Rascals, Triflers, and Pragmatists: Developing a Peircean Account of Assertion

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Abstract
While the topic of assertion has recently received a fresh wave of interest from Peirce scholars, to this point no systematic account of Peirce’s view of assertion has been attempted. We think that this is a lacuna that ought to be filled. Doing so will help make better sense of Peirce’s pragmatism; further, what is hidden amongst various fragments is a robust pragmatist theory of assertion with unique characteristics that may have significant contemporary value. Here we aim to uncover this theory, and to show that assertion for Peirce is not a mere corollary of pragmatic conceptions of truth, judgement, and belief, but is rather a central aspect of his philosophy.
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BOYRTA-2
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First archival date: 2016-10-23
Latest version: 2 (2016-10-23)
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On Peirce.De Waal, Cornelis

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2016-10-23

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