Bending it like beckham: Movement, control and deviant causal chains

Analysis 70 (2):299-303 (2010)
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Like all causal theories in philosophy, the causal theory of action is plagued by the problem of deviant causal chains. I have proposed a solution on the basis of the assumption that mental states and events are causally efficacious in virtue of their contents. This solution has been questioned by Torbjörn Tännsjö (2009). First, I will reply to the objection, and then I will discuss Tännsjö’s alternative.
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Archival date: 2009-12-17
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