View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

29 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
  1. added 2018-08-29
    Practical Knowledge as Knowledge of a Normative Judgment.Eric Marcus - 2018 - Manuscrito (4):319-347.
    According to one interpretation of Aristotle’s famous thesis, to say that action is the conclusion of practical reasoning is to say that action is itself a judgment about what to do. A central motivation for the thesis is that it suggests a path for understanding the non-observational character of practical knowledge. If actions are judgments, then whatever explains an agent’s knowledge of the relevant judgment can explain her knowledge of the action. I call the approach to action that accepts Aristotle’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2018-07-29
    Intelligent Action Guidance and the Use of Mixed Representational Formats.Joshua Shepherd - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    My topic is the intelligent guidance of action. In this paper I offer an empirically grounded case for four ideas: that [a] cognitive processes of practical reasoning play a key role in the intelligent guidance of action, [b] these processes could not do so without significant enabling work done by both perception and the motor system, [c] the work done by perceptual and motor systems can be characterized as the generation of information (often conceptually structured information) specialized for action guidance, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2018-07-08
    The Category of Occurrent Continuants.Rowland Stout - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):41-62.
    Arguing first that the best way to understand what a continuant is is as something that primarily has its properties at a time rather than atemporally, the paper then defends the idea that there are occurrent continuants. These are things that were, are, or will be happening—like the ongoing process of someone reading or my writing this paper, for instance. A recently popular philosophical view of process is as something that is referred to with mass nouns and not count nouns. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  4. added 2018-06-14
    How I Found My Way to the Written Word Through Visual Art.Laura Donkers - 2014 - Philosophy Study 4 (7):511-519.
    The author’s practice-led research explores “the act of living.” In order to advance this idea, the author has acquired skills in investigation and expressed her thinking through a descriptive and explanatory visual language. The author’s learning journey, while not unique, has not been an ordinary one. Initial academic failure to achieve in the school education system contributes to choosing a life working on the land and harbouring the belief that she is unable to learn academically. Still, the author has gained (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2018-05-29
    Meditation and the Scope of Mental Action.Michael Brent & Candace Upton - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (1):52-71.
    While philosophers of mind have devoted abundant time and attention to questions of content and consciousness, philosophical questions about the nature and scope of mental action have been relatively neglected. Galen Strawson’s account of mental action, arguably the most well-known extant account, holds that cognitive mental action consists in triggering the delivery of content to one’s field of consciousness. However, Strawson fails to recognize several distinct types of mental action that might not reduce to triggering content delivery. In this paper, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2018-03-19
    Robots and Us: Towards an Economics of the ‘Good Life’.C. W. M. Naastepad & Jesse M. Mulder - 2018 - Review of Social Economy:1-33.
    (Expected) adverse effects of the ‘ICT Revolution’ on work and opportunities for individuals to use and develop their capacities give a new impetus to the debate on the societal implications of technology and raise questions regarding the ‘responsibility’ of research and innovation (RRI) and the possibility of achieving ‘inclusive and sustainable society’. However, missing in this debate is an examination of a possible conflict between the quest for ‘inclusive and sustainable society’ and conventional economic principles guiding capital allocation (including the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2018-02-03
    How Many Accounts of Act Individuation Are There?Joseph Ulatowski - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Utah
    The problem of act individuation is a debate about the identity conditions of human acts. The fundamental question about act individuation is: how do we distinguish between actions? Three views of act individuation have dominated the literature. First, Donald Davidson and G.E.M. Anscombe have argued that a number of different descriptions refer to a single act. Second, Alvin Goldman and Jaegwon Kim have argued that each description designates a distinct act. Finally, Irving Thalberg and Judith Jarvis Thomson have averred that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2017-10-03
    Intelligibility and the Guise of the Good.Paul Boswell - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1):1-31.
    According to the Guise of the Good, an agent only does for a reason what she sees as good. One of the main motivations for the view is its apparent ability to explain why action for a reason must be intelligible to its agent, for on this view, an action is intelligible just in case it seems good. This motivation has come under criticism in recent years. Most notably, Kieran Setiya has argued that merely seeing one’s action as good does (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2017-04-13
    Wie kausal ist menschliches Handeln? Grenzen in der Naturalisierung menschlichen Handelns.Gasser Georg - 2011 - Zeitschrift Für Katholische Theologie 133 (3-4):361-381.
    This article argues that the causal theory of action cannot explain conscious human action adequately. Interpreting actions as bodily movements caused by (mental) states internal to the agent does not do justice to the particular role of the agent herself as ‘performing’ or ‘bringing about’ the action in the light of specific reasons. The only thing one can say about actions being distinct from other bodily movements such as automatic physiological processes or reflexes will employ again the concept of action (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. added 2017-01-19
    Agent Causation as a Solution to the Problem of Action.Michael Brent - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):656-673.
    My primary aim is to defend a nonreductive solution to the problem of action. I argue that when you are performing an overt bodily action, you are playing an irreducible causal role in bringing about, sustaining, and controlling the movements of your body, a causal role best understood as an instance of agent causation. Thus, the solution that I defend employs a notion of agent causation, though emphatically not in defence of an account of free will, as most theories of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. added 2016-11-24
    Co–Operation and Communication in Apes and Humans.Ingar Brinck & Peter Gärdenfors - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (5):484–501.
    We trace the difference between the ways in which apes and humans co–operate to differences in communicative abilities, claiming that the pressure for future–directed co–operation was a major force behind the evolution of language. Competitive co–operation concerns goals that are present in the environment and have stable values. It relies on either signalling or joint attention. Future–directed co–operation concerns new goals that lack fixed values. It requires symbolic communication and context–independent representations of means and goals. We analyse these ways of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  12. added 2016-11-06
    Constraint Satisfaction, Agency and Meaning Generation as an Evolutionary Framework for a Constructive Biosemiotic (2017).Christophe Menant - manuscript
    A constructivist perspective on biosemiotics brings to the forefront meaning generation by biological agents for constraint satisfaction in an evolutionary background. Biosemiotics deal with the study of signs and meaning in biological entities. One of its main challenges is to attempt to naturalize biological meaning (Sharov & all 2015). Constructivism is an epistemological perspective that considers knowledge as constructed by agents which are sense makers. So a constructive approach on biosemiotics addresses meanings as constructed by biological agents as sense makers. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. added 2016-05-05
    Autism: The Micro-Movement Perspective.Elizabeth B. Torres, Maria Brincker, Robert W. Isenhower, Polina Yanovich, Kimberly Stigler, John I. Nurnberger, Dimitri N. Metaxas & Jorge V. Jose - 2013 - Frontiers Integrated Neuroscience 7 (32).
    The current assessment of behaviors in the inventories to diagnose autism spectrum disorders (ASD) focus on observation and discrete categorizations. Behaviors require movements, yet measurements of physical movements are seldom included. Their inclusion however, could provide an objective characterization of behavior to help unveil interactions between the peripheral and the central nervous systems. Such interactions are critical for the development and maintenance of spontaneous autonomy, self-regulation and voluntary control. At present, current approaches cannot deal with the heterogeneous, dynamic and stochastic (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14. added 2015-12-02
    The Life of a Process.Rowland Stout - 2003 - In Guy Debrock (ed.), Process Pragmatism. Rodopi.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15. added 2015-05-25
    Voluntary Action and Neural Causation.Hanoch Ben-Yami - 2014 - Cognitive Neuroscience 5:217-218.
    I agree with Nachev and Hacker’s general approach. However, their criticism of claims of covert automaticity can be strengthened. I first say a few words on what voluntary action involves and on the consequent limited relevance of brain research for the determination of voluntariness. I then turn to Nachev and Hacker’s discussion of possible covert automaticity and show why the case for it is weaker than they allow.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. added 2015-03-30
    Acting and Satisficing.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2015 - In George Pavlakos & Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco (eds.), Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency. Cambridge University Press. pp. 31-51.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. added 2014-09-29
    Agency and Incompatibilism. [REVIEW]Randolph Clarke - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):519-525.
    This paper is part of a symposium discussing Helen Steward's A METAPHYSICS FOR FREEDOM. Steward argues for what she calls Agency Incompatibilism: agency itself is incompatible with determinism. This paper examines what Steward presents as her main argument for Agency Incompatibilism and finds it wanting.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. added 2014-04-02
    Agency Without Avoidability: Defusing a New Threat to Frankfurt's Counterexample Strategy.Seth Shabo - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):505-522.
    In this paper, I examine a new line of response to Frankfurt’s challenge to the traditional association of moral responsibility with the ability to do otherwise. According to this response, Frankfurt’s counterexample strategy fails, not in light of the conditions for moral responsibility per se, but in view of the conditions for action. Specifically, it is claimed, a piece of behavior counts as an action only if it is within the agent’s power to avoid performing it. In so far as (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  19. added 2014-03-22
    How Do We Ever Get Up? On the Proximate Causation of Actions and Events.Geert Keil - 2001 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1):43-62.
    Many candidates have been tried out as proximate causes of actions: belief-desire pairs, volitions, motives, intentions, and other kinds of pro-attitudes. None of these mental states or events, however, seems to be able to do the trick, that is, to get things going. Each of them may occur without an appropriate action ensuing. After reviewing several attempts at closing the alleged “causal gap”, it is argued that on a correct analysis, there is no missing link waiting to be discovered. On (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. added 2014-03-16
    The Will as Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):201-220.
    I here defend an account of the will as practical reason —or, using Kant's phrase, as " reason in its practical employment"—as against a view of the will as a capacity for choice, in addition to reason, by which we execute practical judgments in action. Certain commonplaces show distance between judgment and action and thus seem to reveal the need for a capacity, in addition to reason, by which we execute judgment in action. However, another ordinary fact pushes in the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  21. added 2014-03-04
    Action Individuation: A Normative Functionalist Approach.Chauncey Maher - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):99-116.
    How or in virtue of what does any one particular action differ from another? Available views on the issue of action individuation tend to emphasize the descriptive features of actions, such as where and when they occur, or what they cause or are caused by. I contend instead that actions are individuated by their normative features, such as what licenses them and what they license in turn. In this essay, deploying a suggestion from Sellars and Brandom, I argue specifically that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  22. added 2012-11-23
    Are All Actions Movements of the Agent's Body?Julian Fink - 2011 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):52-64.
    Davidson famously contended that all actions are movements of the agent's body. It has been objected, however, that Davidson's view is incompatible with his own definition of primitive actions. This paper argues that this objection is based on an incorrect reading of Davidson's argument. I will show that by reading 'movements', in 'all actions are bodily movements', transitively, Davidson's definition of primitive actions ceases to contradict with his thesis that all actions are bodily movements.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. added 2012-11-22
    Time as Success.Gilbert Plumer - 1984 - International Studies in Philosophy 16 (1):35-55.
    Partly following suggestions from Dewey, I show how we may acquire the concepts of Now and time without our being able to sense time. I rationally reconstruct these concepts by ‘deriving’ them from the concepts of ‘required for’ and ‘sensed’ (taken tenselessly). Among other reasons, because activity is explicitly required for succeeding or failing, and because these ubiquitous conditions are sensed, our concept of time is rooted squarely in our experience of these conditions.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. added 2012-01-09
    Review of Natural Agency. [REVIEW]David-Hillel Ruben - 1991 - Mind (2):287-290.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. added 2011-07-16
    A. Ford, J. Hornsby, and F. Stoutland, Eds., Essays on Anscombe’s Intention. [REVIEW]John Schwenkler - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2):241-243.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. added 2011-04-29
    Taking Aim at the Truth.Masahiro Yamada - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):47-59.
    One prominent feature of belief is that a belief cannot be formed at will. This paper argues that the best explanation of this fact is that belief formation is a process that takes aim at the truth. Taking aim at the truth is to be understood as causal responsiveness of the processes constituting belief formation to what facilitates achieving true beliefs. The requirement for this responsiveness precludes the possibility of belief formation responding to intentions in a way that would count (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. added 2009-11-08
    What Happens When Someone Acts?J. David Velleman - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):461-481.
    What happens when someone acts? A familiar answer goes like this. There is something that the agent wants, and there is an action that he believes conducive to its attainment. His desire for the end, and his belief in the action as a means, justify taking the action, and they jointly cause an intention to take it, which in turn causes the corresponding movements of the agent's body. I think that the standard story is flawed in several respects. The flaw (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   79 citations  
  28. added 2009-11-06
    Bending It Like Beckham: Movement, Control and Deviant Causal Chains.Markus E. Schlosser - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):299-303.
    Like all causal theories in philosophy, the causal theory of action is plagued by the problem of deviant causal chains. I have proposed a solution on the basis of the assumption that mental states and events are causally efficacious in virtue of their contents. This solution has been questioned by Torbjörn Tännsjö (2009). First, I will reply to the objection, and then I will discuss Tännsjö’s alternative.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  29. added 2009-10-28
    Non-Reductive Physicalism, Mental Causation and the Nature of Actions.Markus E. Schlosser - 2009 - In H. Leitgeb & A. Hieke (eds.), Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain. Ontos.
    Given some reasonable assumptions concerning the nature of mental causation, non-reductive physicalism faces the following dilemma. If mental events cause physical events, they merely overdetermine their effects (given the causal closure of the physical). If mental events cause only other mental events, they do not make the kind of difference we want them to. This dilemma can be avoided if we drop the dichotomy between physical and mental events. Mental events make a real difference if they cause actions. But actions (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations