 2017-10-17
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