Functionalist response-dependence avoids missing explanations

Analysis 71 (2):297-300 (2011)
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Abstract

I argue that there is a flaw in the way that response-dependence has been formulated in the literature, and this flawed formulation has been correctly attacked by Mark Johnston’s Missing Explanation Argument (1993, 1998). Moving to a better formulation, which is analogous to the move from behaviourism to functionalism, avoids the Missing Explanation Argument.

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Darren Bradley
University of Leeds

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