Can There Be More Than One Set of Categories?

Proceedings of the Sixth International Kant Congress 2 (1):169-181 (1989)
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Abstract

Kant's aim in the transcendental deduction is to show that the categories, i.e., a specific set of categories, are a necessary condition for all possible experience. Some philosophers have extended this idea in the following way: Kant solely identified a set of a priori concepts, which are a necessary condition for all possible epistemic claims within a framework of Newtonian physics; however, there exist other sets of epistemic claims, which can solely be justified by means of alternative sets of a priori concepts. In this paper I will address the following questions: (1) What claims are precisely involved in this alleged extension of Kant's results of the transcendental deduction? (2) Is it merely an historical accident that Kant could only identify one set of categories, or, are there, apart from Kant's explicit commitment to one particular set of categories, any other claims within the Transcendental Analytic, which are incompatible with this extension of Kant's view?

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Luc Bovens
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

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