Functionalist response-dependence avoids missing explanations

Analysis 71 (2):297-300 (2011)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I argue that there is a flaw in the way that response-dependence has been formulated in the literature, and this flawed formulation has been correctly attacked by Mark Johnston’s Missing Explanation Argument (1993, 1998). Moving to a better formulation, which is analogous to the move from behaviourism to functionalism, avoids the Missing Explanation Argument.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BRAFRA-5
Upload history
First archival date: 2011-01-25
Latest version: 2 (2013-06-25)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2011-01-25

Total views
401 ( #11,049 of 51,339 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
29 ( #20,107 of 51,339 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.