Pluralism and Deliberation

In Volker Kaul & Ingrid Salvatore (eds.), What is Pluralism? London: Routledge. pp. 31-47 (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
In this chapter, I consider the claim for pluralism commonly advanced in political philosophy as a claim concerning the standards, methods, and norms for forming belief and judgment about certain kinds of facts rather than the nature of facts themselves. After distinguishing between descriptive and normative epistemic pluralism, I contend that in this context, pluralism needs to rest on grounds that are stronger than fallibilism yet weaker than relativism in order to enjoy a distinct standing. The idea of reasonable pluralism seems to devise a variety of normative pluralism designed to meet this demand. I argue, however, that this is an unstable position and suggest that an epistemic view of deliberation may be better suited to making sense of political justification. The latter view, though, is bound to dispense with normative pluralism.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-04-13
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
48 ( #55,507 of 2,448,218 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
36 ( #18,252 of 2,448,218 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.