Knowledge

Detendo-se na angústia enquanto existência como possibilidade, o Prof. Luiz Carlos Mariano Da Rosa mostra que, tal qual em seu emergir caracteriza-se como aquilo que guarda condição de estranheza, Kierkegaard assinala que a sua emergência consiste em um sentimento de risco que em condição de imanência se impõe a toda possibilidade como tal enquanto sentimento puro da possibilidade em face da liberdade como determinação fundamental do devir e o caráter contingente do possível, o que implica a realidade da liberdade enquanto (...) possibilidade para a possibilidade, que encerra dois caminhos, a saber, o suicídio ou a fé. Dessa forma, baseado no princípio fenomenológico-ontológico-existencial, o artigo sublinha que Heidegger assinala que não é senão a angústia que instaura e antes inaugura o abrir o mundo como mundo, a qual, longe de se deter em angústia-com, implica também angústia-por que, remetendo a pre-sença para aquilo pelo que a angústia se angustia, a saber, o seu próprio poder-ser-no-mundo. E, finalizando, o artigo destaca que, tendo como princípio teórico-conceitual a perspectiva de que a liberdade é o ser da consciência, Sartre se detém na questão se há consciência enquanto consciência de liberdade, como pressuposto, e qual é a forma desta consciência, assinalando que, constituindo-se angústia o locus que possibilita ao existente humano a consciência de sua liberdade, não é senão o que perfaz o modus essendi da liberdade como consciência de ser. (shrink)

Our interest in understanding belief stems partly from our being creatures who think. However, the term ‘belief’ is used to refer to many states: from the fully conscious rational state that partly constitutes knowledge to the fanciful states of alarm clocks. Which of the many ‘belief’ states must a theory of belief be answerable to? This is the scope question. I begin my answer with a reply to a recent argument that belief is invariably weak, i.e., that the evidential standards (...) that are required for belief are low. Although one state we refer to using the term ‘belief’ fits this profile, other ‘belief’ states do not. Crucially, when ‘belief’ is heard in a weak sense, it attributes a state that only a rational creature can be in. I will use this observation as a starting point for an argument that the study of (our) belief should not be constrained by the requirement that the illuminated state be held in common with any non‐rational being. This lends support to the Transformative Theory of Rationality, according to which rationality does not merely add powers or complexity to the animal mind, but transforms it into a different kind of mind altogether. (shrink)

Studies within mathematics education have shown the existence of a so-called “mathematics anxiety” among secondary and high school students as a global phenomenon and have related it to various social and psychological aspects of the processes of teaching and learning mathematics, which are responsible for the understanding of mathematics. Current research project aims at crystallizing a primary conceptual and theoretical framework necessary for the application of contributions of philosophy of mathematics and of science and epistemology of mathematics in mathematics education (...) from an epistemological perspective. It argues for and discusses applicability of the general principle that teaching about mathematics along with traditionally teaching formal mathematics and ‘doing’ mathematics does not render the process more difficult, but rather, this approach enhances mathematics education, with effects on the mathematics anxiety. -/- . (shrink)

“I promise to mow your lawn, but I don’t know whether I will.” Call promises of this form “Moorean,” based on their resemblance to Moore’s paradox. Moorean promises sound absurd. But why? In the literature on assertion, many have used Moore’s paradox to motivate a knowledge norm of assertion. I put forward an analogous norm on promising, according to which one should only make a promise if one knows that one will fulfill it. A knowledge norm explains why Moorean promises (...) are absurd, accounts for a variety of linguistic data, and sheds light on how promises generate obligations. (shrink)

Cosmovision ni neno ambalo linapaswa kumaanisha seti ya misingi ambayo huibuka uelewa wa kimfumo wa Ulimwengu, sehemu zake kama maisha, ulimwengu tunaoishi, asili, hali ya mwanadamu, na uhusiano wao. Kwa hivyo, ni uwanja wa falsafa ya uchanganuzi inayolishwa na sayansi, ambayo lengo lake ni maarifa haya yaliyojumlishwa na endelevu ya mantiki juu ya kila kitu tulicho nacho na kilichomo, ambacho kinatuzunguka, na kinachohusiana nasi kwa njia yoyote. Ni kitu cha zamani kama mawazo ya mwanadamu, na, pamoja na kutumia vipengele vya (...) kosmolojia ya kisayansi, inajumuisha kila kitu katika falsafa na sayansi ambacho kinarejelea ulimwengu na maisha. Cosmovision si seti ya mawazo, dhahania, na mawazo bali ni mfumo unaozingatia uchunguzi, uchambuzi, ushahidi na maonyesho. Hakuna cosmovision inayonuia kufafanua, kuanzisha, au kupendekeza lakini kuelewa tu, kuchanganua na kufasiri. Kila mmoja wetu hujenga na kusafirisha ulimwengu wake katika maisha yote, bila kuanzisha fomu, kama msingi wa mawazo na tabia zetu. (shrink)

This paper critically examines Coliva and Palmira’s characterization of the disagreement between Humean skeptics and hinge epistemologists as a distinctive kind of conceptual disagreement. Humean skepticism requires evidential justification for all rational beliefs, presenting a narrower conception of rationality. This contrasts with constitutivist hinge epistemology, which posits that our unwarranted hinge propositions — the basic certainties which makes the justifications for ordinary empirical propositions possible — are constitutive of the concept of epistemic rationality, thus they are also rationally accepted by (...) us. Coliva and Palmira (2020, 2021) argue that this divergence reflects a conceptual disagreement over the conception of epistemic rationality, implying a dispute about how the concept of epistemic rationality should be understood. Their strategy is two-fold: they first mentioned Stroud’s (2019) categorization of conceptual disagreement, but contended that the disagreement between Humean skeptics and hinge epistemologists represents a novel kind of conceptual disagreement that Stroud’s categorization cannot encompass. They suggest this new framing allows for a rational resolution of the disagreement; second, they argue that the extended conception of rationality is superior because it coherently accounts for the rationality of our epistemic practices. However, I contend that both parts of their two-fold strategy fail. Even if the disagreement is conceptual, it can be understood as a type of disagreement within Stroud’s categorization; therefore, it does not represent a novel type of disagreement. Additionally, I argue that they misinterpret the skeptic’s stance. Skeptics do not assume that our epistemic practices are rational; rather, they doubt the rationality of these practices and the possibility of knowledge. Therefore, for a skeptic, there is no advantage from a conceptual proposal that makes a coherent account of the alleged rationality of our epistemic practices. (shrink)

This chapter from Michel Serres’s comprehensive study on Leibniz—"The System of Leibniz and its Mathematical Models [Le système de Leibniz et ses modèles mathématiques]"—examines Leibniz’s epistemological framework. This framework, which Leibniz developed for a large part in his “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas [Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis],” is pitched against Descartes’s "Meditations on First Philosophy [Meditationes de Prima Philosophia]" and the method of systematic doubt developed therein. While Descartes rejects any knowledge with the slightest possibility of falsehood, (...) Leibniz accepts knowledge with even a minimal degree of truth. Leibniz’s approach involves a progressive genesis of truth through a series of filters, each further refining knowledge. This process is intrinsically linked to infinitism and combinatorics, allowing for a gradual differentiation of the distinct from the indistinct. The filters are applied sequentially, with each filter proceeding through its own oppositions, resulting in a spectrum of knowledge ranging from obscure to clear, confused to distinct, inadequate to adequate, and symbolic to intuitive. This framework facilitates pluralism within rationalism that proceeds through evolving or regional truths. The filters overlap, and only the final stage of knowledge is devoid of mixture. Leibniz’s epistemology is non-Cartesian, as it relativizes truth and falsehood at each stage of the filtering process. It also accounts for the limitations of sensory perception, attributing them to the imperfection of the human mind in its current state. (Translated by Martijn Boven). (shrink)

COMPLETE OBJECTIVITY IS UNATTAINABLE: Language structures our perception of reality. Words define and limit thought, shaping what is expressible or even thinkable. Since the link between words and meanings is socially constructed, language carries hidden constraints that influence how we interpret the world. Memory, too, is fluid rather than a fixed archive. Each recollection reshapes past events, prioritizing coherence over accuracy. Our senses and cognition evolved for survival, not for discovering absolute truth. Our „truth“ is never final but an evolving (...) approximation. The perception of reality is inherently selective. Evolution shaped our brains and senses to process only survival-relevant information, filtering overwhelming complexity into simplified, actionable categories. Cognitive biases further streamline decision-making but distort reality by reinforcing preexisting beliefs. These are not errors but evolved shortcuts. INVISIBLE COLLECTIVE FORCES: Memplexes, Pendulums, Discourses, and Animistic Spirits describe the same underlying phenomenon — external, self-replicating forces that shape human thought and behavior. They function like “software agents,” gaining influence by capturing collective attention and reinforcing dominant narratives. As they sustain themselves through cultural and social energy, they guide behavior, beliefs, and norms without conscious recognition. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: AI, primarily based on language models, is emerging as a new vehicle for idea propagation. As AI evolves, it may not only spread but also generate novel „memplexes,” accelerating cultural and intellectual shifts at an unprecedented pace. However, despite its computational sophistication, AI remains constrained by its training data, programming, and structural limitations. (shrink)

In his new book, La société automatique, Bernard Stiegler departs from a philosophical tradition that opposes autonomy and automatization so as to position automatization at the core of biological, social, and technical forms of life. Responding to the rise of the digital—as the increasing automatization of processes of selection through computational means—Stiegler’s project challenges us to recognize contemporary life as automatic. This shift in approach inevitably recalibrates the ontogenetic grounds of contemporary culture, and necessitates a reconsideration of sociocultural practices from (...) the standpoint of the digital modes of algorithmic existence that are enacted within our midst. -/- Anaïs Nony: Thank you very much, Bernard Stiegler, for having me in Paris today, in your Institute for Research and Innovation. You just finished a new book titled La société automatique. Can you explain what you mean by “automatic society,” and especially that element of it that refers to the self, autos (αὐτός) in Greek? What does it mean to apply this concept to the social order? -/- Bernard Stiegler: Thank you for these questions. First I must say that what I call automatic society is produced by the technology of automatism that is digital technology. (shrink)

Sanford Goldberg has recently proposed a solution to the swamping problem for process reliabilist truth-monism (PRTM). In short, he argues that reliably formed true beliefs have a property he calls the ‘modal reliability property’, the epistemic value of which is explained in terms of the value of true belief but is not swamped by it. He offers two arguments to this effect. I claim that both of his arguments are valid, but they employ premisses the truth of which needs to (...) be explained. However, it is not obvious how a proponent of PRTM could explain them without abandoning her preferred order of explanation. I do not argue that it is impossible in principle to discharge this burden. However, I do claim that Goldberg has yet to show us that it is possible. The result is that the swamping problem is no less problematic for PRTM than it was previously. (shrink)

Tanto Scheler como Polo aceptan la estructura acto-objeto para explicar el conocimiento intelectual. Pero no la entienden del mismo modo. Scheler defiende la prioridad del objeto (el objeto se da) y Polo la del acto (la operación presenta el objeto). Para Scheler el acto es intencional y para Polo lo es el objeto. Ambos detectan que esta estructura tiene un límite, porque el acto no es nunca el objeto. -/- Both Scheler and Polo use the act-object structure to explain the (...) intelectual knowledge. Nevertheless, they don’t understand this structure on the same way. Scheler holds the priority of the object (the object is given by itself) and Polo on his behalf holds the priority of the act (the operation presentates the object). For Scheler the act is intentional, but for Polo which is intentional is the object. Both observe that this structure has a limit, because the act is never the object. (shrink)

The reliability of one´s memory is far from certain. Have you ever misplaced an item, forgotten a name or gotten the date wrong? Everyday situations can introduce doubt about our memorial faculties. This raises epistemological questions: Can we trust our memory as a source of knowledge? If memory is fallible, how can we justify beliefs that depend on it? Andrew Moon` global skeptical argument about memory states that we lack knowledge or warrant when it comes to trusting our memory as (...) a reliable faculty. His argument is the following: I. I can know a proposition on the basis of a faculty only if I know that faculty is reliable. II. I cannot know that my memory is reliable. III. Therefore, I cannot know a proposition on the basis of my memory. Moon’s stance on premise I. is that any reasoning to support the conclusion that one’s memory is reliable will either result in epistemic circularity or fail to sufficiently justify the belief. While he does offer a positive response to circularity by distinguishing between declarative and non-declarative memory, his solution primarily applies to non-declarative memory, such as remembering of how to ride a bike. Within the scope of this text, however, I will focus exclusively on declarative memory, episodic, as in remembering walking to the grocery store, in thought experiments and semantic, as in deriving general conclusions like "going to the grocery store involves leaving home", in deriving conclusions. Moon introduces a refinement to premise I. by suggesting that unless we encounter strong reasons to doubt the reliability of memory, we can trust it as a source of knowledge. This condition is meant to avoid over-intellectualization by not requiring explicit knowledge of memory’s reliability. The text is structured into three sections. In Section A, I begin by introducing Memory-Skepticism. We will build on Moon´s skeptical argument and consider whether we can maintain confidence in our memorial faculties by drawing on Moore’s distinction between epistemic and dialectical issues. I will further demonstrate how an inference to the best explanation can help overcome skeptical challenges. Turning to premise II., Moon argues that knowing whether memory is reliable involves reasoning in its favor. Even if we consider memory to be non-inferential in nature, that is, basic and independent of other beliefs, explaining concepts and theories still requires background knowledge, which, in turn, relies on memory. Regardless of memory´s innate reliability, we are still left with the need of avoiding either epistemic circularity or insufficient justification. However, not all circularity is problematic. Moon introduces the concept of benign circularity, which refers to circular reasoning that does not undermine a belief’s warrant. For instance, if I have no reason to doubt the reliability of my memory, I can use it to recall past experiences and form the belief that my memory is reliable. In Section B, I will build on this idea by starting with Foundationalism and develop Memory-Reliabilism as a contender theory for understanding the reliability of memory. I will try to flesh out the theory in detail. Finally, in Section C, I will turn to Memory-Knowledge and explore how memory can function as a source of knowledge. By drawing on Moon´s cases about forgotten evidence and stored beliefs, we will formulate a memory-related Gettier Case and analyze it for its justification and evidence. By focusing on sensitivity and E=K, I hope to expand on Moon´s approach to memory-skepticism. To narrow the focus of this text, we will consider memory to be non-inferential in nature. That is, memory-based beliefs are justified independently of any inferential relations to other beliefs. The act of remembering itself acts as a source of immediate justification. By examining how memory fits with foundationalist and reliabilist perspectives, I aim to explore memory´s capacity to function as a trustworthy source of knowledge. (shrink)

Do factive mental states come in degrees? If so, what is their underlying structure, and what is their theoretical significance? Many have observed that ‘knows that’ is not a gradable verb and have taken this to be strong evidence that propositional knowledge does not come in degrees. This paper demonstrates that the adjective ‘aware that’ passes all the standard tests of gradability, and thus strongly motivates the idea that it refers to a factive mental state that comes in degrees. We (...) will explore a range of structural questions that have been overlooked in regard to our awareness of facts, showing that the degreed structure of awareness has significant implications for our understanding of knowledge. (shrink)

This paper develops an account of committed beliefs: beliefs we commit to through reflection and conscious reasoning. To help make sense of committed beliefs, I present a new view of conscious reasoning, one of putting yourself in a position to become phenomenally consciously aware of evidence. By doing this for different pieces of evidence, you begin to make your up mind, making conscious reasoning, as such, a voluntary activity with an involuntary conclusion. The paper then explains how we use conscious (...) reasoning in reflection not just to form and change committed beliefs, but to become aware of existing ones. The paper concludes with an explanation of how the limitations of conscious reasoning require us to maintain committed beliefs in a system. It is our maintenance of this system that allows us to knit together individual episodes of conscious reasoning into one enduring performance as a committed systematic believer. (shrink)

La prospettiva transdisciplinare è il tentativo di costruire un nuovo sapere umano. Transdisciplinare si dice di un metodo per lo studio di problemi complessi che rifiuta l’ottica riduzionista dell’approccio scientifico convenzionale. Al contrario, mira all’integrazione o unione di diverse branche di apprendimento o campi di competenza, solitamente separati, al fine di affrontare la complessità intrinseca di alcune questioni urgenti della situazione umana attuale. A differenza, quindi, della multidisciplinarità che giustappone distinti saperi o dell’interdisciplinarità che confronta molteplici visioni disciplinari su un (...) unico problema comune, un metodo transdisciplinare si preoccupa di proporre nuove prospettive, basandosi sulla necessità di trovare soluzioni alternative che uniscano metodologie plurali per crearne di totalmente inedite. In questo contesto, tuttavia, intendiamo transdisciplinare con un significato che si propone di andare oltre all’accezione comune: superando i confini dell’idea di identità tutta umana, transdisciplinare si può dire di un sapere integrato volto alla tutela delle molteplici vie di accesso al mondo e, quindi, non solo umane. Ma in che senso si può sostenere che questa nuova idea di transdisciplinare sia essenzialmente biodiversa? Come costruire un sapere che sia capace di rivoluzionare il nostro modo di vedere il mondo? (shrink)

The existence of God is a controversial topic. Believers in God often claim there is evidence supporting God's existence and defend these arguments. Those who argue against the existence of God provide reasons and evidence for why God's nonexistence should be accepted. However, neither side has been able to convince the other. In this article, definitive proofs of God's nonexistence and the true nature of reality will be presented. When it comes to definitive proofs, examples can often be drawn from (...) mathematics. For instance, we can definitively prove that two plus two equals four. Similarly, this article will explain why God is a contradictory being and employ methods as rigorous as those used in mathematical proofs. Using the principles of logic, we will attempt to explain the nature of reality step by step. Undoubtedly, there are many valuable ideas proposed throughout the history of philosophy, and this article will aim to provide a general proof for these concepts as well. (shrink)

The battlefield of the Anthropocene is a tragic one. It begins at the end. It emerges out of melancholy, in the locality of being not-dead-yet. As an Epoch dating the human impact on earth, the Anthropocene looks like a graveyard-to-come, one in which the story of humankind is writing its own epitaph in real time. The tragedy of our moment, or the tragic moment of our action means having to act despite knowing it is too late, searching for hope in (...) the dark. This tragedy produces the sensation that humankind must necessarily face its own limits. And these limits are telling a story that is not a happy one: we cannot keep up with the pace of such an entropic boneyard. When it comes to the massive eradications of people and species, no one can justify the feelings of sympathy that proliferate against a back- ground of intellectual numbness. The battlefield of the Anthropocene is one that demands action. (shrink)

This note (it is not a full-fledged academic paper) introduces a novel approach to classic thought experiments in consciousness studies through the incorporation of non-referential terms—symbols that present experiences directly rather than referring to them. By analyzing the Hard Problem, Knowledge Argument, Philosophical Zombies, and Spectrum Inversion thought experiments using both referential terms (like "blackness") and non-referential terms (like █), the paper reveals that many apparent philosophical puzzles arise from conflating referential descriptions with direct presentational experiences. The analysis shows that (...) attempting to formulate these thought experiments using non-referential terms often requires instantiating the very experiences in question, creating self-referential paradoxes that solve or dissolve the original problems. (shrink)

Epistemologists have widely accepted that truth, justification, and belief are necessary conditions for knowledge. This article challenges the necessity of the two components, “belief” and “justification”, in the definition of knowledge. It argues that belief is distinct from knowledge; belief is an act of will, whereas knowledge is acquired automatically. One may possess knowledge without being actively willing to believe it, and conversely, one may will to believe something without actually knowing it. Additionally, justification should be seen as a method (...) of validating knowledge, not a fundamental part of its definition. Therefore, knowledge without justification remains knowledge, even though its truth cannot be proven. Building on this perspective, the proposed definition of knowledge shifts to “awareness or recognition of facts.” According to this definition, the Gettier problem and the lottery paradox find alternative solutions. (shrink)

This article proposes a unified solution to the mind-body problem, grounded in the philosophical framework of Ethical Empirical Rationalism. By presenting a mathematical model of the mind-body interaction, we oƯer a dynamic feedback loop that resolves the traditional dualistic separation between mind and body. At the core of our model is the concept of essence—an eternal, metaphysical truth that sustains both the mind and body. Through coupled diƯerential equations, we demonstrate how the mind and body are two expressions of the (...) same essence, interacting in a continuous and harmonious relationship. This approach provides a new perspective on the mind-body relationship, grounded in both empirical evidence and metaphysical insight. Keywords: Mind-body problem, Unmoved Mover, Essence, Unified Theory, Feedback Loop, Ethical Empirical Rationalism, Mathematical Modeling. (shrink)

The value of testimony as a source of knowledge has been a subject of epistemological debates. The "trust theory of testimony" suggests that human testimony is based on an affective relationship supported by social norms. However, the advent of generative artificial intelligence challenges our understanding of genuine testimony. The concept of "quasi-testimony" seeks to characterize utterances produced by non-human entities that mimic testimony but lack certain fundamental attributes. This article analyzes these issues in depth, exploring philosophical perspectives on testimony and (...) the implications of conversational AI technologies on our epistemic practices. (shrink)

Conversation, dialogue, reasonable disagreement, and the acquisition of knowledge through the words of others, all of this has always been at the center of philosophers’ concerns since the emergence of philosophy in Ancient Greece. It is also important to recognize that in contemporary philosophy, marked by the linguistic turn, there is a wealth of intellectual production on ethical, psycho-linguistic, logical-linguistic, and pragmatic aspects of the conversation. Despite all this, this is the first collection of texts dedicated exclusively to the strictly (...) epistemic aspects of this phenomenon which is so decisive for the very constitution of our humanity. This book brings together the contributions of fifteen leading philosophers on some of the most relevant issues of what we could call the Epistemology of Conversation. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show that understanding AI hallucination requires an interdisciplinary approach that combines insights from epistemology and cognitive science to address the nature of AI-generated knowledge, with a terminological worry that concepts we often use might carry unnecessary presuppositions. Along with terminological issues, it is demonstrated that AI systems, comparable to human cognition, are susceptible to errors in judgement and reasoning, and proposes that epistemological frameworks, such as reliabilism, can be similarly applied to enhance the (...) trustworthiness of AI outputs. This exploration seeks to deepen our understanding of the possibility of AI cognition and its implications for the broader philosophical questions of knowledge and intelligence. (shrink)

Practical knowledge, in the sense made famous by G. E. M. Anscombe, is “the knowledge that a man has of his intentional actions”. This knowledge is very ordinary, but philosophically it is not easy to understand. One illuminating approach is to see practical knowledge as a kind of self-knowledge or self-consciousness. I offer an enrichment of this approach, by (1) exploiting Gilbert Ryle’s discussion of heeding (that is, paying attention), in particular paying attention to one’s own intentional action, and (2) (...) constructing and applying a practical analogue of Kant’s apperceptive “I think”. Combining (1) and (2), I offer an argument for my main claim—paying attention to what one is doing is an exercise of practical self-consciousness – it is how practical self-consciousness gets “schematized”. (shrink)

Several philosophers have proposed Knowledge-Based Decision Theories (KDTs)—theories that require agents to maximize expected utility as yielded by utility and probability functions that depend on the agent’s knowledge. Proponents of KDTs argue that such theories are motivated by Knowledge-Reasons norms that require agents to act only on reasons that they know. However, no formal derivation of KDTs from Knowledge-Reasons norms has been suggested, and it is not clear how such norms justify the particular ways in which KDTs relate knowledge and (...) rational action. In this paper, I suggest a new axiomatic method for justifying KDTs and providing them with stronger normative foundations. I argue that such theories may be derived from constraints on the relation between knowledge and preference, and that these constraints may be evaluated relative to intuitions regarding practical reasoning. To demonstrate this, I offer a representation theorem for a KDT proposed by Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) and briefly evaluate it through its underlying axioms. (shrink)

Whereas many philosophers accept the validity of 'probability' and confine themselves to interpreting it, this paper challenges its conceptual coherence by critically examining its use in the empirical world. While measure theory provides a rigorous mathematical framework for manipulating probability functions, we argue that applying precise probability measures to empirically uncertain outcomes introduces a fundamental contradiction. Probability measures claim to quantify uncertainty while simultaneously implying a degree of understanding about events that we do not fully possess. This inconsistency undermines the (...) idea that probability offers objective or reliable insights into reality. Moreover, we argue that it is impossible to assign a correct probability in the empirical world—neither deduction nor induction provides a justifiable basis for doing so. Therefore, despite probability appearing to work as a practical tool for managing uncertainty, its theoretical foundation collapses under scrutiny in empirical applications. (shrink)

In a convoluted and a frail sense there might be external reasons. One cannot just precipitate an external reason on demand. Their emergence is feasible only via a posteriori rationalization---effectively the effects of future mental events. This paper attempts to specify pre-conditions for an (internal) reason for action in the past to transform into an external reason later. Most fundamentally one must not know something about one's reason at the time of action .

Was ist Wissen von morgen im Vergleich mit Wissen von heute? Die geschichtliche Erfahrung zeigt diesen Übergang als ein Prozess der Weiterentwicklung der Sprache, weil menschliches Wissen an die Sprache gekoppelt ist, und seine Inhalte zu begreifen nur in sprachlichen Formen möglich ist. Während alte Sprachen vergehen, entstehen neue Sprachen: in diesem Prozess der Erneuerung von sprachlichen Formen wird das Wissen gesammelt, geklärt, und weitergegeben, und das geschieht durch Auswahl der Worte, deren Gebrauchswert ständig geprüft wird.

(This is one of the essays to be included in a book examining the causes of day-to-day strife in the populations of modern democracies vying to live and assert the freedoms promised to them by systems of governance supposed and expected to represent them.) -/- The emigrant / immigrant / migrant makes a conscious, relatively difficult decision to exchange what s/he knows for what is not known at all but in promise. The choice is often stark and carries with it (...) the imposition of restrictions on what will be possible in terms of existing customs, culture, and direct involvement with friends and family, and signifies a leap of faith into what appears to be a better, more prosperous, happier future. -/- At times, such choice is unavoidable, others it turns out to be a gamble of sorts, but, no matter what the cause, reason, or desire underlying an act of migration away from what the emigrant has known, it never turns out to be what was expected and no amount of preparation allows the emigrant to anticipate what will in fact occur. Migration is the founding of a new life in all the aspects of the emigrant’s existence. (shrink)

This dissertation answers the three value problems in epistemology. These three problems require an answer as to how knowledge is more valuable 1) than mere true belief, 2) any of the proper subsets of knowledge, and 3) in kind than that which falls short of knowledge. The methodology used to provide an answer to these problems relies on the arguments put forth in a rarely discussed paper from Ward Jones. In short, the Jonesian approach can be summed up as the (...) view that epistemic axiology and analysis ought to be kept separate. The Jonesian framework instead looks outside of the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge to find properties of knowledge which, though contingent, can explain the distinctive value of knowledge. Thisframework, though remarkably robust, requires going against what I consider to be the orthodox approach to the problems. This orthodox approach relies on two axiological assumptions. The first is that every component of an analysis on knowledge must provide independent value to knowledge. The second assumption is that the value of knowledge cannot be derived from factors excluded from an analysis of knowledge. Once these assumptions are appropriately discarded, the Jonesian view has a straightforward answer to the first problem. Answering the second requires assessing Jonathan Kvanvig’s claim that a satisfied Gettier condition contributes no independent value. While I agree with Kvanvig regarding a satisfied Gettier condition, I will argue that an unsatisfied Gettier condition is not likewise neutral; it contributes disvalue. With that distinction in place, a solution to the second problem follows immediately. The third value problem, however, is a different kind of problem altogether. Answering it requires not only the Jonesian framework, but also a novel account of how we determine final value. Once this account is offered, a Jonesian answer to the tertiary problem follows immediately. This dissertation closes by applying the Jonesian framework to an argument that claims there can be no modal conditions on knowledge due to such conditions failing to help answer the value problems. This claim will be found wanting. (shrink)

We are frequently confronted with moral situations that are unsettling, confusing, disorienting. We try to come to grips with them. When we do so, we engage in a distinctive type of moral inquiry: hermeneutical inquiry. Its aim is to make sense of our situation. What is it to make sense of one's situation? Hermeneutical inquiry is part of our everyday moral experience. Understanding its nature and its place in moral epistemology is important. Yet, I argue, that existing accounts of moral (...) inquiry do not give us the resources to do so. This paper develops a positive account of hermeneutical inquiry. I argue that when we engage in hermeneutical inquiry, we search for an apt perspective on our situation. (shrink)

Being able to apply grue-like predicates would allow one to instantly solve an infinite number of mysteries (historical, scientific, etc.). In this paper I’ll give three examples. It is still a mystery whether George Mallory and Andrew Irvine managed to reach the summit of Mount Everest in 1924. The predicate “greverest” applies to an object if either the object is green and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is not green and Mount Everest was not scaled in (...) 1924. The predicate “greverest” is interdefinable with the predicate “green”: the predicate "green" applies to an object if either the object is greverest and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is not greverest and Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. The predicate "non-greverest" applies to an object if either the object is non-green and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is green and Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. The predicate "non-green" applies to an object if either the object is non-greverest and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is greverest and Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. We know that the famous diamond called Golden Jubilee is not green. If someone (a greverest-speaker) informed us that the Golden Jubilee diamond is greverest, we would automatically come to know Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. According to the definitions, a greverest object can only be either 1) green (in case Mount Everest was scaled in 1924), or 2) non-green (in case Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924). Since we know that the Golden Jubilee diamond is not green, if we come to know that the Golden Jubilee diamond is also greverest, we would automatically know from the definition of “greverest” that we are faced with case 2, the case in which the object is both non-green and greverest, and Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. Vice versa, if someone informed us that the Golden Jubilee diamond is not greverest, we would automatically come to know that Mount Everest was scaled in 1924. According to the definitions, a non-greverest object can only be either 1) non-green (in case Mount Everest was scaled in 1924), or 2) green (in the case Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924). Since we know that the Golden Jubilee diamond is not green, if we come to know that the Golden Jubilee diamond is also non-greverest, we would automatically know from the definition of “non-greverest” that we are faced with case 1, the case in which the object is both non-green and non-greverest, and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924. At the moment no one has yet been able to convince the scientific community that he can correctly determine whether the Golden Jubilee diamond is greverest. I am skeptical that anyone will demonstrate to the scientific community that he can correctly determine whether a specific object is greverest; but I would be happy if someone could demonstrate to the scientific community that he can correctly determine whether an object is greverest: that would be a good news for historical studies. The paper continues with two examples, including an example about the predicate "grue". (shrink)

An important debate in the current philosophy of wisdom is whether knowledge is necessary for wisdom. In this paper I argue that knowledge is necessary to explain wise actions. Towards this, firstly, I individuate two modal properties relevant for wise actions: (i) counterfactual robustness: an action performed in the actual world is wise only if it leads to or is constituted by the goals of living well in all nearby worlds; (ii) rational robustness: an action performed for the sake of (...) living well is wise only if, in all nearby worlds, when an agent has sufficient reasons to perform the action, she performs the action. Secondly, I argue that these two modal properties are best explained in terms of two central features of knowledge: (a) safety: if the agent knows that a certain action will help her successfully reach the relevant goal(s) of living well, or is constituted by those goal(s), then in all the nearby worlds, her belief that the action will help her successfully reach the goal is true; (b) stability: the agent's knowledge that the action will help her successfully reach the goal(s) of living well, or is constituted by those goals, entails that her belief that the action will help her successfully reach the goal(s), or is constituted by those goals, isn’t based on any reason that could easily have been defeated by misleading evidence. (shrink)

Philosophy can be regarded as a type of conceptual research subjected to the usual standards of rationality. However, there seems to be no objective and accepted criteria for evaluating and comparing philosophical theories. From a heuristic- and erotetic-based approach, philosophy is here considered a set of second-order reflections that are presupposed by more specific theories; and evaluated by their informativeness, adequateness, cogency, generality, novelty, and presuppositional nature. As a practice, one can proceed upwards (from problems to presuppositions) or downwards (from (...) presuppositions as meaning conditions for assertions under question). But as a product, a philosophical theory is to be assessed as how it helps foster knowledge and assists in learning, posing, and solving new queries. (shrink)

The main objection to pragmatism about knowledge is that it entails that truth-irrelevant factors can make a difference to knowledge. Blake Roeber [2018. “Anti-Intellectualism.” Mind: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy 127: 437–466] has recently argued that this objection fails. I agree with Roeber. But in this paper, I present another way of thinking about the dispute between purists and pragmatists about knowledge. I do so by formulating a new objection to pragmatism about knowledge. This is that pragmatism about knowledge entails (...) that factors irrelevant to both truth and ‘cognitive agency’ can make a difference to knowledge. An interesting additional upshot of my argument is the connection revealed between the debate between pragmatists and purists about knowledge, and the debate between ‘alethists’ and pragmatists about reasons for belief. (shrink)

Ao analisar a teoria da memória mecânica de Hegel, a maioria dos intérpretes considerou apenas dois aspectos da memorização mecânica: o desaparecimento do significado nas palavras mecânicamente memorizadas ou a internalização totalmente abstrata da mente que as memoriza. No primeiro caso, a interpretação concentrou-se na relação entre o significante e o significado das palavras; no segundo caso, concentrou-se na relação entre o signo linguístico como um todo e a mente. Entretanto, a posição específica da memória mecânica na sistematização das atividades (...) cognitivas de Hegel não se baseia nessas duas relações, mas na relação entre o significado de cada palavra e o significado das outras palavras. Ao memorizar de cor fileiras de palavras que não estão conectadas umas às outras por seus significados, mas apenas pela força da mente que decide memorizá-las juntas, a mente se liberta de qualquer conteúdo dado externamente e sublima a referência linear do conteúdo representacional de cada significado à intuição em sua origem. A atualização do poder da mente de interconectar conteúdos de acordo com as próprias regras lógicas da mente realiza, para Hegel, a transição para o pensamento propriamente dito. (shrink)

I first present a brief interpretation of Sosa’s virtue epistemology by showing how it is arguably better than Goldman’s process reliabilism, why Sosa distinguishes between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge, and how Sosa’s recent account of knowing full well can deal with pragmatic encroachment. Then, I raise two worries about Sosa’s account: (a) Sosa’s claim that one might have animal knowledge without knowing reflectively or knowing full well implies that one’s true belief might manifest both competence and luck, which seems (...) to pose a challenge to Sosa’s solution to the Gettier problem; (b) intellectual virtue or competence does not seem to be a necessary condition for knowledge: there are cases where one knows without possessing the relevant intellectual virtue or competence. Finally, I suggest a responsibilist account of knowledge and show how it can not only handle the cases that pose a problem for Sosa’s account but also explain our intuitions about different grades of knowledge. (shrink)

I raise an example that suggests that Andrea Kern’s Knowledge View of Perception should concede that a mere perceptual experience can be a potentiality for one to know something on its basis. I argue that the Knowledge View can accommodate this suggestion by distinguishing between two kinds of defective exercises of a capacity for perceptual knowledge, namely failed and incomplete exercises. I explain that, rather than collapsing the Knowledge View into the contrary Two-Capacity View, my suggestion further articulates the definitive (...) insight of the Knowledge View, namely that perceptual experience, on the basis of which one knows, issues from the same capacity as the knowledge enabled by it. (shrink)

A wide range of more objectivist norms appear to leave uncharted an important part of normative space. In the beginning of this paper I briefly outline two broad ways of seeking more subject-directed norms: perspectivism and feasibilism. According to feasibilism, the ultimate reason why more objectivist norms are inadequate on their own is not that they fail to take into account the limits of an agent’s perspective, but that they are not sensitive to limits on what ways of choosing, acting, (...) and believing are feasible in a given situation. I think of these ways of choosing, acting, and believing in terms of an agent's dispositions. In this paper I focus on a knowledge-first implementation of feasibilism, a view in epistemology that supplements a knowledge norm with a norm urging one to manifest dispositions that are among the most knowledge-conducive feasible ones. A view with different norms that sometimes cannot be jointly satisfied raises questions about the status of these norms. By drawing on two general hypotheses about the relationship between succeeding (e.g. knowing) and manifesting dispositions conducive to success, I argue for a view on which the prescriptive and the hypological come radically apart. The result is that an epistemic analogue of a thesis that many have assumed to hold in the moral realm should be rejected. This thesis is Only Blameworthy for Wrongs: we can only ever be blameworthy for acts that are morally wrong. I argue that on the picture presented, we can be epistemically blameworthy for doxastic states that do not violate any prescriptive epistemic norms. I then generalise the considerations to the moral realm, arguing against Only Blameworthy for Wrongs. (shrink)

Çağdaş epistemoloji içerisinde, dışsalcı, güvenilirci ve erdeme dayalı epistemolojik tartışmaların bir benzerini, dini epistemoloji içerisinde etkili bir şekilde yer edinen ve reformcu epistemoloji olarak bilinen yaklaşım üzerinden görebilmek mümkündür. Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff ve William Alston gibi filozofların öne çıktığı bu yaklaşımın ana iddiası, kanıta ya da argümana dayanmaksızın, Tanrı’nın varlığına inanmanın bütünüyle doğru, rasyonel, makul ve güvenilir olacağı şeklindeki bir tezdir. Kanıtın, gerekçelendirme için zorunlu bir koşul olmadığı fikri, algısal deneyimlerin gerekçelendirilmesine benzer şekilde, dini deneyimlerin de öyle olduğu ve (...) dolayısıyla, aynı epistemik statüye sahip olması gerektiğini öne süren, eşitlik tezine dayanır. İlk ortaya çıktığı günden bugüne, üzerinde çokça konuşulan ve tartışılan bir yaklaşım olan reformcu epistemoloji, özellikle son beş yıl içerisinde, oldukça farklı bir hale gelmiştir. Zira bu yaklaşımı, kanıtsalcılıkla uyumlu, erdem epistemolojisiyle bağlantılı ve diğer teistik dinler üzerinden değerlendiren yeni çalışmalar ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu nedenle, bu makalede, reformcu epistemoloji ana hatlarıyla ele alınmıştır. Beraberinde, ona yöneltilen itirazlara değinilmiş ve sonrasında, bahsi geçen yenilik iddiaları soruşturulmaya çalışılmıştır. Son olarak, teistik inancın rasyonalitesiyle ilgili, farklı bir bakış açısı sunulmuştur. (shrink)

Must rational thinkers have consistent sets of beliefs? I shall argue that it can be rational for a thinker to believe a set of propositions known to be inconsistent. If this is right, an important test for a theory of rational belief is that it allows for the right kinds of inconsistency. One problem we face in trying to resolve disagreements about putative rational requirements is that parties to the disagreement might be working with different conceptions of the relevant attitudes. (...) My aim is modest. I hope to show that there is at least one important notion of belief such that a thinker might rationally hold a collection of beliefs (so understood) even when the thinker knows their contents entail a contradiction. (shrink)

This book argues that misinformation poses a multi-faceted threat to knowledge, while arguing that some forms of content moderation risk exacerbating these threats. It proposes alternative forms of content moderation that aim to address this complexity while enhancing human epistemic agency. The proliferation of fake news, false conspiracy theories, and other forms of misinformation on the internet and especially social media is widely recognized as a threat to individual knowledge and, consequently, to collective deliberation and democracy itself. This book argues (...) that misinformation presents a three-pronged threat to knowledge. While researchers often focus on the role of misinformation in causing false beliefs, this deceptive potential of misinformation exists alongside the potential to suppress trust and to distort the perception of evidence. Recognizing the multi-faceted nature of this threat is essential to the development of effective measures to mitigate the harms associated with misinformation. The book weaves together work in analytic epistemology with emerging empirical work in other disciplines to offer novel insights into the threats posed by misinformation. Additionally, it breaks new ground by systematically assessing different forms of content moderation from the perspective of epistemology. Misinformation, Content Moderation, and Epistemology will appeal to philosophers working in applied and social epistemology, as well as scholars and advanced students in disciplines such as communication studies, political science, and social psychology who are researching misinformation. (shrink)

Given the significant exculpatory power that ignorance has when it comes to moral, legal, and epistemic transgressions, it is important to have an accurate understanding of the concept of ignorance. According to the Standard View of factual ignorance, a person is ignorant that p whenever they do not know that p, while on the New View, a person is ignorant that p whenever they do not truly believe that p. On their own though, neither of these accounts explains how ignorance (...) can often be a degreed notion—how we can sometimes be slightly ignorant, quite ignorant, or completely ignorant that p. In this paper, I will argue that there is a route for advocates of the Standard View and the New View to accommodate the gradability of ignorance. On the view I defend, ‘ignorant’ picks out everyone that is ignorant to some degree, making it possible that ignorance can be both degreed and characterized as a lack of knowledge or true belief. Even though we can be ignorant to a greater or lesser extent, the only way to avoid being ignorant that p is to know or truly believe. (shrink)

Traditionally, philosophers have been skeptical that the imagination can justify beliefs about the actual world. After all, how could merely imagining something give you any reason to believe that it is true? However, within the past decade or so, a lively debate has emerged over whether the imagination can justify empirical belief and, if so, how. This paper provides a critical overview of the recent literature on the epistemology of imagination and points to avenues for future research.

You omega know p when you possess every iteration of knowledge of p. This book argues that omega knowledge plays a central role in philosophy. In particular, the book argues that omega knowledge is necessary for permissible assertion, action, inquiry, and belief. Although omega knowledge plays this important role, existing theories of omega knowledge are unsatisfying. One theory, KK, identifies knowledge with omega knowledge. This theory struggles to accommodate cases of inexact knowledge. The other main theory is skeptical, claiming that (...) we do not omega know any ordinary claims about the world. This book develops and critically compares three new theories of omega knowledge. (shrink)

Mark Schroeder’s Reasons First is admirable in its scope and execution, deftly demonstrating the theoretical promise of extending the reasons-first approach from ethics to epistemology. In what follows we explore how (not) to account for the evidence-that relation within the reasons-first program, we explain how factive content views of evidence can be resilient in the face of Schroeder’s criticisms, and we explain how knowledge from falsehood threatens Schroeder’s view of knowledge. Along the way we sketch a reliabilist account of the (...) reasons-for relation (inspired by Alston) and show how it limits the applicability of Schroeder’s arguments. (shrink)

Critical notice of Christoph Kelp and Mona Simion's _Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion_.