View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

42 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
  1. Multisensory Consciousness and Synesthesia.Berit Brogaard & Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. Oxford: Routledge.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. High-Level Perception and Multimodal Perception.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - forthcoming - In Heather Logue & Louise Richardson (eds.), Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    What is the correct procedure for determining the contents of perception? Philosophers tackling this question increasingly rely on empirically-oriented procedures in order to reach an answer. I argue that this constitutes an improvement over the armchair methodology constitutive of phenomenal contrast cases, but that there is a crucial respect in which current empirical procedures remain limited: they are unimodal in nature, wrongly treating the senses as isolatable faculties. I thus have two aims: first, to motivate a reorientation of the admissible (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  3. What Was Molyneux's Question A Question About?Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen - forthcoming - In Routledge Handbook on Molyneux's Question. London: Routledge.
    Molyneux asked whether a newly sighted person could distinguish a sphere from a cube by sight alone, given that she was antecedently able to do so by touch. This, we contend, is a question about general ideas. To answer it, we must ask (a) whether spatial locations identified by touch can be identified also by sight, and (b) whether the integration of spatial locations into an idea of shape persists through changes of modality. Posed this way, Molyneux’s Question goes substantially (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. A Puzzle About Aftertaste.Akiko Frischhut & Giuliano Torrengo - forthcoming - In Andrea Borghini & Patrik Engisch (eds.), Philosophy of Recipes. Making, Experiencing, Valuing.
    When we cook, by meticulously following a recipe, or adding a personal twist to it, we sometimes care not only to (re-)produce a taste that we can enjoy, but also to give our food a certain aftertaste. This is not surprising, given that we ordinarily take aftertaste to be an important part of the gustatory experience as a whole, one which we seek out, and through which we evaluate what we eat and drink—at least in many cases. What is surprising (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. In Defense of Cognitive Phenomenology: Meeting the Matching Content Challenge.Preston Lennon - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-17.
    Bayne and McClelland (2016) raise the matching content challenge for proponents of cognitive phenomenology: if the phenomenal character of thought is determined by its intentional content, why is it that my conscious thought that there is a blue wall before me and my visual perception of a blue wall before me don’t share any phenomenology, despite their matching content? In this paper, I first show that the matching content challenge is not limited to proponents of cognitive phenomenology but extends to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Material Objects as the Singular Subjects of External Perception.Mohan Matthen - forthcoming - In Aleksandra Mroczko-Wąsowicz & Rick Grush (eds.), Sensory Individuals: Contemporary Perspectives on Modality-specific and Multimodal Perceptual Objects. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Higher animals need to identify and track material objects because they depend on interactions with them for nutrition, reproduction, and social interaction. This paper investigates the perception of material objects. It argues, first, that material objects are tagged, in all five external senses, as bearers of the features detected by them. This happens through a perceptual process, here entitled Generalized Completion, which creates the appearance of objects that have properties that transcend the activation of sensory receptors. The paper shows, secondly, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Molyneux’s Question and Interpersonal Variations in Multimodal Mental Imagery Among Blind Subjects.Bence Nanay - forthcoming - In Brian Glenney (ed.), Molyneux's Question. London: Routledge.
    If the sight of cortically blind people were restored, could they visually recognize a cube or a sphere? This is Molyneux’s question. I argue that the answer to this question depends on the specificities of the mental setup of these cortically blind people. Some cortically blind people have (sometimes quite vivid) visual imagery. Others don’t. The answer to Molyneux’s question depends on whether the blind subjects have had visual imagery before their sight was restored. If they did, the answer to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Constitutivity in Flavour Perception.Błażej Skrzypulec - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Within contemporary philosophy of perception, it is commonly claimed that flavour experiences are paradigmatic examples of multimodal perceptual experiences. In fact, virtually any sensory system, including vision and audition, is believed to influence how we experience flavours. However, there is a strong intuition, often expressed in these works, that not all of these sensory systems make an equal contribution to the phenomenology of flavour experiences. More specifically, it seems that the activities of some sensory systems are constitutive for flavour perception (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Restricted Auditory Aspatialism.Douglas Wadle - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Some philosophers have argued that we do not hear sounds as located in the environment. Others have objected that this straightforwardly contradicts the phenomenology of auditory experience. And from this they draw metaphysical conclusions about the nature of sounds—that they are events or properties of vibrating surfaces rather than waves or sensations. I argue that there is a minimal, but recognizable, notion of audition to which this phenomenal objection does not apply. While this notion doesn’t correspond to our ordinary notion (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Bodily Awareness and Novel Multisensory Features.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2021 - Synthese 198:3913-3941.
    According to the decomposition thesis, perceptual experiences resolve without remainder into their different modality-specific components. Contrary to this view, I argue that certain cases of multisensory integration give rise to experiences representing features of a novel type. Through the coordinated use of bodily awareness—understood here as encompassing both proprioception and kinaesthesis—and the exteroceptive sensory modalities, one becomes perceptually responsive to spatial features whose instances couldn’t be represented by any of the contributing modalities functioning in isolation. I develop an argument for (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  11. Multisensory Perception in Philosophy.Amber Ross & Mohan Matthen - 2021 - Multisensory Research 34 (3):219-231.
    This is the editors' Introduction to a special issue of the journal, Multisensory Research. European philosophers of the modern period found multisensory perception to be impossible because they thought that perceptual ideas are defined by how they are experienced. Under this conception, the individual modalities are determinables of ideas—just as colour is a determinable that embraces red and blue, so also the visual is a determinable that embraces colour and (visually experienced) shape. Since no idea is experienced as, for example, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Sensory Modalities and Novel Features of Perceptual Experiences.Douglas C. Wadle - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9841-9872.
    Is the flavor of mint reducible to the minty smell, the taste, and the menthol-like coolness on the roof of one’s mouth, or does it include something over and above these—something not properly associated with any one of the contributing senses? More generally, are there features of perceptual experiences—so-called novel features—that are not associated with any of our senses taken singly? This question has received a lot of attention of late. Yet surprisingly little attention has been paid to the question (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. Coordinating Attention Requires Coordinated Senses.Lucas Battich, Merle T. Fairhurst & Ophelia Deroy - 2020 - Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 27 (6):1126-1138.
    From playing basketball to ordering at a food counter, we frequently and effortlessly coordinate our attention with others towards a common focus: we look at the ball, or point at a piece of cake. This non-verbal coordination of attention plays a fundamental role in our social lives: it ensures that we refer to the same object, develop a shared language, understand each other’s mental states, and coordinate our actions. Models of joint attention generally attribute this accomplishment to gaze coordination. But (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Many Molyneux Questions.Mohan Matthen & Jonathan Cohen - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):47-63.
    Molyneux's Question (MQ) concerns whether a newly sighted man would recognize/distinguish a sphere and a cube by vision, assuming he could previously do this by touch. We argue that (MQ) splits into questions about (a) shared representations of space in different perceptual systems, and about (b) shared ways of constructing higher dimensional spatiotemporal features from information about lower dimensional ones, most of the technical difficulty centring on (b). So understood, MQ resists any monolithic answer: everything depends on the constraints faced (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15. Multisensory Evidence.Casey O'Callaghan - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):238-256.
    It is tempting to think that one’s perceptual evidence comprises just what issues from perceiving with each of the respective sensory modalities. However, empirical, rational, and phenomenological considerations show that one’s perceptual evidence can outstrip what one possesses due to perceiving with each separate sense. Some novel perceptual evidence stems from the coordinated use of multiple senses. This paper argues that some perceptual evidence in this respect is distinctively multisensory.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. An Argument for Shape Internalism.Jan Almäng - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):819-836.
    This paper is a defense of an internalist view of the perception of shapes. A basic assumption of the paper is that perceptual experiences have certain parts which account both for the phenomenal character associated with perceiving shapes—phenomenal shapes—and for the intentional content presenting shapes—intentional shapes. Internalism about perceptions of shapes is defined as the claim that phenomenal shapes determine the intentional shapes. Externalism is defined as the claim that perceptual experiences represent whatever shape the phenomenal shape reliably tracks. The (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  17. Representationalism and Sensory Modalities: An Argument for Intermodal Representationalism.David Bourget - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (3):251-268.
    Intermodal representationalists hold that the phenomenal characters of experiences are fully determined by their contents. In contrast, intramodal representationalists hold that the phenomenal characters of experiences are determined by their contents together with their intentional modes or manners of representation, which are nonrepresentational features corresponding roughly to the sensory modalities. This paper discusses a kind of experience that provides evidence for an intermodal representationalist view: intermodal experiences, experiences that unify experiences in different modalities. I argue that such experiences are much (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  18. Multisensory Processing and Perceptual Consciousness: Part II.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (12):1-13.
    The first part of this survey article presented a cartography of some of the more extensively studied forms of multisensory processing. In this second part, I turn to examining some of the different possible ways in which the structure of conscious perceptual experience might also be characterized as multisensory. In addition, I discuss the significance of research on multisensory processing and multisensory consciousness for philosophical debates concerning the modularity of perception, cognitive penetration, and the individuation of the senses.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  19. Synesthesia Vs. Crossmodal Illusions.Casey O'Callaghan - 2017 - In Ophelia Deroy (ed.), Sensory Blendings: New Essays on Synaesthesia. Oxford, UK: pp. 45-58.
    We can discern two opposing viewpoints regarding synesthesia. According to the first, it is an oddity, an outlier, or a disordered condition. According to the second, synesthesia is pervasive, driving creativity, metaphor, or language itself. Which is it? Ultimately, I favor the first perspective, according to which cross-sensory synesthesia is an outlying condition. But the second perspective is not wholly misguided. My discussion has three lessons. First, synesthesia is just one of a variety of effects in which one sense modality (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  20. Switching to the Rubber Hand.S. L. Yeh & Timothy Joseph Lane - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
    Inducing the rubber hand illusion (RHI) requires that participants look at an imitation hand while it is stroked in synchrony with their occluded biological hand. Previous explanations of the RHI have emphasized multisensory integration, and excluded higher cognitive functions. We investigated the relationship between the RHI and higher cognitive functions by experimentally testing task switch (as measured by switch cost) and mind wandering (as measured by SART score); we also included a questionnaire for attentional control that comprises two subscales, attention-shift (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. Multisensory Processing and Perceptual Consciousness: Part I.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (2):121-133.
    Multisensory processing encompasses all of the various ways in which the presence of information in one sensory modality can adaptively influence the processing of information in a different modality. In Part I of this survey article, I begin by presenting a cartography of some of the more extensively investigated forms of multisensory processing, with a special focus on two distinct types of multisensory integration. I briefly discuss the conditions under which these different forms of multisensory processing occur as well as (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  22. Investigating What Felt Shapes Look Like.Sam Clarke - 2016 - I-Perception 7 (1).
    A recent empirical study claims to show that the answer to Molyneux’s question is negative, but, as John Schwenkler points out, its findings are inconclusive: Subjects tested in this study probably lacked the visual acuity required for a fair assessment of the question. Schwenkler is undeterred. He argues that the study could be improved by lowering the visual demands placed on subjects, a suggestion later endorsed and developed by Kevin Connolly. I suggest that Connolly and Schwenkler both underestimate the difficulties (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  23. Philosophy of Perception: A Road-Map with Many Bypass Roads.Bence Nanay - 2016 - In Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. London: Routlegde.
    An introduction to contemporary debates in philosophy of perception.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  24. Sorting the Senses.Stephen Biggs, Mohan Matthen & Dustin Stokes - 2014 - In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and its Modalities. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-19.
    We perceive in many ways. But several dubious presuppositions about the senses mask this diversity of perception. Philosophers, scientists, and engineers alike too often presuppose that the senses (vision, audition, etc.) are independent sources of information, perception being a sum of these independent contributions. We too often presuppose that we can generalize from vision to other senses. We too often presuppose that vision itself is best understood as a passive receptacle for an image thrown by a lens. In this essay (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  25. Making Sense of Multiple Senses.Kevin Connolly - 2014 - In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer.
    In the case of ventriloquism, seeing the movement of the ventriloquist dummy’s mouth changes your experience of the auditory location of the vocals. Some have argued that cases like ventriloquism provide evidence for the view that at least some of the content of perception is fundamentally multimodal. In the ventriloquism case, this would mean your experience has constitutively audio-visual content (not just a conjunction of an audio content and visual content). In this paper, I argue that cases like ventriloquism do (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  26. Multisensory Perception as an Associative Learning Process.Kevin Connolly - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5:1095.
    Suppose that you are at a live jazz show. The drummer begins a solo. You see the cymbal jolt and you hear the clang. But in addition seeing the cymbal jolt and hearing the clang, you are also aware that the jolt and the clang are part of the same event. Casey O’Callaghan (forthcoming) calls this awareness “intermodal feature binding awareness.” Psychologists have long assumed that multimodal perceptions such as this one are the result of a subpersonal feature binding mechanism (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  27. Active Perception and the Representation of Space.Mohan Matthen - 2014 - In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford University Press. pp. 44-72.
    Kant argued that the perceptual representations of space and time were templates for the perceived spatiotemporal ordering of objects, and common to all modalities. His idea is that these perceptual representations were specific to no modality, but prior to all—they are pre-modal, so to speak. In this paper, it is argued that active perception—purposeful interactive exploration of the environment by the senses—demands premodal representations of time and space.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  28. Synesthesia, Experiential Parts, and Conscious Unity.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2012 - Philosophy Study 2 (2):73-80.
    Synesthesia is the “union of the senses” whereby two or more of the five senses that are normally experienced separately are involuntarily and automatically joined together in experience. For example, some synesthetes experience a color when they hear a sound or see a letter. In this paper, I examine two cases of synesthesia in light of the notions of “experiential parts” and “conscious unity.” I first provide some background on the unity of consciousness and the question of experiential parts. I (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  29. The Multimodal Experience of Art.Bence Nanay - 2012 - British Journal of Aesthetics 52 (4):353-363.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that our experience of artworks is normally multimodal. It is the result of perceptual processing in more than one sense modality. In other words, multimodal experience of art is not the exception; it is the rule. I use the example of music in order to demonstrate the various ways in which the visual sense modality influences the auditory processing of music and conclude that this should make us look more closely at our (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  30. XV—Cross‐Modal Experiences.Fiona Macpherson - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):429-468.
    This paper provides a categorization of cross-modal experiences. There are myriad forms. Doing so allows us to think clearly about the nature of different cross-modal experiences and allows us to clearly formulate competing hypotheses about the kind of experiences involved in different cross-modal phenomena.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  31. The Qualitative Character of Spatial Perception.Douglas B. Meehan - 2007 - Dissertation, Graduate Center, City University of New York
    Ordinary perceiving relies heavily on our sensing the spatial properties of objects, e.g., their shapes, sizes, and locations. Such spatial perception is central in everyday life. We safely cross a street by seeing and hearing the locations of oncoming vehicles. And we often identify objects by seeing and feeling their distinctive shapes. -/- To understand how we perceive spatial properties, we must explain the nature of the mental states figuring in spatial perception. The experience one has when seeing a cube, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  32. Sensory Substitution Conference Question Three.Kevin Connolly, Diana Acosta Navas, Umut Baysan, Janiv Paulsberg & David Suarez - manuscript
    This is an excerpt from a report on the Sensory Substitution and Augmentation Conference at the British Academy in March of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: How does sensory substitution interact with the brain’s architecture?
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Sensory Substitution Conference Full Report.Kevin Connolly, Diana Acosta Navas, Umut Baysan, Janiv Paulsberg & David Suarez - manuscript
    This report highlights and explores five questions that arose from the workshop on sensory substitution and augmentation at the British Academy, March 26th through 28th, 2013.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Sensory Substitution Conference Report Question One.Kevin Connolly, Diana Acosta Navas, Umut Baysan, Janiv Paulsberg & David Suarez - manuscript
    This is an excerpt from a report on the Sensory Substitution and Augmentation Conference at the British Academy in March of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: Does sensory substitution generate perceptual or cognitive states?
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Sensory Substitution Conference Question Two.Kevin Connolly, Diana Acosta Navas, Umut Baysan, Janiv Paulsberg & David Suarez - manuscript
    This is an excerpt from a report on the Sensory Substitution and Augmentation Conference at the British Academy in March of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: What can sensory substitution tell us about perceptual learning?
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Sensory Substitution Conference Question Five.Kevin Connolly, Diana Acosta Navas, Umut Baysan, Janiv Paulsberg & David Suarez - manuscript
    This is an excerpt from a report on the Sensory Substitution and Augmentation Conference at the British Academy in March of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: What are the limitations of sensory substitution.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Multisensory Integration Workshop: Question One.Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin & Andrew MacGregor - manuscript
    This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on multisensory integration at the University of Toronto, on May 9th and 10th, 2014, written by Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin, and Andrew MacGregor, and available at: http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This excerpt explores the question: What is multisensory integration?
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Multisensory Integration Workshop: Question Two.Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin & Andrew MacGregor - manuscript
    This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on multisensory integration at the University of Toronto, on May 9th and 10th, 2014, written by Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin, and Andrew MacGregor, and available at: http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This excerpt explores the question: Do multisensory percepts involve emergent features?
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Multisensory Integration Workshop: Question Three.Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin & Andrew MacGregor - manuscript
    This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on multisensory integration at the University of Toronto, on May 9th and 10th, 2014, written by Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin, and Andrew MacGregor, and available at: http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This excerpt explores the question: What can multisensory processing tell us about multisensory awareness?
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Multisensory Integration Workshop: Question Four.Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin & Andrew MacGregor - manuscript
    This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on multisensory integration at the University of Toronto, on May 9th and 10th, 2014, written by Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin, and Andrew MacGregor, and available at: http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This excerpt explores the question: Is language processing a special kind of multisensory integration?
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Multisensory Integration Workshop: Question Five.Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin & Andrew MacGregor - manuscript
    This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on multisensory integration at the University of Toronto, on May 9th and 10th, 2014, written by Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin, and Andrew MacGregor, and available at: http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This excerpt explores the question: What is the purpose of multisensory integration?
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Multisensory Integration Workshop Full Report.Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin & Andrew MacGregor - manuscript
    This report highlights and explores five questions that arose from the multisensory integration workshop at the University of Toronto on May 9th and 10th, 2014: 1. What Is Multisensory Integration? 2. Do Multisensory Percepts Involve Emergent Features? 3. What Can Multisensory Processing Tell Us about Multisensory Awareness? 4. Is Language Processing a Special Kind of Multisensory Integration? 5. What Is the Purpose of Multisensory Integration?
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark