Content and self-knowledge

Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26 (1989)
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Abstract
This paper argues that, given a certain apparently inevitable thesis about content, we could not know our own minds. The thesis is that the content of a thought is determined by its relational properties
ISBN(s)
0276-2080
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BOGCAS
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Archival date: 2021-09-23
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