Slow Switching and Authority of Self-Knowledge

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Abstract
Based on content externalism, the question of whether self-knowledge is authoritative or not has launched a real controversy in the philosophy of mind. Boghossian proposed slow switching argument in defense of incompatibility of the two views. This argument has been criticized by some philosophers through different approaches. Vahid is one of them. He claimed that Boghossian's argument appeals to some controversial assumptions without which it cannot achieve its conclusion. In this article, I criticize Vahid's response to slow switching argument and show that self-knowledge in Vahid's response differs in having authority and therefore in function from that of Boghossian.
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Archival date: 2014-11-28
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2014-11-28

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