On Robust Discursive Equality

Dialogue 58 (3):1-26 (2019)
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Abstract
This paper explores the idea of robust discursive equality on which respect-based conceptions of justificatory reciprocity often draw. I distinguish between formal and substantive discursive equality and argue that if justificatory reciprocity requires that people be accorded formally equal discursive standing, robust discursive equality should not be construed as requiring standing that is equal substantively, or in terms of its discursive purchase. Still, robust discursive equality is purchase sensitive: it does not obtain when discursive standing is impermissibly unequal in purchase. I then showcase different candidate conceptions of purchase justice, and draw conclusions about the substantive commitments of justificatory reciprocity.
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2019
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BESORD
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First archival date: 2018-06-18
Latest version: 3 (2018-08-16)
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Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.Rawls, John & Kelly, Erin

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2018-06-18

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