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  1. Abolishing morality in biomedical ethics.Parker Crutchfield & Scott Scheall - 2024 - Bioethics 38 (4):316-325.
    In biomedical ethics, there is widespread acceptance of moral realism, the view that moral claims express a proposition and that at least some of these propositions are true. Biomedical ethics is also in the business of attributing moral obligations, such as “S should do X.” The problem, as we argue, is that against the background of moral realism, most of these attributions are erroneous or inaccurate. The typical obligation attribution issued by a biomedical ethicist fails to truly capture the person's (...)
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  2. Zetetic indispensability and epistemic justification.Mikayla Kelley - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (4):671-688.
    Robust metanormative realists think that there are irreducibly normative, metaphysically heavy normative facts. One might wonder how we could be epistemically justified in believing that such facts exist. In this paper, I offer an answer to this question: one’s belief in the existence of robustly real normative facts is epistemically justified because so believing is indispensable to being a successful inquirer for creatures like us. The argument builds on Enoch's (2007, 2011) deliberative indispensability argument for Robust Realism but avoids relying (...)
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  3. Action and Necessity: Wittgenstein's On Certainty and the Foundations of Ethics.Michael Wee - 2024 - Dissertation, Durham University
    This thesis develops an account of ethics called the Linguistic Perspective, which is realist in a practical, non-theoretical sense, and is rooted Wittgenstein’s 'On Certainty'. On this account, normativity is intrinsic to human action and language; the norms of ethics are the logical limits of the most basic, unassailable concepts that practical reasoning requires for intelligibility. Part I lays the groundwork for this account by developing a Tractarian Reading of 'On Certainty'. Here, I contend that 'On Certainty' is primarily concerned (...)
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  4. ON GIBSON's DEFENCE OF QUINEAN ETHICS.Olaoluwa Andrew Oyedola & David Oyedola - 2012 - Nigerian Journal of the Humanities 18 (Sepember):18-37..
    Roger Gibson offers a defence of W.V.O. Quine’s conception of ethics as “methodologically infirm” against Owen Flanagan’s criticism. Gibson argues that Flanagan’s critique of Quinean ethics is misdirected, and that he (Flanagan) fails to establish that ethics and science (natural science) are on a methodological par. In this essay, we argue that there may actually be some sort of overemphasis in Flanagan’s argument, given its inclination to see Quine’s holism as rejecting any form of correspondence theory, yet, pace Gibson (as (...)
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  5. Can Moral Anti-Realists Theorize?Michael Zhao - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Call "radical moral theorizing" the project of developing a moral theory that not only tries to conform to our existing moral intuitions, but also manifests various theoretical virtues: consistency, simplicity, explanatory depth, and so on. Many moral philosophers assume that radical moral theorizing does not require any particular metaethical commitments. In this paper, I argue against this assumption. The most natural justification for radical moral theorizing presupposes moral realism, broadly construed; in contrast, there may be no justification for radical moral (...)
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  6. Moralische Archetypen: Ethik in der Vorgeschichte.Roberto Arruda Thomas - 2023 - São Paulo: Terra à Vista.
    Die philosophischen, traditionellen Ansätze zur Moral beruhen hauptsächlich auf metaphysischen und theologischen Konzepten und Theorien. Unter den traditionellen Ethikkonzepten ist die göttliche Befehlstheorie die prominenteste (DCT). Gemäß der DCT gibt Gott der Menschheit moralische Grundlagen durch ihre Schöpfung und durch Offenbarung. Moral und Göttlichkeit sind seit der fernsten Zivilisation untrennbar. Diese Konzepte tauchen in einen theologischen Rahmen ein und werden hauptsächlich von den meisten Anhängern der drei abrahamitischen Traditionen angenommen: Judentum, Christentum und Islam: dem bedeutendsten Teil der menschlichen Bevölkerung. Die (...)
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  7. Ethics and the Question of What to Do.Olle Risberg - 2023 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 25 (2).
    In this paper I present an account of a distinctive form of ‘practical’ or ‘deliberative’ uncertainty that has been central in debates in both ethics and metaethics. Many writers have assumed that such uncertainty concerns a special normative question, such as what we ought to do ‘all things considered.’ I argue against this assumption and instead endorse an alternative view of such uncertainty, which combines elements of both metaethical cognitivism and non-cognitivism. A notable consequence of this view is that even (...)
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  8. Kierkegaard's Views on Normative Ethics, Moral Agency, and Metaethics.Roe Fremstedal - 2015 - In Jon Stewart (ed.), A Companion to Kierkegaard. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 111–125.
    This chapter deals with Kierkegaard's contributions to ethics by focusing on his relation to virtue ethics and deontology, his views of moral agency, and the source of moral obligations. It argues that Kierkegaard presents a critique of Kantian autonomy that favors moral realism and theological voluntarism, and that he gives an account of human agency and selfhood in which morality is inescapable.
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  9. Discourse Ethics and Practical Knowledge Stable Structures for Practical Reasoning.Ramírez Calle Olga - 2022 - Episteme NS: Revista Del Instituto de Filosofía de la Universidad Central de Venezuela 42:53-85.
    The present paper 1departs from the discussion on the foundation of morality in Discourse Ethics (DE) and the criticism raised against it, coming to reconstruct in a somewhat different way the foundational process. A first section is dedicated to analysing the difficulties of Habermas distinction between morality and ethics and the criticism raised against it, questioning a) the possibility to set the difference in the distinction between norms and values and b) the presumed neutrality of DE regarding ethical evaluations. A (...)
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  10. Précis of Pragmatist Quietism: A Meta-Ethical System.Andrew Sepielli - manuscript
    A précis of my book Pragmatist Quietism: A Meta-Ethical System (OUP, 2022); forthcoming in Analysis along with commentaries and my replies.
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  11. Divine Command Theory without a Divine Commander.Robert Bass - 2023 - Journal of Value Inquiry 1:1-19.
    Recent divine command theorists make a serious and impressive case that a sophisticated divine command theory has significant metaethical advantages and can adequately meet traditional objections, such as the Euthyphro problem. I survey the attempt sympathetically with a view to explaining how the divine command theory can deal with traditional objections while delivering on metaethical desiderata, such as providing an account of ethical objectivity. I argue, however, that to the extent that a divine command theory succeeds, an ideal observer theory (...)
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  12. Debunking, Epistemic Achievement, and Undermining Defeat.Michael Klenk - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):43-60.
    Several anti-debunkers have argued that evolutionary explanations of our moral beliefs fail to meet a necessary condition on undermining defeat called modal security. They conclude that evolution, therefore, does not debunk our moral beliefs. This article shows that modal security is false if knowledge is virtuous achievement. New information can undermine a given belief without providing reason to doubt that that belief is sensitive or safe. This leads to a novel conception of undermining defeat, and it shows that successful debunking (...)
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  13. The Thin/Thick Dilemma.Andrew Sepielli - manuscript
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  14. Kantian Constructivism and the Sources of Normativity.Janis David Schaab - 2022 - Kant Yearbook 14 (1):97-120.
    While it is uncontroversial that Kantian constructivism has implications for normative ethics, its status as a metaethical view has been contested. In this article, I provide a characterisation of metaethical Kantian constructivism that withstands these criticisms. I start by offering a partial defence of Sharon Street’s practical standpoint characterisation. However, I argue that this characterisation, as presented by Street, is ultimately incomplete because it fails to demonstrate that the claims of Kantian constructivism constitute a distinctive contribution to metaethics. I then (...)
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  15. Truth and the Limits of Ethical Thought: Reading Wittgenstein with Diamond.Gilad Nir - 2023 - In Jens Pier (ed.), Limits of Intelligibility: Issues from Kant and Wittgenstein. Routledge.
    This chapter investigates how a reading of Wittgenstein along the lines laid out by Cora Diamond makes room for a novel approach to ethical truth. Following Diamond, I develop the connection between the kinds of elucidatory propositions by means of which we spell out and maintain the shape of our theoretical thinking, such as “‘someone’ is not the name of someone” and “five plus seven equals twelve,” and the kind of propositions by means of which we spell out and maintain (...)
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  16. Ahlaktan Tanrı'ya Ulaşılabilir mi? Enis Doko'nun “Allah'sız Ahlak Mümkün mü?” Kitabı Üzerine Bir İnceleme. [REVIEW]Hasan G. Bahçekapili - 2022 - Ahlak 2 (2):55-64.
    Enis Doko bu kitapta 1) ahlakın doğasından hareketle nesnel ahlaki olguların varlığına (ahlaki gerçekçilik), 2) ahlaki gerçekçilikten hareketle ahlaki olguların doğal olgular olamayacağına, 3) doğal olmayan ahlaki olguların varlığından hareketle de Tanrı'nın varlığına ulaşmaya çalışıyor. Göreceğimiz gibi bu üç adımın her biriyle ilgili ciddi sorunlar var.
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  17. The Rorty-Dworkin Debate.Raff Donelson - 2021 - In Giancarlo Marchetti (ed.), The Ethics, Epistemology and Politics of Richard Rorty. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 50-63.
    Ronald Dworkin and Richard Rorty are sometimes thought to be diametrically opposed philosophers, particularly in their approach to foundational questions in moral thought. Dworkin is a champion of truth and objectivity in morality. Rorty, by contrast, is a great pragmatist who subscribed to a deflated vision of truth and unambiguously renounced objectivity, in favor of what he called “solidarity”. If their stated -isms and alliances were not evidence enough of discord, they also criticized one another in print, particularly on these (...)
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  18. On What Matters: Volume Three by Derek Parfit. [REVIEW]Farbod Akhlaghi - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
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  19. Reply to Hernandez and Laskowski.Matti Eklund - 2021 - Southwest Philosophy Review 37 (2):1-4.
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  20. Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truthmaking, and Ontological Cheating.Farbod Akhlaghi - 2022 - Ethics 132 (2):291-321.
    Derek Parfit defended Non-Realist Cognitivism. It is an open secret that this metaethical theory is often thought at best puzzling and at worst objectionably unclear. Employing truthmaker theory, I provide an account of Non-Realist Cognitivism that dispels charges of objectionable unclarity, clarifies how to assess it, and explains why, if plausible, it would be an attractive theory. I develop concerns that the theory involves cheating into an objection that ultimately reveals Non-Realist Cognitivism faces a dilemma. Whether it can escape demands (...)
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  21. Truth in Ethics and Epistemology: A Defense of Normative Realism.Nathan Nobis - 2005 - Dissertation, University of Rochester
    In this work I defend moral realism, the thesis that there are objective moral truths, by defending “epistemic realism.” Epistemic realism is the thesis that epistemic judgments, e.g., judgments that some belief is epistemically reasonable, or justified, or known or should be held, are sometimes true and made true by stance-independent epistemic facts and properties. -/- One might think that epistemic realism needs no defense because it is obviously true and nearly universally accepted. But there are influential arguments against moral (...)
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  22. Meta-Ethical Quietism? Wittgenstein, Relaxed Realism, and Countercultures in Meta-Ethics.Farbod Akhlaghi - forthcoming - In Jonathan Beale & Richard Rowland (eds.), Wittgenstein and Contemporary Moral Philosophy.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein has often been called a quietist. His work has inspired a rich and varied array of theories in moral philosophy. Some prominent meta-ethicists have also been called quietists, or ‘relaxed’ as opposed to ‘robust’ realists, sometimes with explicit reference to Wittgenstein in attempts to clarify their views. In this chapter, I compare and contrast these groups of theories and draw out their importance for contemporary meta-ethical debate. They represent countercultures to contemporary meta-ethics. That is, they reject in different (...)
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  23. Ugliness Is in the Gut of the Beholder.Ryan P. Doran - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (5):88-146.
    I offer the first sustained defence of the claim that ugliness is constituted by the disposition to disgust. I advance three main lines of argument in support of this thesis. First, ugliness and disgustingness tend to lie in the same kinds of things and properties (the argument from ostensions). Second, the thesis is better placed than all existing accounts to accommodate the following facts: ugliness is narrowly and systematically distributed in a heterogenous set of things, ugliness is sometimes enjoyed, and (...)
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  24. Natural Love: Aquinas, Evolution and Charity.Adam M. Willows - 2021 - Heythrop Journal 62 (3):535-545.
    This paper offers an analysis of work on human development in evolutionary anthropology from a Thomist perspective. I show that both fields view care for others as fundamental to human nature and interpret cooperative breeding as expression of the virtue of charity. I begin with an analysis of different approaches to the relationship between evolutionary anthropology and moral theory. I argue that ethical naturalism is the approach best suited to interdisciplinary dialogue, since it holds that natural facts are useful for (...)
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  25. On Idealistic Ethics, Nihilism, and the Analyticity of ‘Black Maleness’: A reply to Tommy Curry.Patrick Bloniasz - 2021 - Letters 1 (722):1-5.
    Curry’s chapter “In the Fiat of Dreams” makes two strong claims about the definition of “black male” and the value of idealistic ethics for black men. Depending on what he means by the analyticity of “black male”, he either understates his desired conclusion for the severity of the black male’s condition, overstates his conclusion in rejecting idealistic ethics, or ends up in contradiction within the “world” or “society” he is talking about. Given the most charitable reading of his argument, I (...)
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  26. Iris Murdoch and the power of love.Anil Gomes - 2019 - TLS.
    Anil Gomes considers Murdoch's view that morality is real and that, with the right conceptual resources, we can perceive it.
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  27. Why Metaethics Needs Empirical Moral Psychology.Jeroen Hopster & Michael Klenk - 2020 - Critica 52 (155):27-54.
    What is the significance of empirical moral psychology for metaethics? In this article we take up Michael Ruse’s evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism and reassess it in the context of the empirical state of the art. Ruse’s argument depends on the phenomenological presumption that people generally experience morality as objective. We demonstrate how recent experimental findings challenge this widely-shared armchair presumption and conclude that Ruse’s argument fails. We situate this finding in the recent debate about Carnapian explication and argue (...)
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  28. On the Alleged Laziness of Moral Realists.Daniel Weltman - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):511-518.
    Melis Erdur has argued that there is something morally wrong with moral realism. Moral realism promotes morally objectionable lethargy by recommending that we accept moral knowledge that could be acquired effortlessly. This is morally objectionable, because morality requires us to be reflective about moral truths. I argue that the moral realist need not be worried, because if reflection about morality is a genuine value, the realist can accept this: moral realism entails no prescriptions about how one morally ought to acquire (...)
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  29. Moral Realism and Philosophical Angst.Joshua Blanchard - 2020 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15.
    This paper defends pro-realism, the view that it is better if moral realism is true rather than any of its rivals. After offering an account of philosophical angst, I make three general arguments. The first targets nihilism: in securing the possibility of moral justification and vindication in objecting to certain harms, moral realism secures something that is non-morally valuable and even essential to the meaning and intelligibility of our lives. The second argument targets antirealism: moral realism secures a desirable independence (...)
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  30. Metaethical Minimalism: A Demarcation, Defense, and Development.Aaron Franklin - 2020 - Dissertation, University of California, Santa Cruz
    The aim of this work is to demarcate, develop, and defend the commitments and consequences of metaethical minimalism. Very roughly, this is the position that a commitment to objective moral truths does not require any accompanying ontological commitments. While there are few, if any, who call themselves “metaethical minimalists”, I endeavor to uncover existing articulations of metaethical minimalism which have been presented under different names, attempting to identify the common ground between them. As I interpret the position, all metaethical minimalists (...)
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  31. The Incoherence of Moral Relativism.Carlo Alvaro - 2020 - Cultura 17 (1):19-38.
    Abstract: This paper is a response to Park Seungbae’s article, “Defence of Cultural Relativism”. Some of the typical criticisms of moral relativism are the following: moral relativism is erroneously committed to the principle of tolerance, which is a universal principle; there are a number of objective moral rules; a moral relativist must admit that Hitler was right, which is absurd; a moral relativist must deny, in the face of evidence, that moral progress is possible; and, since every individual belongs to (...)
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  32. Parfit : l'âge de la raison de la morale.Yann Schmitt - 2019 - Klēsis Revue Philosophique 1 (43).
    Figure majeure de la philosophie morale, Derek Parfit (1942-2017) reste encore peuconnu en France. Cette introduction vise à montrer l'ampleur des thématiques abordées de Parfit en les rattachant au projet d'une éthique rationnelle, tandis que le numéro dansson ensemble, sans prétendre être exhaustif, propose des présentations et discussions de différents éléments clefs de sa philosophie.
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  33. Review of Jean Moritz Müller, The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling. [REVIEW]Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Review of Jean Moritz Müller, The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling.
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  34. Le problème de la souffrance chez Nietzsche et Parfit.Nicolas Delon - 2019 - Klesis 43:156-186.
    Dans On What Matters Parfit défénd un objectivisme moral sur lequel il espère que les philosophes finiront par converger. Au cœur de cet espoir sont des vérités normatives irréductibles telles que l’affirmation que la souffrance est intrinsèquement mauvaise. Parfit se demande si Nietzsche menace son édifice et lui consacre un chapitre entier chapeautant la discussion du désaccord moral et de la convergence, et conclut que Nietzsche soit n’est pas en vrai désaccord, soit ne raisonne pas dans des conditions satisfaisantes. Je (...)
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  35. Beyond the Surf and Spray: Erring on the Side of Error Theory.Joel Marks - 2018 - In Richard Garner & Richard Joyce (eds.), The End of Morality: Taking Moral Abolitionism Seriously. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 94-109.
    Taking as its starting point that morality does not exist (moral error theory), this chapter tries to persuade the reader to eradicate it from her psyche as well (moral abolitionism). It is argued further that the most effective way to rid oneself (and society) of moralist attitudes would be to eliminate moralist vocabulary and manners of speaking and, indeed, to the greatest degree practicable, all normative vocabularies and manners of speaking. This is because moralism lies deep and pervasively in the (...)
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  36. Reply to Bykvist and Olson.Matti Eklund - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (3):347-349.
    Reply to Krister Bykvist and Jonas Olson's review of Choosing Normative Concepts (OUP, 2017) in Utilitas.
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  37. Objectivity.Ross Colebrook & Hagop Sarkissian - 2018 - In Todd K. Shackelford & Vivian A. Weekes-Shackelford (eds.), Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science.
    In this entry, we outline the ways in which evolutionary theory has implications for the objectivity of morality.
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  38. Aesthetic Properties, Mind-Independence, and Companions in Guilt.Daan Evers - 2019 - In Richard Rowland & Christopher Cowie (eds.), Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge.
    I first show how one might argue for a mind-independent conception of beauty and artistic merit. I then discuss whether this makes aesthetic judgements suitable to undermine skeptical worries about the existence of mind-independent moral value and categorical reasons.
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  39. Moral realism and semantic accounts of moral vagueness.Ali Abasnezhad - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):381-393.
    Miriam Schoenfield argues that moral realism and moral vagueness imply ontic vagueness. In particular, she argues that neither shifty nor rigid semantic accounts of vagueness can provide a satisfactory explanation of moral vagueness for moral realists. This paper constitutes a response. I argue that Schoenfield's argument against the shifty semantic account presupposes that moral indeterminacies can, in fact, be resolved determinately by crunching through linguistic data. I provide different reasons for rejecting this assumption. Furthermore, I argue that Schoenfield's rejection of (...)
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  40. Objectivity and Evaluation.Justin Clarke-Doane - forthcoming - In Christopher Cowie & Richard Rowland (eds.), Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics.
    I this article, I introduce the notion of pluralism about an area, and use it to argue that the questions at the center of our normative lives are not settled by the facts -- even the normative facts. One upshot of the discussion is that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which are widely identified, are actually in tension. Another is that the concept of objectivity, not realism, should take center stage.
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  41. Making metaethics work for AI: realism and anti-realism.Michal Klincewicz & Lily E. Frank - 2018 - In Mark Coeckelbergh, M. Loh, J. Funk, M. Seibt & J. Nørskov (eds.), Envisioning Robots in Society – Power, Politics, and Public Space. pp. 311-318.
    Engineering an artificial intelligence to play an advisory role in morally charged decision making will inevitably introduce meta-ethical positions into the design. Some of these positions, by informing the design and operation of the AI, will introduce risks. This paper offers an analysis of these potential risks along the realism/anti-realism dimension in metaethics and reveals that realism poses greater risks, but, on the other hand, anti-realism undermines the motivation for engineering a moral AI in the first place.
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  42. Non-Naturalist Moral Realism and the Limits of Rational Reflection.Max Khan Hayward - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):724-737.
    This essay develops the epistemic challenge to non-naturalist moral realism. While evolutionary considerations do not support the strongest claims made by ‘debunkers’, they do provide the basis for an inductive argument that our moral dispositions and starting beliefs are at best partially reliable. So, we need some method for separating truth from falsity. Many non-naturalists think that rational reflection can play this role. But rational reflection cannot be expected to bring us to truth even from reasonably accurate starting points. Reflection (...)
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  43. (Probably) Not companions in guilt.Sharon Berry - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2285-2308.
    In this paper, I will attempt to develop and defend a common form of intuitive resistance to the companions in guilt argument. I will argue that one can reasonably believe there are promising solutions to the access problem for mathematical realism that don’t translate to moral realism. In particular, I will suggest that the structuralist project of accounting for mathematical knowledge in terms of some form of logical knowledge offers significant hope of success while no analogous approach offers such hope (...)
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  44. Realismo Moral Naturalista: Problemas Semânticos.Rafael Martins - 2010 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal Do Rio de Janeiro
    As the intuitions about moral phenomenology shows the metaphysical distinction between mind-dependent and mind-independent properties has set the metaethical distinction between normativity and objectivity in ethics. Traditionally, many arguments were built in order to show that moral realists cannot account, in naturalist vocabulary, for the process of determining moral reference due to the desiderative disposition taken to be necessarily part of the meaning of moral terms. This dissertation assess some anti-realists arguments like is-ought thesis, the argument from queerness, the argument (...)
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  45. Can Moral Realists Deflect Defeat Due to Evolutionary Explanations of Morality?Michael Klenk - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):227-248.
    I address Andrew Moon's recent discussion (2016, this journal) of the question whether third-factor accounts are valid responses to debunking arguments against moral realism. Moon argues that third-factor responses are valid under certain conditions but leaves open whether moral realists can use his interpretation of the third-factor response to defuse the evolutionary debunking challenge. I rebut Moon's claim and answer his question. Moon's third-factor reply is valid only if we accept externalism about epistemic defeaters. However, even if we do, I (...)
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  46. Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Our Shared Hatred of Pain.Ben Bramble - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (1):94-101.
    This article responds to an argument from Katarzyna de Ladari-Radek and Peter Singer in their article, "The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical Reason.".
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  47. Anthropocentric Realism about Values.Bryan Van Norden - 2014 - In Chenyang Li & Peimin Ni (eds.), Moral Cultivation and Confucian Character. Albany, NY, USA: State University of New York Press. pp. 65-96.
    31 The choice of human goals cannot be completely subjective, because 32 there are some (even ones that motivate many humans) that are simply 33 unintelligible as ultimate goals. For example, wealth is rational as an 34 intermediate goal, a means to achieving some further end, but it is simply 35 unintelligible to suggest that wealth is an ultimate goal in itself. Second, 36 we have seen that some things are reasonable to pursue as aspects of 37 our ultimate goals (...)
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  48. Revisiting Folk Moral Realism.Thomas Pölzler - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):455-476.
    Moral realists believe that there are objective moral truths. According to one of the most prominent arguments in favour of this view, ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming, and we have therefore prima facie reason to believe that realism is true. Some proponents of this argument have claimed that the hypothesis that ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming is supported by psychological research on folk metaethics. While most recent research has been thought to contradict this claim, four prominent earlier studies (...)
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  49. Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences.Thomas Pölzler - 2018 - New York: Routledge.
    Are there objective moral truths, i.e. things that are morally right, wrong, good, or bad independently of what anybody thinks about them? To answer this question more and more scholars have recently turned to evidence from psychology, neuroscience, cultural anthropology, and evolutionary biology. This book investigates this novel scientific approach in a comprehensive, empirically-focused, and partly meta-theoretical way. It suggests that while it is possible for the empirical sciences to contribute to the moral realism/anti-realism debate, most arguments that have so (...)
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  50. Can the empirical sciences contribute to the moral realism/anti-realism debate?Thomas Pölzler - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4907-4930.
    An increasing number of moral realists and anti-realists have recently attempted to support their views by appeal to science. Arguments of this kind are typically criticized on the object-level. In addition, however, one occasionally also comes across a more sweeping metatheoretical skepticism. Scientific contributions to the question of the existence of objective moral truths, it is claimed, are impossible in principle; most prominently, because such arguments impermissibly derive normative from descriptive propositions, such arguments beg the question against non-naturalist moral realism, (...)
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