Is there room for reference borrowing in Donnellan’s historical explanation theory?

Linguistics and Philosophy 37 (3):175-203 (2014)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Famously, both Saul Kripke and Keith Donnellan opposed description theories and insisted on the role of history in determining the reference of a proper name token. No wonder, then, that their views on proper names have often been assimilated. By focusing on reference borrowing—an alleged phenomenon that Kripke takes to be fundamental—we argue that they should not be. In particular, we claim that according to Donnellan a proper name token never borrows its reference from preceding tokens which it is historically connected to. On the contrary, its reference is always fixed anew on who or what the speaker has in mind when he or she produces it. In fact, what is important to realize is that Donnellan and Kripke took two different histories to be relevant: that of the proper name token produced by the speaker , and that of the cognitive status of the speaker when he or she produces it . We end by suggesting that this difference between Kripke’s and Donnellan’s accounts of proper names rests on a more general difference in their approach to language
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BIAITR
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-06-04
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Themes From Kaplan.Almog, Joseph; Perry, John & Wettstein, Howard (eds.)

View all 37 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2014-07-18

Total views
56 ( #29,707 of 39,700 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #36,353 of 39,700 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.