Williams contextualism as a critique of epistemological realism

Theoria: Beograd 62 (1):91-102 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Although Williams’ contextual thesis is above all a critique of one way of interpreting contextualism in epistemology, viz., simple conversational contextualisam, I will argue that this thesis has also been a very successful means for the critique of a standpoint on which that interpretation, and the entire traditional epistemology rests - epistemological realism. Accordingly, in spite of certain weaknesses in Williams’ position pointed out by his critiques, in this paper I will try to show that, by interpreting the problem of scepticism as first and foremost a methodological necessity of epistemological realism, Williams succeeds in offering an enlightening diagnosis of the sceptical paradox problem which is at the centre of epistemology traditionally construed.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BOGWCA-3
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-01-08
View other versions
Added to PP index
2021-01-08

Total views
15 ( #55,952 of 55,861 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #40,709 of 55,861 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.