Related

Contents
95 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 95
  1. Possible Limits of Conceptual Engineering: Magnetism, Fixed Points and Inescapability.Matti Eklund - forthcoming - Argumenta.
    In contemporary philosophy there is much focus on conceptual engineering: the enterprise of revising and replacing concepts. In this talk, I focus on a theoretical issue that has not yet received much attention. What principled limits are there to this sort of enterprise? Are there concepts that for principled reasons cannot or should not be revised or replaced? Examples discussed include logical concepts and normative concepts.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. When Things Fail to Fit Together.Daniel Fogal - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Critical Notice of Alex Worsnip's 'Fitting Things Together: Coherence and the Demands of Structural Rationality' (OUP 2021).
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Moral Worth and Skillful Action.David Horst - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Someone acts in a morally worthy way when they deserve credit for doing the morally right thing. But when and why do agents deserve credit for the success involved in doing the right thing? It is tempting to seek an answer to that question by drawing an analogy with creditworthy success in other domains of human agency, especially in sports, arts, and crafts. Accordingly, some authors have recently argued that, just like creditworthy success in, say, chess, playing the piano, or (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. Authoritatively Normative Concepts.Tristram McPherson - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
    This paper offers an analysis of the authoritatively normative concept PRACTICAL OUGHT that appeals to the constitutive norms for the activity of non-arbitrary selection. I argue that this analysis permits an attractive and substantive explanation of what the distinctive normative authority of this concept amounts to. I contrast my account with more familiar constitutivist theories, and briefly show how it answers ‘schmagency’-style objections to constitutivist explanations of normativity. Finally, I explain how the account offered here can be used to help (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  5. Normativity: A Unit of.Andrew Reisner - forthcoming - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwells.
    This entry discusses the notion of a unit of normativity. This notion may be understood in two distinct ways. One way to understand a unit of normativity is as some particular type of assignment of normative status, e.g., a requirement, an ought, a reason, or a permission. A second way to understand a unit of normativity is as a measure of a quantity of normativity, perhaps associated with the numerical assignment given to the strength of reasons. This entry outlines some (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  6. Metaethics as Conceptual Engineering.Knut Olav Skarsaune - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    On the traditional approach to metaethics, theories are expected to be faithful to ordinary normative discourse – or at worst (if we think the ordinary discourse is metaphysically unsound) to deviate from it as little as possible. -/- This paper develops an alternative, “conceptual engineering” approach to metaethical enquiry, which is not in this way restricted by our present discourse. On this approach, we will seek to understand the psychology, semantics, metaphysics and epistemology, not just of our present concepts, but (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Jadedness: A philosophical analysis.Andreas Elpidorou - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 1:1-24.
    The essay contributes to the philosophical literature on emotions by advancing a detailed analysis of jadedness and by investigating whether jadedness can be subject to the various standards that are often thought to apply to our emotional states. The essay argues that jadedness is the affective experience of weariness, lack of care, and mild disdain with some object, and that it crucially involves the realisation that such an object was previously, but is no longer, significant to us. On the basis (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. The weight of reasons.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2573-2596.
    This paper addresses the question of how the ‘weight’ or ‘strength’ of normative reasons is best understood. We argue that, given our preferred analysis of reasons as sources of normative support, this question has a straightforward answer: the weight of a normative reason is simply a matter of how much support it provides. We also critically discuss several competing views of reasons and their weight. These include views which take reasons to be normatively fundamental, views which analyze reasons as evidence (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Do Imaginings have a Goal?Marcus Hunt - 2023 - Axiomathes: Global Philosophy 33 (1):1-17.
    The paper investigates whether imaginative states about propositions can be assessed in terms of fittingness (also known as correctness, appropriateness, aptness). After characterizing propositional imaginings and explaining the idea of fittingness, I present some considerations in favour of the no conditions view: imagining seems to be the sort of action that cannot be done unfittingly, and imaginings have no external cognitive nor conative goals in light of which they could be unfitting. I then examine the local conditions view, that there (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. A new problem for rules.Jeffrey Kaplan - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (3):671-691.
    This paper presents a series of arguments aimed at showing that, for an important subclass of social rules—non‐summary rules—no adequate metaphysical account has been given, and it tentatively suggests that no such account can be given. The category of non‐summary rules is an important one, as it includes the rules of etiquette, fashion, chess, basketball, California state law, descriptive English grammar, and so on. This paper begins with behavioristic accounts of the conditions for the existence of such rules, and proceeds (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Egalitarian Justice as a Challenge for the Value-Based Theory of Practical Reasons.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2023 - In Andrés Garcia, Mattias Gunnemyr & Jakob Werkmäster (eds.), Value, Morality & Social Reality: Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen. Lund: Department of Philosophy, Lund University. pp. 239-249.
    In this essay, I argue that the objections that have been raised against the view that equality is intrinsically valuable also provide objections to the view that all practical reasons can be explained in terms of value. Plausible egalitarian principles entail that under certain conditions people have claims to an equal share. These claims entail reasons to distribute goods equally that cannot be explained by value if equality has no intrinsic value.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Aptness and means-end coherence: a dominance argument for causal decision theory.J. Robert G. Williams - 2023 - Synthese 201 (2):1-19.
    Why should we be means-end rational? Why care whether someone’s mental states exhibit certain formal patterns, like the ones formalized in causal decision theory? This paper establishes a dominance argument for these constraints in a finite setting. If you violate the norms of causal decision theory, then your desires will be aptness dominated. That is, there will be some alternative set of desires that you could have had, which would be more apt (closer to the actual values fixed by your (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. What Makes Requests Normative? The Epistemic Account Defended.Daniel Weltman - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (64):1715-43.
    This paper defends the epistemic account of the normativity of requests. The epistemic account says that a request does not create any reasons and thus does not have any special normative power. Rather, a request gives reasons by revealing information which is normatively relevant. I argue that compared to competing accounts of request normativity, especially those of David Enoch and James H.P. Lewis, the epistemic account gives better answers to cases of insincere requests, is simpler, and does a better job (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. A pluralistic framework for the psychology of norms.Evan Westra & Kristin Andrews - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (5):1-30.
    Social norms are commonly understood as rules that dictate which behaviors are appropriate, permissible, or obligatory in different situations for members of a given community. Many researchers have sought to explain the ubiquity of social norms in human life in terms of the psychological mechanisms underlying their acquisition, conformity, and enforcement. Existing theories of the psychology of social norms appeal to a variety of constructs, from prediction-error minimization, to reinforcement learning, to shared intentionality, to domain-specific adaptations for norm acquisition. In (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  15. Illusions of Affection: A Hyper-Illusory Account of Normative Valence.Mihailis Diamantis - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (5-6):6-29.
    This article challenges the orthodox position that some smells are pleasantly fragrant and some tactile sensations are painful. It proposes that the affective components of our experiences are a kind of illusion. Under this alternative picture, experiences that seem to have positive or negative affect never actually do. Rather, the affective component is hyper-illusory, a second-order misrepresentation of the way things actually seem to us. While perceptual hyperillusions have elicited scepticism in other contexts, affective hyperillusions can withstand common critiques. Focusing (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Experimental Philosophical Bioethics and Normative Inference.Brian D. Earp, Jonathan Lewis, Vilius Dranseika & Ivar R. Hannikainen - 2021 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 42 (3-4):91-111.
    This paper explores an emerging sub-field of both empirical bioethics and experimental philosophy, which has been called “experimental philosophical bioethics” (bioxphi). As an empirical discipline, bioxphi adopts the methods of experimental moral psychology and cognitive science; it does so to make sense of the eliciting factors and underlying cognitive processes that shape people’s moral judgments, particularly about real-world matters of bioethical concern. Yet, as a normative discipline situated within the broader field of bioethics, it also aims to contribute to substantive (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  17. Does environmental science crowd out non-epistemic values?Kinley Gillette, Stephen Andrew Inkpen & C. Tyler DesRoches - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 87 (C):81-92.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18. History, Freedom, and Normativity in Cassirer.Michael Gregory - 2021 - In Anne Pollok & Luigi Filieri (eds.), The Method of Culture. Bologna, Metropolitan City of Bologna, Italy: pp. 167-192.
    Whether and to what extent Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of culture contains a normative element for the proper evaluation of symbolic forms is a central question in Cassirer interpretation. In this paper, my aim is to specify the nature of this normative element. I not only assert the existence of a real normative dimension in the philosophy of culture, but also specify the nature of its main element: the concept of freedom. The concept of freedom in Cassirer is by no means (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Der letzte Universalismus. Foucaults Freiheitsdenken und die Begründung von radikaler Demokratie im Postfundamentalismus.Schubert Karsten - 2021 - In Oliver Flügel-Martinsen, Franziska Martinsen & Martin Saar (eds.), Das Politische (in) der Politischen Theorie. Nomos. pp. 43-58.
    Die Debatte um die politische Differenz stellt Kontingenz und Konfliktualität als fundamentale Eigenschaften des Politischen heraus. Dies birgt ein Problem für die postfundamentalistische Demokratietheorie, die auf Augenhöhe mit dieser Debatte argumentieren will: Durch die Kontingentsetzung aller normativen Begründungen ist zunächst unklar, welche Art von demokratischen Institutionen wie begründet werden kann, und sogar, ob es überhaupt eine von der postfundamentalistischen Sozialontologie ausgehend argumentierende normative Begründung für demokratische Institutionen geben kann. Meine These ist, dass Freiheit, verstanden als kontinuierliche selbstreflexive Kritik, derjenige normative (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20. The Rationality of Emotional Change: Toward a Process View.Oded Na'aman - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):245-269.
    The paper argues against a widely held synchronic view of emotional rationality. I begin by considering recent philosophical literature on various backward‐looking emotions, such as regret, grief, resentment, and anger. I articulate the general problem these accounts grapple with: a certain diminution in backward‐looking emotions seems fitting while the reasons for these emotions seem to persist. The problem, I argue, rests on the assumption that if the facts that give reason for an emotion remain unchanged, the emotion remains fitting. However, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  21. “In a certain sense we cannot make mistakes in logic”: Wittgenstein’s Anti-Psychologism and the Normativity of Logic.Gilad Nir - 2021 - Disputatio 10 (18):165-185.
    Wittgenstein’s Tractatus construes the nature of reasoning in a manner which sharply conflicts with the conventional wisdom that logic is normative, not descriptive of thought. For although we sometimes seem to reason incorrectly, Wittgenstein denies that we can make logical mistakes (5.473). My aim in this paper is to show that the Tractatus provides us with good reasons to rethink some of the central assumptions that are standardly made in thinking about the relation between logic and thought. In particular, the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  22. Hume’s and Kant’s understanding of epistemic normativity.Petar Nurkić - 2021 - Theoria, Beograd 64 (3):91-112.
    Question (d) how do we form beliefs?, implies descriptive answers. On the other hand, the question (n) how should we form beliefs?, implies normative answers. Can we provide answers to (n) questions without answering (d) questions? This (n) - (d) relation can be characterized as epistemic normativity. Hume and Kant provide answers to both questions. Hume is more inclined to psychologize these answers through an empirical approach to questions related to beliefs. While Kant is more inclined to consider a priori (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Out of habit.Santiago Amaya - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11161-11185.
    This paper argues that habits, just like beliefs, can guide intentional action. To do this, a variety of real-life cases where a person acts habitually but contrary to her beliefs are discussed. The cases serve as dissociations showing that intentional agency is possible without doxastic guidance. The upshot is a model for thinking about the rationality of habitual action and the rationalizing role that habits can play in it. The model highlights the role that our history and institutions play in (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  24. Gründe, Rationalität und Parenthetikalismus. [REVIEW]Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2020 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 68 (3):481-491.
    This is a review of Tim Henning's 'From a Rational Point of View' (Oxford 2019).
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Varieties of Normativity: Reasons, Expectations, Wide-scope oughts, and Ought-to-be’s.Arto Laitinen - 2020 - In Miguel Garcia-Godinez, Rachael Mellin & Raimo Tuomela (eds.), Social Ontology, Normativity and Law. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 133-158.
    This chapter distinguishes between several senses of “normativity”. For example, that we ought to abstain from causing unnecessary suffering is a normative, not descriptive, claim. And so is the claim that we have good reason, and ought to drive on the right, or left, side of the road because the law requires us to do that. Reasons and oughts are normative, by definition. Indeed, it may be that “[t]he normativity of all that is normative consists in the way it is, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26. Rationality, Normativity, and Emotions: An Assessment of Max Weber’s Typology of Social Action.Frédéric Minner - 2020 - Klesis 48:235-267.
    A view inherited from Max Weber states that purposive rational action, value rational action and affective action are three distinct types of social action that can compete, oppose, complement or substitute each other in social explanations. Contrary to this statement, I will defend the view that these do not constitute three different types of social actions, but that social actions always seem to concurrently involve rationality, normativity and affectivity. I show this by discussing the links between rational actions and consequentialism (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Normative explanation unchained.Pekka Väyrynen - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):278-297.
    [This paper is available as open access from the publisher.] Normative theories aim to explain why things have the normative features they have. This paper argues that, contrary to some plausible existing views, one important kind of normative explanations which first-order normative theories aim to formulate and defend can fail to transmit downward along chains of metaphysical determination of normative facts by non-normative facts. Normative explanation is plausibly subject to a kind of a justification condition whose satisfaction may fail to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  28. On Robust Discursive Equality.Thomas M. Besch - 2019 - Dialogue 58 (3):1-26.
    This paper explores the idea of robust discursive equality on which respect-based conceptions of justificatory reciprocity often draw. I distinguish between formal and substantive discursive equality and argue that if justificatory reciprocity requires that people be accorded formally equal discursive standing, robust discursive equality should not be construed as requiring standing that is equal substantively, or in terms of its discursive purchase. Still, robust discursive equality is purchase sensitive: it does not obtain when discursive standing is impermissibly unequal in purchase. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  29. Defining Normativity.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - In Kevin Toh, David Plunkett & Scott Shapiro (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. Oxford University Press. pp. 62-104.
    This paper investigates whether different philosophers’ claims about “normativity” are about the same subject or (as recently argued by Derek Parfit) theorists who appear to disagree are really using the term with different meanings, in order to cast disambiguating light on the debates over at least the nature, existence, extension, and analyzability of normativity. While I suggest the term may be multiply ambiguous, I also find reasons for optimism about a common subject-matter for metanormative theory. This is supported partly by (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  30. Taking Prudence Seriously.Guy Fletcher - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:70-94.
    Philosophers have long theorized about which things make people’s lives go well, and why, and the extent to which morality and self-interest can be reconciled. Yet little time has been spent on meta-prudential questions, questions about prudential discourse. This is surprising given that prudence is, prima facie, a normative form of discourse and, as such, cries out for further investigation. Chapter 4 takes up two major meta-prudential questions. It first examines whether there is a set of prudential reasons, generated by (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  31. Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory About All Normative Judgements By Bart Streumer. [REVIEW]StJohn Lambert - 2019 - Ethics 129 (2):421–425.
    A review of Bart Streumer's "Unbelievable Errors.".
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. On the Rationality of Vow‐making.Alida Liberman - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):881-900.
    I offer a philosophical account of vowing and the rationality of vow-making. I argue that vows are most productively understood as exceptionless resolutions that do not have any excusing conditions. I then articulate an apparent problem for exceptionless vow-making: how can it be rational to bind yourself unconditionally, when circumstances might change unexpectedly and make it the case that vow-keeping no longer makes sense for you? As a solution, I propose that vows can be rational to make only if they (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  33. Bridging the Gap between Rationality, Normativity and Emotions.Frédéric Minner - 2019 - Labyrinth: An International Journal for Philosophy, Value Theory and Sociocultural Hermeneutics 20 (1):79-98.
    Intentional explanation, according to Elster, seeks to elucidate an action by showing that it was intentionally conducted, in order to bring about certain goals . Intentional actions furthermore, are rational actions: they imply that agents establish a connection between the goals they target and the means that are appropriate to reach them, by way of different beliefs about the means, the goals and the environment. But how should we understand intentional actions in the light of philosophical research on emotions, rationality, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. The Organism and its Umwelt: a Counterpoint between the Theories of Uexküll, Goldstein and Canguilhem.Agustin Ostachuk - 2019 - In Jakob von Uexküll and Philosophy: Life, Environments, Anthropology. Londres, Reino Unido: pp. 158-171.
    The topic of the relationship between the organism and its environment runs through the theories of Uexküll, Goldstein and Canguilhem with equal importance. In this work a counterpoint will be established between their theories, in the attempt to assess at which points the melodies are concordant and at which points they are discordant. As fundamental basis to his theory, Uexküll relies on the concept of conformity to a plan, which allows him to account for the congruity and perfect adjustment between (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35. Laws as Conventional Norms.Nicholas Southwood - 2019 - In D. Plunkett, S. Shapiro & K. Toh (eds.), Legal Norms, Ethical Norms: New Essays on Meta-Ethics and Jurisprudence. Oxford University Press.
    A persistent worry concerning conventionalist accounts of law is that such accounts are ill equipped to account for law’s special normativity. I offer a particular kind of conventionalist account that is based on the practice-dependent account of conventional norms I have offered elsewhere and consider whether it is vulnerable to the Normativity Objection. I argue that it isn’t. It can account for all the ways in which law can justly claim to be normative. While there are ways of being normative (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  36. Reasons why in normative explanation.Pekka Väyrynen - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (6):607-623.
    Normative explanations, which specify why things have the normative features they do, are ubiquitous in normative theory and ordinary thought. But there is much less work on normative explanation than on scientific or metaphysical explanation. Skow (2016) argues that a complete answer to the question why some fact Q occurs consists in all of the reasons why Q occurs. This paper explores this theory as a case study of a general theory that promises to offer us a grip on normative (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  37. Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter.Derek Clayton Baker - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
    There are many different oughts. There is a moral ought, a prudential ought, an epistemic ought, the legal ought, the ought of etiquette, and so on. These oughts can prescribe incompatible actions. What I morally ought to do may be different from what I self-interestedly ought to do. Philosophers have claimed that these conflicts are resolved by an authoritative ought, or by facts about what one ought to do simpliciter or all-things-considered. However, the only coherent notion of an ought simpliciter (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  38. Normativity all the way down: from normative realism to pannormism.Einar Duenger Bohn - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):4107-4124.
    In this paper, I provide an argument for pannormism, the view according to which there are normative properties all the way down. In particular, I argue for what I call the trickling down principle, which says that if there is a metaphysically basic normative property, then, if whatever instantiates it has a ground, that ground instantiates it as well.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  39. Needing and Necessity.Guy Fletcher - 2018 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 170-192.
    Claims about needs are a ubiquitous feature of everyday practical discourse. It is therefore unsurprising that needs have long been a topic of interest in moral philosophy, applied ethics, and political philosophy. Philosophers have devoted much time and energy to developing theories of the nature of human needs and the like. -/- Philosophers working on needs are typically committed to the idea that there are different kinds of needs and that within the different kinds of needs is a privileged class (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  40. Normativity in joint action.Javier Gomez-Lavin & Matthew Rachar - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (1):97-120.
    The debate regarding the nature of joint action has come to a stalemate due to a dependence on intuitional methods. Normativists, such as Margaret Gilbert, argue that action-relative normative relations are inherent in joint action, while non-normativists, such as Michael Bratman, claim that there are minimal cases of joint action without normative relations. In this work, we describe the first experimental examinations of these intuitions, and report the results of six studies that weigh in favor of the normativist paradigm. Philosophical (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  41. Bart Streumer, Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory About All Normative Judgements: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. ISBN 9780198785897. Pp. 223. £45.00 Hbk.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (2):445-447.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. Alignment and commitment in joint action.Matthew Rachar - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):831-849.
    Important work on alignment systems has been applied to philosophical work on joint action by Tollefsen and Dale. This paper builds from and expands on their work. The first aim of the paper is to spell out how the empirical research on alignment may be integrated into philosophical theories of joint action. The second aim is then to develop a successful characterization of joint action, which spells out the difference between genuine joint action and simpler forms of coordination based on (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Two Thesis about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In C. McHugh, J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 221-240.
    In tradition linked to Aristotle and Kant, many contemporary philosophers treat practical and theoretical normativity as two genuinely distinct domains of normativity. In this paper I consider the question of what it is for normative domains to be distinct. I suggest that there are two different ways that the distinctness thesis might be understood and consider the different implications of the two different distinctness theses.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  44. Scope or Focus? Normative Focus and the Metaphysics of Normative Relations.Nicholas Shackel - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (6):281-312.
    A prolonged debate about the nature of norms has been conducted in terms of the scope of a modal operator. Here I argue that the features of what I call Normative Focus are more fundamental than scope. We shall see limitations of scope contrasted with better analysis in terms of Normative Focus. Some authors address such limitations by extending what they mean by scope. I show that scope is still not doing the work: what does it is their elicitation of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Introduction.Daniel Star - 2018 - In The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  46. Categorical Norms and Convention‐Relativism about Epistemic Discourse.Cameron Boult - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):85-99.
    Allan Hazlett has recently developed an alternative to the most popular form of anti-realism about epistemic normativity, epistemic expressivism. He calls it “convention-relativism about epistemic discourse”. The view deserves more attention. In this paper, I give it attention in the form of an objection. Specifically, my objection turns on a distinction between inescapable and categorical norms. While I agree with Hazlett that convention-relativism is consistent with inescapable epistemic norms, I argue that it is not consistent with categorical epistemic norms. I (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. Hard Choices.Ruth Chang - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (1):1-21.
    What makes a choice hard? I discuss and criticize three common answers and then make a proposal of my own. Paradigmatic hard choices are not hard because of our ignorance, the incommensurability of values, or the incomparability of the alternatives. They are hard because the alternatives are on a par; they are comparable, but one is not better than the other, and yet nor are they equally good. So understood, hard choices open up a new way of thinking about what (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  48. Précis zu The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 71 (4):560-4.
    This is a summary of the main ideas of my book 'The Normativity of Rationality'.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  49. Review of Pragmatic Perspectives in Phenomenology edited by O. Švec and J. Čapek. [REVIEW]Jonathan Lewis - 2017 - Phenomenological Reviews 3:76.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Motherhood in Ferrante's The Lost Daughter: A Case Study of Irony as Extraordinary Reflection.Melissa Mcbay Merritt - 2017 - Philosophy and Literature 41 (1):185-200.
    In A Case for Irony, Jonathan Lear aims to advance “a distinguished philosophical tradition that conceives of humanity as a task” by returning this tradition to the ironic figure at its origin — Socrates. But he is hampered by his reliance on well-worn philosophical examples. I suggest that Elena Ferrante’s The Lost Daughter illustrates the mode of ironic experience that interests Lear, and helps us to think through his relation to Christine Korsgaard, arguably the greatest contemporary proponent of the philosophical (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 95