Skepticism, Misc

Edited by Everett Fulmer (Loyola University, New Orleans)
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  1. added 2020-06-21
    On The Hypothetical Given.Adam Marushak - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    My aim in this paper is to assess the viability of a perceptual epistemology based on what Anil Gupta calls the “hypothetical given”. On this account, experience alone yields no unconditional entitlement to perceptual beliefs. Experience functions instead to establish relations of rational support between what Gupta calls “views” and perceptual beliefs. I argue that the hypothetical given is a genuine alternative to the prevailing theories of perceptual justification but that the account faces a dilemma: on a natural assumption about (...)
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  2. added 2020-06-16
    On Intellectual Skepticism: A Selection of Skeptical Arguments and Tusi's Criticisms, with Some Comparative Notes.Pirooz Fatoorchi - 2013 - Philosophy East and West 63 (2):213-250.
    This essay deals with a selected part of an epistemological controversy provided by Tūsī in response to the skeptical arguments reported by Rāzī that is related to what might be called "intellectual skepticism," or skepticism regarding the judgments of the intellect, particularly in connection with self-evident principles. It will be shown that Rāzī has cited and exposed a position that seems to be no less than a medieval version of empiricism. Tūsī, in contrast, has presented us with a position that (...)
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  3. added 2020-01-30
    What Pessimism Is.Paul Prescott - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:337-356.
    On the standard view, pessimism is a philosophically intractable topic. Against the standard view, I hold that pessimism is a stance, or compound of attitudes, commitments and intentions. This stance is marked by certain beliefs—first and foremost, that the bad prevails over the good—which are subject to an important qualifying condition: they are always about outcomes and states of affairs in which one is personally invested. This serves to distinguish pessimism from other views with which it is routinely conflated— including (...)
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  4. added 2019-11-21
    "Introduction" - Ch 1 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification.
    In this introduction I present the topic of the investigation carried out in this book and the central theses defended in it. I also clarify some assumption of my research, specify the intended audience of this book and summarize its structure.
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  5. added 2019-10-12
    Descartes Foundationalism: An Answer to the Skeptics’ or A Way Out?Ncha Gabriel Bubu - 2019 - Social Sciences Studies Journal 5 (44):5232-5237.
    The phenomenon of knowledge is a fundamental issue in epistemology as a main branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge related problems. Over time, epistemologists attempted to give us or provide clues as to what reality actually is, that is the question of the certainty of knowledge has always been topical in any epistemic enterprise. The search for knowledge becomes more cumbersome when one considers the challenge of the skeptics and sophists about the ability of man knowing anything for certain. To (...)
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  6. added 2019-09-26
    Epistemologia Analítica, Vol .1: debates contemporâneos.Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues (ed.) - 2019 - Editora Fi.
    O presente volume se trata de uma coletânea de artigos que reúne alguns dos trabalhos propostos para o evento “III International Colloquium of Analytic Epistemology and VII Conference of Social Epistemology”, realizado entre os dias 27 e 30 de Novembro de 2018, na Universidade Federal de Santa Maria. O “III International Colloquium of Analytic Epistemology and VII Conference of Social Epistemology” é um dos principais eventos de Epistemologia analítica da América Latina e reúne especialistas do Brasil e do exterior para (...)
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  7. added 2019-09-23
    Reason and Experience in Buddhist Epistemology.Christian Coseru - 2013 - In Steven Emmanuel (ed.), A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy. West Sussex, UKL: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.. pp. 241–255.
    Among the key factors that play a crucial role in the acquisition of knowledge, Buddhist philosophers list (i) the testimony of sense experience, (ii) introspective awareness (iii) inferences drawn from these directs modes of acquaintance, and (iv) some version of coherentism, so as guarantee that truth claims remains consistent across a diverse philosophical corpus. This paper argues that when Buddhists employ reason, they do so primarily in order to advance a range of empirical and introspective claims. As a result, reasoning, (...)
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  8. added 2019-09-07
    New Lessons From Old Demons: The Case For Reliabilism.Thomas Grundmann - 2016 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 90-110.
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  9. added 2019-07-09
    Types of Boltzmann Brains.Alexey Turchin & Roman Yampolskiy - manuscript
    Abstract. Boltzmann brains (BBs) are minds which randomly appear as a result of thermodynamic or quantum fluctuations. In this article, the question of if we are BBs, and the observational consequences if so, is explored. To address this problem, a typology of BBs is created, and the evidence is compared with the Simulation Argument. Based on this comparison, we conclude that while the existence of a “normal” BB is either unlikely or irrelevant, BBs with some ordering may have observable consequences. (...)
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  10. added 2019-07-08
    O argumento da ilusão/alucinação e o disjuntivismo: Ayer versus Austin.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2015 - Skepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research 12:85-106.
    The argument from illusion/hallucination have been proposed many times as supporting the strong conclusion that we are always perceiving directly sense-data. In Sense & Sensibilia, Austin argues that this argument is based on a “mass of seductive (mainly verbal) fallacies”. In this paper, I argue that Austin's argumentative moves to deconstruct the argument from illusion is better understood if they are seen as due to his implicit commitment to some disjunctivist conception of perception. His considerations should be taken as a (...)
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  11. added 2019-06-17
    The Disappearance of Ignorance.Robin McKenna - forthcoming - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-17.
    Keith DeRose’s new book The Appearance of Ignorance (TAI) is a welcome companion volume to his 2009 book The Case for Contextualism (TCC). Where TCC focused on contextualism as a view in the philosophy of language, TAI focuses on how contextualism contributes to our understanding of (and solution to) some perennial epistemological problems, with the skeptical problem being the main focus of six of the seven chapters. DeRose’s view is that a solution to the skeptical problem must do two things. (...)
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  12. added 2019-06-06
    Skepticism, Externalism, and Inference to the Best Explanation.Jochen Briesen - 2008 - Abstracta 4 (1):5-26.
    This paper focuses on a combination of the antiskeptical strategies offered by semantic externalism and the inference to the best explanation. I argue that the most difficult problems of the two strategies can be solved, if the strategies are combined: The strategy offered by semantic externalism is successful against standard skeptical brain-in-a-vat arguments. But the strategy is ineffective, if the skeptical argument is referring to the recent-envatment scenario. However, by focusing on the scenario of recent envatment the most difficult problems (...)
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  13. added 2019-05-06
    Review of R. Fogelin, Walking the Tightrope of Reason: The Precarious Life of a Rational Animal (OUP, 2003). [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (1):188-191.
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  14. added 2019-05-02
    Brains in Vats? Don't Bother!Peter Baumann - 2019 - Episteme 16 (2):186-199.
    Contemporary discussions of epistemological skepticism - the view that we do not and cannot know anything about the world around us - focus very much on a certain kind of skeptical argument involving a skeptical scenario (a situation familiar from Descartes’ First Meditation). According to the argument, knowing some ordinary proposition about the world (one we usually take ourselves to know) requires knowing we are not in some such skeptical scenario SK; however, since we cannot know that we are not (...)
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  15. added 2019-05-01
    Radical Scepticism and the Epistemology of Confusion.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism (3):1-15.
    The lack of knowledge—as Timothy Williamson (2000) famously maintains—is ignorance. Radical sceptical arguments, at least in the tradition of Descartes, threaten universal ignorance. They do so by attempting to establish that we lack any knowledge, even if we can retain other kinds of epistemic standings, like epistemically justified belief. If understanding is a species of knowledge, then radical sceptical arguments threaten to rob us categorically of knowledge and understanding in one fell swoop by implying universal ignorance. If, however, understanding is (...)
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  16. added 2019-04-25
    Between Forteana and Skepticism. [REVIEW]M. R. X. Dentith - 2018 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (11):48-52.
    A review of Bernard Will's "Believing Weird Things".
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  17. added 2019-04-24
    The Malthus-Ricardo Correspondence: Sequential Structure, Argumentative Patterns, and Rationality.Marcelo Dascal & Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 1999 - Journal of Pragmatics 31 (9):1129-1172.
    Although the controversy between Malthus and Ricardo has long been considered to be an important source for the history of economic thought, it has hardly been the object of a careful study qua controversy, i.e. as a polemical dialogical exchange. We have undertaken to fill this gap, within the framework of a more ambitious project that places controversies at the center of an account of the history of ideas, in science and elsewhere. It is our contention that the dialogical co-text (...)
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  18. added 2019-02-23
    Disagreement Skepticism and the Rationality of Religious Belief.Jonathan Matheson - 2019 - In Kevin McCain & Ted Poston (eds.), The Mystery of Skepticism: New Explorations. Brill. pp. 83-104.
    The Equal Weight View is a view about the epistemic significance of disagreement that is thought to have significant skeptical consequences. In this paper I do two things: (i) apply the Equal Weight View to cases of religious disagreement, and (ii) evaluate some consequences of that application for the rationality of religious beliefs. With regard to (i), I argue that the Equal Weight View implies that awareness of the current state of disagreement over religious propositions, such as God exists or (...)
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  19. added 2018-09-26
    On the Nature of Hinge Commitments.Eros Carvalho - 2019 - Sképsis 10 (19):55-66.
    This is a critical commentary on Pritchard's book Epistemic Angst. In Section 2, I present the closure-based radical skeptical paradox. Then in Section 3, I sketch Pritchard’s undercutting response to this paradox. Finally, in Section 4, I put forward two concerns about Pritchard’s response and I also propose a reading of hinge commitments, the ability reading, that might put some pressure on Pritchard’s own reading of these commitments.
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  20. added 2018-09-20
    The Model-Theoretic Argument: From Skepticism to a New Understanding.Gila Sher - 2016 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat. Cambridge, Britain: Cambridge University Press. pp. 208-225.
    In this paper I investigate Putnam’s model-theoretic argument from a transcendent standpoint, in spite of Putnam’s well-known objections to such a standpoint. This transcendence, however, requires ascent to something more like a Tarskian meta-level than what Putnam regards as a “God’s eye view”. Still, it is methodologically quite powerful, leading to a significant increase in our investigative tools. The result is a shift from Putnam’s skeptical conclusion to a new understanding of realism, truth, correspondence, knowledge, and theories, or certain aspects (...)
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  21. added 2018-09-01
    Skepticism and Evolution.N. Ángel Pinillos - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
    I develop a cognitive account of how humans make skeptical judgments (of the form “X does not know p”). In my view, these judgments are produced by a special purpose metacognitive "skeptical" mechanism which monitors our reasoning for hasty or overly risky assumptions. I argue that this mechanism is modular and shaped by natural selection. The explanation for why the mechanism is adaptive essentially relies on an internalized principle connecting knowledge and action, a principle central to pragmatic encroachment theories. I (...)
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  22. added 2018-06-03
    How to Solve the Puzzle of Peer Disagreement.Michele Palmira - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):83-96.
    While it seems hard to deny the epistemic significance of a disagreement with our acknowledged epistemic peers, there are certain disagreements, such as philosophical disagreements, which appear to be permissibly sustainable. These two claims, each independently plausible, are jointly puzzling. This paper argues for a solution to this puzzle. The main tenets of the solution are two. First, the peers ought to engage in a deliberative activity of discovering more about their epistemic position vis-à-vis the issue at stake. Secondly, the (...)
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  23. added 2018-03-09
    Are You a Sim?Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):425–431.
    Nick Bostrom argues that if we accept some plausible assumptions about how the future will unfold, we should believe we are probably not humans. The argument appeals crucially to an indifference principle whose precise content is a little unclear. I set out four possible interpretations of the principle, none of which can be used to support Bostrom’s argument. On the first two interpretations the principle is false, on the third it does not entail the conclusion, and on the fourth it (...)
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  24. added 2018-03-03
    In Defense of the Epistemic Imperative.Seungbae Park - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (4):435-446.
    Sample (2015) argues that scientists ought not to believe that their theories are true because they cannot fulfill the epistemic obligation to take the diachronic perspective on their theories. I reply that Sample’s argument imposes an inordinately heavy epistemic obligation on scientists, and that it spells doom not only for scientific theories but also for observational beliefs and philosophical ideas that Samples endorses. I also delineate what I take to be a reasonable epistemic obligation for scientists. In sum, philosophers ought (...)
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  25. added 2018-03-03
    In Defense of Truth: Skepticism, Morality, and The Matrix.Barry Smith & J. Erion Gerald - 2002 - In William Irwin (ed.), Philosophy and The Matrix. Chicago: Open Court. pp. 16-27.
    The Matrix exposes us to the uncomfortable worries of philosophical skepticism in an especially compelling way. However, with a bit more reflection, we can see why we need not share the skeptic’s doubts about the existence of the world. Such doubts are appropriate only in the very special context of the philosophical seminar. When we return to normal life we see immediately that they are groundless. Furthermore, we see also the drastic mistake that Cypher commits in turning his back upon (...)
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  26. added 2018-02-27
    Las respuestas académicas a la objeción de apraxia.Christian F. Pineda-Pérez - 2018 - Praxis Filosófica 46:221-42.
    En este artículo reconstruyo y analizo las respuestas de los escépticos académicos a la objeción de apraxia. Esta objeción afirma que el escepticismo es una doctrina imposible de practicar puesto que sus tesis conducen a la apraxia, esta es, un estado de privación o imposibilidad de acción. Las respuestas a la objeción se dividen en dos clases. La primera prueba que el asentimiento no es una condición necesaria para realizar acciones, por lo que la recomendación escéptica de suspender global y (...)
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  27. added 2018-02-17
    Truth and Freedom: Rorty and the Problem of Priority.Michael P. Lynch - 2014 - The European Legacy 19 (2):163-173.
    What does truth have to do with freedom? That is, what is the relationship between our political and epistemic principles? In this paper, I grapple and reject Rorty's reasons for thinking that the former can't be based on the latter, but offer an alternative argument that supports his over-all conclusion that our epistemic and political values are ultimately intertwined.
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  28. added 2018-02-16
    The Salem Region: Two Mindsets About Science.John S. Wilkins - 2013 - In Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry (eds.), Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem. University of Chicago Press. pp. 397.
    This chapter distinguishes between two mindsets about science—the deductivist mindset and inductivist mindset—and explores the cognitive styles relating to authority and tradition in both science and pseudoscience. The deductivist tends to see problems as questions to be resolved by deduction from known theory or principle. The inductivist sees problems as questions to be resolved by discovery. Those leaning towards a deductivist mindset may find results that conflict with prior theoretical commitments unacceptable. The deductivist tends to be a cognitive conservative, and (...)
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  29. added 2018-01-19
    Three Arguments for Humility.David Yates - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):461-481.
    Ramseyan humility is the thesis that we cannot know which properties realize the roles specified by the laws of completed physics. Lewis seems to offer a sceptical argument for this conclusion. Humean fundamental properties can be permuted as to their causal roles and distribution throughout spacetime, yielding alternative possible worlds with the same fundamental structure as actuality, but at which the totality of available evidence is the same. On the assumption that empirical knowledge requires evidence, we cannot know which of (...)
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  30. added 2018-01-02
    Postmodern Sophistications: Philosophy, Architecture, and Tradition.David KOLB - 1990 - University of Chicago Press.
    Kolb discusses postmodern architectural styles and theories within the context of philosophical ideas about modernism and postmodernism. He focuses on what it means to dwell in a world and within a history and to act from or against a tradition.
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  31. added 2017-12-25
    Unger's Argument From Absolute Terms.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (3):443-461.
    In this paper, I explain the curious role played by the Argument from Absolute Terms in Peter Unger's book Ignorance, I provide a critical presentation of the argument, and I consider some outstanding issues and the argument’s contemporary significance.
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  32. added 2017-06-03
    A Sceptical Look at “A Skeptical Look at Karl Popper”.J. C. Lester - 2016 - In Arguments for Liberty: A Libertarian Miscellany. Buckingham, England: the University of Buckingham Press. pp. 102-107.
    It is an irony to attack a more sceptical epistemology than one's own in the name of scepticism and defend, instead, an epistemology that is positively illogical. And yet that is what Martin Gardner has done in his “A Skeptical Look at Karl Popper.”.
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  33. added 2017-04-12
    Escepticismo y Epistemología Naturalizada.Rodrigo González - 2002 - Revista de filosofía (Chile) 58:53-69.
    Reliabilism, one ofthe most significant naturalized epistemological theories, is an an attempt to justify knowledge on the basis of causal reliable procedures. This theory also seems to be the solution for the skeptic claims. However, as this paper suggests, this theory involves many problems; among others, how experiments could cause justified but false beliefs. This difficulty may reveal that naturalized epistemology cannot answer the radical question of skepticism, because it is not a scientific issue. As Quine thought, it implies a (...)
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  34. added 2017-03-19
    Wie „Natürlich“ Ist der Skeptizismus?: Überlegungen Zum Historischen Grund der Skeptischen Erfahrung.Jörg Volbers - 2011 - In Markus Gabriel (ed.), Skeptizismus Und Metaphysik. De Gruyter Akademie Forschung. pp. 155-166.
    Questions Cavell's thesis that scepticism is a "natural" condition for mankind, by exploring certain historical developments (such as the scientific revolution) which does give scepticism a "natural" place in modern thinking. Emphasis is laid upon the question how scepticism can be an overwhelming ordinary experience, which is traced back to the establishment of devices such as the microscope.
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  35. added 2017-02-20
    EL RELATIVISMO FILOSÓFICO.Miguel Acosta & José María Garrido (eds.) - 2005 - Madrid, Spain: Instituto de Humanidades Ángel Ayala-CEU (Fundación Universitaria San Pablo CEU).
    Esta obra compila los estudios presentados en las I Jornadas de Filosofía del Instituto CEU de Humanidades Ángel Ayala y está prologada por Abelardo Lobato, O. P. Los filósofos tienen el deber de buscar y alcanzar la verdad apelando a las fuerzas de la razón, la cual, por cierto, no impide otras vías genuinas de conocimiento, como la fe. La búsqueda intelectual exige un trabajo de análisis que debe afinarse ante las obcecaciones que a menudo se interponen en el horizonte (...)
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  36. added 2017-02-10
    Stroud, Austin, and Radical Skepticism.Eros Moreira de Carvalho & Flavio Williges - 2016 - Sképsis 14:57-75.
    Is ruling out the possibility that one is dreaming a requirement for a knowledge claim? In “Philosophical Scepticism and Everyday Life” (1984), Barry Stroud defends that it is. In “Others Minds” (1970), John Austin says it is not. In his defense, Stroud appeals to a conception of objectivity deeply rooted in us and with which our concept of knowledge is intertwined. Austin appeals to a detailed account of our scientific and everyday practices of knowledge attribution. Stroud responds that what Austin (...)
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  37. added 2017-01-30
    Wittgenstein on knowledge, certainty and "hinge propositions".Pris Francois-Igor - 2017 - Germany: Lap Lambert.
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  38. added 2017-01-22
    Reasons to Care About Reasons for Action: A Response to Paul S. Davies.G. M. Trujillo - 2016 - Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (2):43-48.
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  39. added 2017-01-08
    Cartesian Humility and Pyrrhonian Passivity: The Ethical Significance of Epistemic Agency.Modesto Gómez-Alonso - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (4):461-487.
    While the Academic sceptics followed the plausible as a criterion of truth and guided their practice by a doxastic norm, so thinking that agential performances are actions for which the agent assumes responsibility, the Pyrrhonists did not accept rational belief-management, dispensing with judgment in empirical matters. In this sense, the Pyrrhonian Sceptic described himself as not acting in any robust sense of the notion, or as ‘acting’ out of sub-personal and social mechanisms. The important point is that the Pyrrhonian advocacy (...)
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  40. added 2017-01-05
    Citizen Skeptic: Cicero’s Academic Republicanism.Scott Aikin - 2015 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 2 (3):275–285.
    The skeptical challenge to politics is that if knowledge is in short supply and it is a condition for the proper use of political power, then there is very little just politics. Cicero’s Republicanism is posed as a program for political legitimacy wherein both citizens and their states are far from ideal. The result is a form of what is termed negative conservatism, which shows political gridlock in a more positive light.
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  41. added 2016-11-06
    A Critical Survey of Some Recent Philosophical Research in China.Xingming Hu - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):971-998.
    In this paper, I survey some recent literature produced by the established Chinese philosophers who regularly publish in Chinese philosophy journals and work in Mainland China. Specifically, I review the recent research of these philosophers in two areas: Chinese Philosophy and epistemology. In each area, I focus on two topics that have caught the attention of a lot of Chinese philosophers. I argue that the Chinese philosophers’ research on these topics has two prevalent problems: (i) a lot of arguments they (...)
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  42. added 2016-11-04
    Religious Belief is Not Natural. Why Cognitive Science of Religion Does Not Show That Religious Belief is Rational.Hans Van Eyghen - 2016 - Studia Humana 5 (4):34-44.
    It is widely acknowledged that the new emerging discipline cognitive science of religion has a bearing on how to think about the epistemic status of religious beliefs. Both defenders and opponents of the rationality of religious belief have used cognitive theories of religion to argue for their point. This paper will look at the defender-side of the debate. I will discuss an often used argument in favor of the trustworthiness of religious beliefs, stating that cognitive science of religion shows that (...)
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  43. added 2016-09-02
    Skepticism and Contextualism.Michael Hannon - 2017 - In Jonathan Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge. pp. 131--144.
    According to some powerful skeptical arguments, we know almost nothing. Contextualist theories of knowledge ascriptions have been developed with an eye toward resisting skepticism. Have the contextualists succeeded? After briefly outlining their view, I will consider whether contextualism about knowledge ascriptions provides a satisfactory response to one of the most popular and influential forms of skepticism. I conclude with some questions for the contextualist. As we’ll see, the effectiveness of the contextualist solution to skepticism is far from settled.
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  44. added 2016-08-27
    Disagreement and the Value of Reflection.Waldomiro Silva Filho & Rocha Felipe - manuscript
    The main aim of this paper is to propose that reflection is a performance that has epistemic value. This idea contains two parts: the first asserts that reflection has instrumental value. The second that reflective performance promotes an epistemic virtue that has final value. The first part is not controversial and most epistemologists would accept it. The second, however, asserts that there is a kind of epistemic good which can only be achieved through reflection. There is much controversy in this. (...)
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  45. added 2016-08-03
    The Value of Reflection in Epistemology.Silva Filho Waldomiro - manuscript
    In this paper, I will assert that reflective performance produces something that is epistemically valuable. My argument depends on us stepping back from the scenario in which the dispute about internalism and externalism about knowledge and justification have developed over recent decades, in order to begin to consider certain, so far little explored, skeptical dialectic challenges. These are skeptical challenges in which individuals are challenged to evaluate and judge whether or not their beliefs are justified. As a rule, a person (...)
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  46. added 2016-02-29
    A Problem for Rationalist Responses to Skepticism.Sinan Dogramaci - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):355-369.
    Rationalism, my target, says that in order to have perceptual knowledge, such as that your hand is making a fist, you must “antecedently” (or “independently”) know that skeptical scenarios don’t obtain, such as the skeptical scenario that you are in the Matrix. I motivate the specific form of Rationalism shared by, among others, White (Philos Stud 131:525–557, 2006) and Wright (Proc Aristot Soc Suppl Vol 78:167–212, 2004), which credits us with warrant to believe (or “accept”, in Wright’s terms) that our (...)
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  47. added 2016-01-23
    The Basing Relation and the Impossibility of the Debasing Demon.Patrick Bondy & J. Adam Carter - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):203-216.
    Descartes' demon is a deceiver: the demon makes things appear to you other than as they really are. However, as Descartes famously pointed out in the Second Meditation, not all knowledge is imperiled by this kind of deception. You still know you are a thinking thing. Perhaps, though, there is a more virulent demon in epistemic hell, one from which none of our knowledge is safe. Jonathan Schaffer thinks so. The "debasing demon" he imagines threatens knowledge not via the truth (...)
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  48. added 2015-11-05
    Wittgensteinian Epistemology and Cartesian Skepticism.Nicola Claudio Salvatore - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):53-80.
    In this paper, I present and criticize a number of influential anti-skeptical strategies inspired by Wittgenstein’s remarks on ‘hinges’. Furthermore, I argue that, following Wittgen- stein’s analogy between ‘hinges’ and ‘rules of grammar’, we should be able to get rid of Cartesian skeptical scenarios as nonsensical, even if apparently intelligible, combinations of signs.
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  49. added 2015-09-12
    Principles of Interpretive Charity and the Semantics of Knowledge Attributions.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (2):153-168.
    Positions in the debate about the correct semantics of “S knows that p” are sometimes motivated in part by an appeal to interpretive charity. In particular, non-skeptical views hold that many utterances of the sentence “S knows that p” are true and some of them think the fact that their views are able to respect this is a reason why their views are more charitable than skeptical invariantism. However, little attention has been paid to why charity should be understood in (...)
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  50. added 2015-09-12
    Cartesianism, Neo-Reidianism, and the A Priori: Reply to Pust.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (2):231–235.
    Joel Pust has recently challenged the Thomas Reid-inspired argument against the reliability of the a priori defended by Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, William Alston, and Michael Bergmann. The Reidian argument alleges that the Cartesian insistence on the primacy of a priori rationality and subjective sensory experience as the foundations of epistemic justification is unwarranted because the same kind of global skeptical scenario that Cartesians recognize as challenging the legitimacy of perceptual beliefs about the external world also undermine the reliability of (...)
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