A note on reciprocity of reasons

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Rainer Forst and others claim that normative moral and political claims depend for their justification on meeting a requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability (RGA). I focus on a core component of RGA, namely, the idea of reciprocity of reasons, distinguish between two readings of RGA, and argue that if reciprocity of reasons is understood in Forst’s terms, then RGA, even on the most promising reading, may not serve as a requirement of moral or political justification at all. The discussion concludes with constructive observations on a path forward for theorists who nevertheless are inclined to hold on to RGA.
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First archival date: 2017-11-25
Latest version: 2 (2017-11-27)
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