Rascals, Triflers, and Pragmatists: Developing a Peircean Account of Assertion

British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (2):1-22 (2017)
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Abstract

While the topic of assertion has recently received a fresh wave of interest from Peirce scholars, to this point no systematic account of Peirce’s view of assertion has been attempted. We think that this is a lacuna that ought to be filled. Doing so will help make better sense of Peirce’s pragmatism; further, what is hidden amongst various fragments is a robust pragmatist theory of assertion with unique characteristics that may have significant contemporary value. Here we aim to uncover this theory, and to show that assertion for Peirce is not a mere corollary of pragmatic conceptions of truth, judgement, and belief, but is rather a central aspect of his philosophy.

Author's Profile

Kenneth Boyd
University of Toronto, St. George Campus (PhD)

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