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Paul Boghossian [5]Paul A. Boghossian [4]
  1. Color as a secondary quality.Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman - 1989 - Mind 98 (January):81-103.
    Should a principle of charity be applied to the interpretation of the colour concepts exercised in visual experience? We think not. We shall argue, for one thing, that the grounds for applying a principle of charity are lacking in the case of colour concepts. More importantly, we shall argue that attempts at giving the experience of colour a charitable interpretation either fail to respect obvious features of that experience or fail to interpret it charitably, after all. Charity to visual experience (...)
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  2. (2 other versions)Content and self-knowledge.Paul Boghossian - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26.
    This paper argues that, given a certain apparently inevitable thesis about content, we could not know our own minds. The thesis is that the content of a thought is determined by its relational properties.
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  3. Physicalist theories of color.Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (January):67-106.
    The dispute between realists about color and anti-realists is actually a dispute about the nature of color properties. The disputants do not disagree over what material objects are like. Rather, they disagree over whether any of the uncontroversial facts about material objects--their powers to cause visual experiences, their dispositions to reflect incident light, their atomic makeup, and so on--amount to their having colors. The disagreement is thus about which properties colors are and, in particular, whether colors are any of the (...)
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  4. Three Kinds of Relativism.Paul Boghossian - 2010 - In Steven D. Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 53–69.
    The paper looks at three big ideas that have been associated with the term “relativism.” The first maintains that some property has a higher-degree than might have been thought. The second that the judgments in a particular domain of discourse are capable only of relative truth and not of absolute truth And the third, which I dub with the oxymoronic label “absolutist relativism,” seeks to locate relativism in our acceptance of certain sorts of spare absolutist principles. -/- The first idea (...)
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  5. Introduction.Paul A. Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke - 2000 - In Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-10.
    This collection of newly commissioned essays, edited by NYU philosophers Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke, resumes the current surge of interest in the proper explication of the notion of a priori. The authors discuss the relations of the a priori to the notions of definition, meaning, justification, and ontology, explore how the concept figured historically in the philosophies of Leibniz, Kant, Frege, and Wittgenstein, and address its role in the contemporary philosophies of logic, mathematics, mind, and science. The editors’ Introduction (...)
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  6. O labirinto do relativismo moral.Paul Boghossian - 2011 - Revista Inquietude 2 (2):238-245.
    Portuguese translation of "The Maze of Moral Relativism" by Janos Biro.
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  7. Does Philosophy Matter?—It Would Appear So. A Reply to Fish.Paul Boghossian - 2011 - Essay From the Stone Series in the New York Times.
    In a piece provocatively entitled “Does Philosophy Matter?” Stanley Fish sets out to respond to my July 24, 2011 Stone column on moral relativism in the New York Times. His argument proceeds as follows. First, Fish changes the topic: instead of talking about the thesis I was discussing, he defines another thesis that, he claims, implausibly, also deserves to be called “moral relativism.” This thesis, he implies, is both more interesting and more defensible than the one I was criticizing. Second, (...)
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