Results for 'Kripke'

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  1. Kripke: modalità e verità.Achille C. Varzi - 2010 - In Andrea Borghini (ed.), (ed.), Il genio compreso. La filosofia di Saul Kripke. Carocci Editore. pp. 21–76, 186–191.
    An introduction to Kripke’s semantics for propositional and quantified modal logic (with special reference to its historical development from the original 1959 version to the extended versions of 1963 and 1965) and to his theory of truth.
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  2. Kripke's Account of the Rule‐Following Considerations.Andrea Guardo - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):366-388.
    This paper argues that most of the alleged straight solutions to the sceptical paradox which Kripke ascribed to Wittgenstein can be regarded as the first horn of a dilemma whose second horn is the paradox itself. The dilemma is proved to be a by‐product of a foundationalist assumption on the notion of justification, as applied to linguistic behaviour. It is maintained that the assumption is unnecessary and that the dilemma is therefore spurious. To this end, an alternative conception of (...)
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  3. Pragmatic Ambiguity and Kripke’s Dialogue Against Donnellan.Carlo Penco - 2019 - Ágora Filosófica 19 (1):103-134.
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.25247/P1982-999X.2019.v19n1.p103-134• Esta obra está licenciada sob uma licençaCreative Commons Atribuição 4.0 InternacionalISSN 1982-999x|Pragmatic ambiguity and Kripke’s dialogue against DonnellanAmbiguidade Pragmática e o diálogo de Kripke contra DonnellanCarlo Penco (Universidade de Genova, Itália)AbstractIn this paper I discuss Donnellan’s claim of the pragmatic ambiguity of the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite des-criptions. The literature on the topic is huge and full of alternative analysis. I will restrict myself to a very classical topos: the challenge posed by (...) to Donnellan’s distinction with the case of a dialogue on an attempt to update a misdescription. I claim that to treat the problem of the referential use of definite descriptions we need not only to take into account the context of utterance, but also the cognitive context with its epistemic restrictions and the possible different contexts of reception of the same utterance. I try to show different aspects of what can be called “pragmatic ambiguity”, which seem not correctly considered by Kripke, and connect them to the basic tenets of Grice Cooperative principle. (shrink)
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  4. Wittgenstein, Kripke, and the Rule Following Paradox.Adam M. Croom - 2010 - Dialogue 52 (3):103-109.
    In?201 of Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein puts forward his famous? rule - following paradox.? The paradox is how can one follow in accord with a rule? the applications of which are potentially infinite? when the instances from which one learns the rule and the instances in which one displays that one has learned the rule are only finite? How can one be certain of rule - following at all? In Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke concedes the (...)
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  5. Indexicals as Demonstratives: On the Debate Between Kripke and Künne.Carlo Penco - 2013 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 88 (1):55-71.
    This paper is a comparison of Kripke’s and Künne’s interpretations of Frege’s theory of indexicals, especially concerning Frege’s remarks on time as “part of the expression of thought”. I analyze the most contrasting features of Kripke’s and Künne’s interpretations of Frege’s remarks on indexicals. Subsequently, I try to identify a common ground between Kripke’s and Künne’s interpretations, and hint at a possible convergence between those two views, stressing the importance given by Frege to nonverbal signs in defining (...)
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  6. Será Procedente o Argumento de Kripke Contra a Teoria da Identidade Tipo-Tipo?Domingos Faria - 2014 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 70 (1):112-131.
    Resumo O meu objetivo neste artigo é examinar criticamente o argumento de Kripke contra a teoria da identidade tipo-tipo. Assumindo a tese da necessidade da identidade, bem como a tese da designação rígida, Kripke sustenta que se a dor é idêntica à estimulação das fibras C, então a dor é necessariamente idêntica à estimulação das fibras C. No entanto, precisamente porque a proposição expressa pela frase “a dor não é idêntica à estimulação das fibras C” é uma possibilidade (...)
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  7. On Boyd's Rebuttal of Kripke's Argument for Dualism.Klaus Ladstaetter - 2014 - Papers of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium 22:175-177.
    The essay presents Saul Kripke's argument for mind/body-dualism and makes the suppositions explicit on which it rests. My claim, inspired by Richard Boyd, is that even if one of Kripke’s central suppositions - the principle of necessity of identities using rigid designators - is shared by the non-traditional identity theorist, it is still possible for her to rebut Kripke’s dualism.
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  8. Kripke's Second Paragraph of Philosophical Investigations 201.Samuel Weir - 2007 - Philosophical Investigations 30 (2):172–178.
    The received view of Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that it fails as an interpretation because, inter alia, it ignores or overlooks what Wittgenstein has to say in the second paragraph of Philosophical Investigations 201. In this paper, I demonstrate that the paragraph in question is in fact fully accommodated within Kripke's reading, and cannot therefore be reasonably utilised to object to it. -/- In part one I characterise the objection; in part two I explain (...)
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  9. Estudio crítico: Martin Kusch A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules. Defending Kripke's Wittgenstein, Montreal and Kingston, Ithaca, McGuill-Queen's University Press, 2006.Pedro Karczmarczyk - 2007 - Fenomenologia. Diálogos Possíveis Campinas: Alínea/Goiânia: Editora da Puc Goiás 42 (89):157-188.
    El presente trabajo es un estudio del libro de Martin Kusch acerca den las tesis sostenidas en "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language" (WRPL) por Saul Kripke examinado a la luz de la controversia desatada por la publicación del mismo en 1982, una de las más intensas que han ocurrido en los últimos 25 años en el seno de la filosofía analítica. En nuestro estudio procedemos en tres etapas. En la primera, presentaremos el desafío del Wittgenstein de Kripke (...)
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  10. Kripke y las descripciones rígidas.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1993 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 19 (1):109-113.
    In this paper I discuss a passage from *Naming and Necessity* where Kripke assumes that the essential properties by means of which a definite description designates are a sufficient condition of its rigidity. I put forward two examples that show the falsity of this assumption. Then I examine the non-rigid character of definite descriptions that designate by means of properties that are sufficient conditions of identity of the objects designated by those descriptions. I conclude that the properties by means (...)
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  11. Kripke.Bryan Frances - 2011 - In Barry Lee (ed.), Key Thinkers in the Philosophy of Language. Continuum. pp. 249-267.
    This chapter introduces Kripke's work to advanced undergraduates, mainly focussing on his "A Puzzle About Belief" and "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language".
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  12. Names, Sense and Kripke’s Puzzle.Tim Crane - 1992 - From the Logical Point of View 2:11-26.
    Frege introduced the distinction between sense and reference to account for the information conveyed by identity statements. We can put the point like this: if the meaning of a term is exhausted by what it stands for, then how can 'a =a' and 'a =b' differ in meaning? Yet it seems they do, for someone who understands all the terms involved would not necessarily judge that a =b even though they judged that a =a. It seems that 'a =b' just (...)
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  13. Émergences par les règles sans « formes de vie » une relecture de Kripke (1982) pour la simulation informatique du vivant.Franck Varenne - 2008 - Noesis 14:201-236.
    Cet article ne se veut pas un commentaire suivi de la réflexion de Wittgenstein sur les règles. Ce ne sera pas non plus un commentaire de l’interprétation que Kripke fait du « suivi de la règle » chez Wittgenstein. Il ne sera pas davantage une application des thèses de Wittgenstein ni une tentative d’application directe d’une interprétation de ces thèses à l’épistémologie de la simulation du vivant ; ce qui serait, en soi, d’ailleurs contestable. Ce travail vise seulement à (...)
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  14. How to Refrain From Answering Kripke’s Puzzle.Lewis Powell - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):287-308.
    In this paper, I investigate the prospects for using the distinction between rejection and denial to resolve Saul Kripke’s puzzle about belief. One puzzle Kripke presents in A Puzzle About Belief poses what would have seemed a fairly straightforward question about the beliefs of the bilingual Pierre, who is disposed to sincerely and reflectively assent to the French sentence Londres est jolie, but not to the English sentence London is pretty, both of which he understands perfectly well. The (...)
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  15. Dicing with Saul Kripke.Andrea Bianchi - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (2):237 - 249.
    Everyone knows what David Lewis' possible worlds are, what role they play in his account of possibility and necessity, and Saul Kripke's criticisms. But what, instead, are Kripke's possible worlds, and what role do they play in his account of possibility and necessity? The answers are not so obvious. Recently, it has even been claimed that, contrary to what is standardly assumed, Kripke's approach to modality has not always been consistently metaphysical. In particular, an interpretation of the (...)
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  16.  42
    Foucault and Kripke on the Proper Names of Authors.Christopher Mole - 2016 - Philosophy and Literature 40 (2):383-398.
    The semantic issues that Saul Kripke addressed in Naming and Necessity overlap substantially with those that were addressed by Michel Foucault in “What Is an Author?”. The present essay examines their area of overlap, with a view to showing that each of these works affords a perspective on the other, from which facets that are usually obscure can be brought into view. It shows that Foucault needs to take some assumptions from Kripke’s theory of naming in order to (...)
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  17.  45
    Weak Arithmetics and Kripke Models.Morteza Moniri - 2002 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 48 (1):157-160.
    In the first section of this paper we show that i Π1 ≡ W⌝⌝lΠ1 and that a Kripke model which decides bounded formulas forces iΠ1 if and only if the union of the worlds in any path in it satisflies IΠ1. In particular, the union of the worlds in any path of a Kripke model of HA models IΠ1. In the second section of the paper, we show that for equivalence of forcing and satisfaction of Πm-formulas in a (...)
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  18. A Critique of Saul Kripke's "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language".Chrysoula Gitsoulis - 2008 - Dissertation, Graduate Center, City University of New York
    In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke presents a controversial skeptical argument, which he attributes to Wittgenstein’s interlocutor in the Philosophical Investigations [PI]. The argument purports to show that there are no facts that correspond to what we mean by our words. Kripke maintains, moreover, that the conclusion of Wittgenstein’s so-called private language argument is a corollary of results Wittgenstein establishes in §§137-202 of PI concerning the topic of following-a-rule, and not the conclusion of an independently (...)
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  19.  98
    The Goodman-Kripke Paradox.Robert Kowalenko - 2003 - Dissertation, King's College London
    The Kripke/Wittgenstein paradox and Goodman’s riddle of induction can be construed as problems of multiple redescription, where the relevant sceptical challenge is to provide factual grounds justifying the description we favour. A choice of description or predicate, in turn, is tantamount to the choice of a curve over a set of data, a choice apparently governed by implicitly operating constraints on the relevant space of possibilities. Armed with this analysis of the two paradoxes, several realist solutions of Kripke’s (...)
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  20. Sense and Linguistic Meaning: A Solution to the Burge-Kripke Conflict.Carlo Penco - 2013 - Paradigmi 3:75-89.
    When “Sinning Against Frege” was published in 1979 I thought it should have given a real turn in the discussion on Frege’s ideas. Actually the impact was less then I imagined, and the problem was that – at the end of the story – Tyler Burge’s interpretation should have posed a shadow on the direct reference theories and the Millean criticism of descriptivist theories of proper names, based on the criticism of the identification of Frege’s notion of sense with linguistic (...)
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  21. The Quasi-Verbal Dispute Between Kripke and 'Frege-Russell'.J. P. Smit - manuscript
    Traditional descriptivism and Kripkean causalism are standardly interpreted as rival theories on a single topic. I argue that there is no such shared topic, i.e. that there is no question that they can be interpreted as giving rival answers to. The only way to make sense of the commitment to epistemic transparency that characterizes traditional descriptivism is to interpret Russell and Frege as proposing rival accounts of how to characterize a subject’s beliefs about what names refer to. My argument relies (...)
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  22. On Kripke's Skeptical Paradox and Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Problem.Francois-Igor Pris - 2014 - Philosophical Investigations (Russian E-Journal) 1:65-112.
    Предлагается виттгенштайновское решение скептического парадокса Крипке, который возникает в результате пренебрежения прагматикой и нормативным измерением производимых операций. Парадокс Крипке указывает на то, что натурализация смысла и проблемы следования правилу в рамках классического (ненормативного) натурализма невозможна. Анализируется и критикуется недавно предложенная Гинзборг интерпретация парадокса. Хотя её натуралистический «срединный путь» между диспозиционализмом и ментализмом и близок к нормативному виттгенштайновскому натурализму, вводимое ею понятие примитивной нормативности неудовлетворительно. Правильнее говорить не о натурализме с минимальным добавлением нормативности, как это делает Гинзборг, а о нормативном натурализме.
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  23. Normativity and Meaning: Kripke's Skeptical Paradox Reconsidered.Consuelo Preti - 2002 - Philosophical Forum 33 (1):39-62.
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  24.  17
    La théorie causale de la référence de Saul Kripke.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    Dans Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke a proposé une théorie causale de la référence selon laquelle un nom se réfère à un objet en vertu d'une connexion causale avec l'objet, médiatisée par les communautés de locuteurs. Il déclare également que les noms propres, contrairement à la plupart des descriptions, sont des désignations rigides (le nom propre fait référence à l'objet nommé dans tout monde possible dans lequel l'objet existe)Les idées de Naming and Necessity ont évolué au fil du temps, (...)
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  25.  37
    Causal Theory of Reference of Saul Kripke.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    Since the 1960s, Kripke has been a central figure in several fields related to mathematical logic, language philosophy, mathematical philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology and set theory. He had influential and original contributions to logic, especially modal logic, and analytical philosophy, with a semantics of modal logic involving possible worlds, now called Kripke semantics. In Naming and Necessity, Kripke proposed a causal theory of reference, according to which a name refers to an object by virtue of a causal connection (...)
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  26.  51
    Teoria cauzală a referinței a lui Saul Kripke.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    În Numire și necesitate Kripke a propus o teorie cauzală a referinței, conform căreia un nume se referă la un obiect prin virtutea unei conexiuni cauzale cu obiectul, mediată de comunitățile vorbitorilor. El afirmă, de asemenea, că numele proprii, spre deosebire de majoritatea descrierilor, sunt desemnări rigide (numele propriu se referă la obiectul numit în orice lume posibilă în care obiectul există). Ideile din Numire și necesitate au evoluat în timp, dezvoltându-se pe baza cercetărilor formale anterioare în teoria modelelor (...)
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  27.  39
    The Real Nature of Kripke's Paradox.Christoph C. Pfisterer - 2000 - Wiener Linguistische Gazette 64:83-98.
    Reading Kripke's "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language", at first one can easily get confused about his claim that the problem discovered was a sort of ontological skepticism. Contrary to the opinion of a great number of contemporary philosophers who hold that rule-following brings up merely epistemological problems I will argue that the scepticism presented by Kripke really is ontological because it is concerned with the exclusion of certain facts. The first section in this paper is dedicated to (...)
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  28. Kripke’s Category Error: Why There Are No Necessary A Posteriori Propositions.Peter Ulric Tse - manuscript
    Kripke’s main argument against descriptivism is rooted in a category error that confuses statements about the world with statements about models of the world. It is only because of the ambiguity introduced by the fact that a single sentence can frame two different propositions, one necessary and the other a posteriori, that one reaches the mistaken conclusion that there can be necessary a posteriori truths. This ambiguity from language was carried over into modal logic by Kripke. However, we (...)
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  29. Goodman’s Paradox, Hume’s Problem, Goodman-Kripke Paradox: Three Different Issues.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    On page 14 of "Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences" (section 4 of chapter 1) by Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin is written: “Since ‘blue’ and ‘green’ are interdefinable with ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’, the question of which pair is basic and which pair derived is entirely a question of which pair we start with”. This paper points out that an example of interdefinability is also that one about the predicate “grueb”, which is a predicate that applies to (...)
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  30. Kripke and the Dogmatism Paradox.Kaave Lajevardi - manuscript
    I aim at dissolving Kripke's dogmatism paradox by arguing that, with respect to any particular proposition p which is known by a subject A, it is not irrational for A to ignore all evidence against p. Along the way, I offer a definition of 'A is dogmatic with respect to p', and make a distinction between an objective and a subjective sense of 'should' in the statement 'A should ignore all the evidence against p'. For the most part, I (...)
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  31. Categoricity and Negation. A Note on Kripke’s Affirmativism.Constantin C. Brîncuș & Iulian D. Toader - 2019 - In The Logica Yearbook 2018. London: College Publications. pp. 57-66.
    We argue that, if taken seriously, Kripke's view that a language for science can dispense with a negation operator is to be rejected. Part of the argument is a proof that positive logic, i.e., classical propositional logic without negation, is not categorical.
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  32. The Discovery That Phosphorus is Hesperus: A Follow-Up to Kripke on the Necessity of Identity.M. J. García-Encinas - 2017 - Analysis and Metaphysics 16:52-69.
    It was an empirical discovery that Phosphorus is Hesperus. According to Kripke, this was also the discovery of a necessary fact. Now, given Kripke’s theory of direct reference one could wonder what kind of discovery this is. For we already knew Phosphorus/Hesperus, and we also knew that any entity is, necessarily, identical to itself. So what is it that was discovered? I want to show that there is more to this widely known case than what usual readings, and (...)
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  33. Kripke's Objections to Description Theories of Names.Michael McKinsey - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):485 - 497.
    In “Naming and Necessity” Saul Kripke describes some cases which, he claims, provide counterexamples both to cluster theories and, more generally, to description theories of proper names. My view of these cases is that while they do not provide counterexamples to cluster theories, they can be used to provide evidence against single-description theories. In this paper I shall defend both of the claims involved in my view.
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  34. On the Weak Kleene Scheme in Kripke's Theory of Truth.James Cain & Zlatan Damnjanovic - 1991 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (4):1452-1468.
    It is well known that the following features hold of AR + T under the strong Kleene scheme, regardless of the way the language is Gödel numbered: 1. There exist sentences that are neither paradoxical nor grounded. 2. There are 2ℵ0 fixed points. 3. In the minimal fixed point the weakly definable sets (i.e., sets definable as {n∣ A(n) is true in the minimal fixed point where A(x) is a formula of AR + T) are precisely the Π1 1 sets. (...)
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  35. How Creationism Supports for Kripke’s Vichianism on Fiction.Alberto Voltolini - 2011 - In F. Lihoreau (ed.), Truth in Fiction. Ontos Verlag. pp. 38--93.
    In this paper, I want to show that a reasonable thesis on truth in fiction, Fictional Vichianism (FV)—according to which fictional truths are true because they are stipulated to be true—can be positively endorsed if one grounds Kripke’s justification for (FV), that traces back to the idea that names used in fiction never refer to concrete real individuals, into a creationist position on fictional entities that allows for a distinction between the pretending and the characterizing use of fiction-involving sentences. (...)
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  36. The Ambiguity Thesis Vs. Kripke's Defence of Russell: Further Developments.Murali Ramachandran & Nadja Rosental - 2000 - Philosophical Writings 14:49-57.
    Kripke (1977) presents an argument designed to show that the considerations in Donnellan (1966) concerning attributive and referential uses of (definite) descriptions do not, by themselves, refute Russell’s (1905) unitary theory of description sentences (RTD), which takes (utterances of) them to express purely general, quantificational, propositions. Against Kripke, Marga Reimer (1998) argues that the two uses do indeed reflect a semantic ambiguity (an ambiguity at the level of literal truth conditions). She maintains a Russellian (quantificational) analysis of utterances (...)
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  37. Analytic Truths and Kripke’s Semantic Turn.Zsófia Zvolenszky - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):327-341.
    In his influential Naming and Necessity lectures, Saul Kripke made new sense of modal statements: “Kant might have been a bachelor”, “Königsberg is necessarily identical with Kaliningrad”. Many took the notions he introduced-metaphysical necessity and rigid designation -- to herald new metaphysical issues and have important consequences. In fact, the Kripkean insight is at bottom semantic, rather than metaphysical: it is part of how proper names work that they purport to refer to individuals to whom modal properties can be (...)
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  38.  23
    Kripke on Theoretical Identifications: A Rejoinder to Perrick.J. Buxton - 1988 - Logique Et Analyse 31 (121-122):109-113.
    This paper examines an argument of Saul Kripke for the necessity of theoretical identification statements and defends it against a criticism of M. Perrick ("Are Kripke's Theoretical Identifications Necessary Truths?", Logique et Analyse, Volume 115, September 1986, pages 381-384). It is argued that Perrick's criticism rests on a fallacy of ambiguity. Formal modal logic is used to examine a number of plausible interpretations of Kripke's argument, and Perrick's error is shown to arise from confusion concerning the scope (...)
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  39. Goodman's Paradox, Hume's Problem, Goodman-Kripke Paradox: Three Different Issues.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    ABSTRACT This paper reports (in section 1 “Introduction”) some quotes from Nelson Goodman which clarify that, contrary to a common misunderstanding, Goodman always denied that “grue” requires temporal information and “green” does not require temporal information; and, more in general, that Goodman always denied that grue-like predicates require additional information compared to what green-like predicates require. One of the quotations is the following, taken from the first page of the Foreword to chapter 8 “Induction” of the Goodman’s book “Problems and (...)
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  40. Translating Kripke's Pierre.Cristian Constantinescu - 2007 - The Reasoner 1 (7):5-6.
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  41.  39
    The Modal Logics of Kripke-Feferman Truth.Carlo Nicolai & Johannes Stern - manuscript
    We determine the modal logic of fixed-point models of truth and their axiomatizations by Solomon Feferman via Solovay-style completeness results.
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  42. A Note on Kripke's Puzzle About Belief.Cristian Constantinescu - 2007 - The Reasoner 1 (4):8-9.
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  43. Saul Kripke: Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume 1. [REVIEW]Stephen Yablo - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (4):221-229.
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  44. Review: Soames on Kripke[REVIEW]Stephen Yablo - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (3):451 - 460.
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  45.  94
    Reid, Rosmini, Mill, and Kripke on Proper Names.Inge-Bert Täljedal - 2017 - In Rosminianesimo filosofico (ed. S. F. Tadini). Milan, Italy: Edizioni Mimesis. pp. 271–281.
    The theory of proper names proposed by J.S. Mill in A system of logic (1843), and discussed in S. Kripke’s Naming and necessity (1980), is shown to be predated by A. Rosmini’s Nuovo saggio sull’origine delle idee (1830) and T. Reid’s Essays on the intellectual powers of man (1785). For philological reasons, Rosmini probably did not obtain his view of proper names from Reid. For philosophical reasons, it is unlikely that he got it from Hobbes, Locke, Smith, or Stewart. (...)
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  46. Wittgenstein on Rule Following: A Critical and Comparative Study of Saul Kripke, John McDowell, Peter Winch, and Cora Diamond.Samuel Weir - 2003 - Dissertation, King's College London
    This thesis is a critical and comparative study of four commentators on the later Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations. As such its primary aim is exegetical, and ultimately the thesis seeks to arrive at an enriched understanding of Wittgenstein’s work through the distillation of the four commentators into what, it is hoped, can be said to approach a definitive interpretation, freed of their individual frailties. -/- The thesis commences by explicating the position of Kripke’s Wittgenstein. He draws our attention to (...)
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  47.  68
    That’s the Guy Who Might Have Lost.Tristan Grøtvedt Haze - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    In an influential passage of Naming and Necessity Kripke argues, with the help of a fictional dialogue, that de re metaphysical modal distinctions have intuitive content. In this note I clarify the workings of the argument, and what it does and does not support. I conclude that Kripke’s argument does not, despite possible appearances, support the view that metaphysical modal distinctions are made in common sense discourse. The argument does however support the view that if metaphysical modal distinctions (...)
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  48. The Qua-Problem and Meaning Scepticism.Samuel Douglas - 2018 - Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 17:71–78.
    When considering potential solutions to meaning-scepticism, Kripke (1982) did not consider a causal-theoretic approach. Kusch (2006) has argued that this is due to the qua-problem. I consider Kusch’s criticism of Maddy (1984) and McGinn (1984) before offering a different way to solve the qua-problem, one that is not susceptible to sceptical attack. If this solution is successful, at least one barrier to using a causal theory to refute Kripke’s scepticism is removed.
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  49. Metaphysics of Pain; Semantics of ‘Pain’.Alik Pelman - 2015 - Ratio 28 (1):302-317.
    Functionalism is often used to identify mental states with physical states. A particularly powerful case is Lewis's analytical functionalism. Kripke's view seriously challenges any such identification. The dispute between Kripke and Lewis's views boils down to whether the term ‘pain’ is rigid or nonrigid. It is a strong intuition of ours that if it feels like pain it is pain, and vice versa, so that ‘pain’ should designate, with respect to every possible world, all and only states felt (...)
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  50. Semantic Normativity.Åsa Maria Wikforss - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (2):203-26.
    My paper examines the popular idea, defended by Kripke, that meaning is an essentially normative notion. I consider four common versions of this idea and suggest that none of them can be supported, either because the alleged normativity has nothing to do with normativity or because it cannot plausibly be said that meaning is normative in the sense suggested. I argue that contrary to received opinion, we don’t need normativity to secure the possibility of meaning. I conclude by considering (...)
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