Logics for Belief as Maximally Plausible Possibility

Studia Logica 108 (5):1019-1061 (2020)
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Abstract
We consider a basic logic with two primitive uni-modal operators: one for certainty and the other for plausibility. The former is assumed to be a normal operator, while the latter is merely a classical operator. We then define belief, interpreted as “maximally plausible possibility”, in terms of these two notions: the agent believes \ if she cannot rule out \ ), she judges \ to be plausible and she does not judge \ to be plausible. We consider four interaction properties between certainty and plausibility and study how these properties translate into properties of belief. We then prove that all the logics considered are minimal logics for the highlighted theorems. We also consider a number of possible interpretations of plausibility, identify the corresponding logics and show that some notions considered in the literature are special cases of our framework.
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First archival date: 2021-03-23
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