On non-inferential structure of perceptual judgment


This paper deals with Peirce’s understanding of perceptual judgment, relating it to the conditions for the use of language defined by Michael Dummett. Namely, drawing on Dummett’s requirement for harmony between descriptive and evaluative aspects of our linguistic practice, we will try to give an interpretation of Peirce’s view of perception that implies rejecting the idea that the formation of a perceptual judgment has an inferential structure. On the other hand, since it is, in Peirce’s opinion, the structure of abductive inference, this approach should enable us to draw some conclusions related to abduction in general.

Author's Profile

Milos Bogdanovic
University of Belgrade (PhD)


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