Contextualism and the Knowledge Norms

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):89-100 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Epistemic contextualism is widely believed to be incompatible with the recently popular view that knowledge is the norm of assertion, practical reasoning, or belief. I argue in this article that the problems arising for contextualism from the mentioned normative views are only apparent and can be resolved by acknowledging the fairly widespread phenomenon of non-obvious context-sensitivity (recently embraced by even some of contextualism's most ardent former critics). Building on recent insights about non-obvious context-sensitivity, the article outlines an independently attractive contextualist account of the mentioned epistemic norms and provides a solution to the puzzles they give rise to in a contextualist framework
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BLOCAT-3
Revision history
Archival date: 2014-01-09
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Relativism and Monadic Truth.Cappelen, Herman & Hawthorne, John

View all 35 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2012-04-05

Total views
475 ( #4,818 of 37,951 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
39 ( #9,693 of 37,951 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.