Bildung, Meaning, and Reasons

Verifiche: Rivista Trimestrale di Scienze Umane 41 (1-3):73-102 (2012)
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Abstract

By endorsing that Bildung is a condition for thought, McDowell explicitly sets out to revive a theme in classical german philosophy. As long as the concept of Bildung is intended to play a role in McDowell’s theory of meaning and reasons, however, it is best understood in the light of its distinctive combination of neo-Fregeanism about content and Wittgensteinianism about rule-following. The Fregean part is there to warrant that reasons are objective, the Wittgensteinian move is to account for our grasping of reasons. I argue that, as it stands, the project can hardly succeed. According to this reading, Bildung not only provides the epistemic resources to access reasons. It shapes them in a way that is in tension with the idea that reasons are objective. I conclude with a guess about the amendment needed to keep the project in the air.

Author's Profile

Matteo Bianchin
UniversitĂ  Degli Studi Di Roma "Tor Vergata"

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