knowledge isn't necessarily true

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Abstract
In this essay I hope to establish that truth is not a necessary condition for knowledge. This is not to go so far as that it is possible to know falsehoods, since not everything that is not true is therefore false. Rather the aim is to show that knowledge is that in which we are fully confident, where our confidence is supported by conclusive evidence. If these two conditions are met, then there is no further condition, truth, that needs to be met in order for us to be in possession of knowledge.
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Archival date: 2015-08-25
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2015-08-25

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