Anomalous Dualism: A New Approach to the Mind-Body Problem

In William Seager (ed.), The Handbook of Panpsychism. Routledge (2019)
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Abstract
In this paper, I explore anomalous dualism about consciousness, a view that has not previously been explored in any detail. We can classify theories of consciousness along two dimensions: first, a theory might be physicalist or dualist; second, a theory might endorse any of the three following views regarding causal relations between phenomenal properties (properties that characterize states of our consciousness) and physical properties: nomism (the two kinds of property interact through deterministic laws), acausalism (they do not causally interact), and anomalism (they interact but not through deterministic laws). I suggest that a kind of anomalous dualism, nonreductive anomalous panpsychism, promises to offer the best overall answer to two pressing issues for dualist views, the problem of mental causation and the mapping problem (the problem of predicting mind-body associations).
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First archival date: 2017-05-17
Latest version: 17 (2018-04-02)
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Counterfactuals.Lewis, David K.
Mental Events.Davidson, Donald

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