Williamson on Counterpossibles
Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4):693-713 (2018)
Abstract
A counterpossible conditional is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Common sense delivers the view that some such conditionals are true, and some are false. In recent publications, Timothy Williamson has defended the view that all are true. In this paper we defend the common sense view against Williamson’s objections.
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Archival date: 2018-03-21
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References found in this work BETA
The Philosophy of Philosophy.Williamson, Timothy
The Philosophy of Philosophy.Williamson, Timothy
Counterfactuals.Lewis, David K.
Guide to Ground.Fine, Kit
Grounding in the Image of Causation.Schaffer, Jonathan
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Citations of this work BETA
On the Substitution of Identicals in Counterfactual Reasoning.Kocurek, Alexander W.
Counteridenticals.Kocurek, Alexander W.
Sensitivity, Safety, and Impossible Worlds.Melchior, Guido
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26 ( #26,136 of 49,024 )
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