Abstract
The essentialist approach to word meaning has been used to undermine the
fundamental assumptions of the cognitive psychology of concepts. Essentialism
assumes that a word refers to a natural kind category in virtue of category members
possessing essential properties. In support of this thesis, Kripke and Putnam deploy
various intuitions concerning word use under circumstances in which discoveries
about natural kinds are made. Although some studies employing counterfactual
discoveries and related transformations appear to vindicate essentialism, we argue
that the intuitions have not been investigated exhaustively. In particular, we argue
that discoveries concerning the essential properties of whole categories (rather than
simply of particular category members) are critical to the essentialist intuitions. The
studies reported here examine such discovery contexts, and demonstrate that words
and concepts are not used in accordance with essentialism. The results are, however,
consistent with "representational change" views of concepts, which are broadly
Fregean in their motivation. We conclude that since essentialism is not vindicated by
ordinary word use, it fails to undermine the cognitive psychology of concepts.