Nou zeg, waar bemoei je je mee

Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 103 (1):4 (2011)
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Abstract

This paper investigates the possibilities of ordinary people to estabish a moral authority in a subclass of everyday scenarios in the public domain that are characterised by an underdetermination of the obtaining norms and regulations. The paper offers a strategy based on hospitality to challenge the all too common practice of ignoring one’s responsibility as a moral agent and to hide in one’s shell, hoping that others (police power!) will solve one’s problem. The paper begins with a description of a few scenarios in which it is less or more complicated for people to intervene as authorities. The tendency in such scenarios to retreat from one’s responsibility is analysed in terms of a distinction between power and authority, the latter enabling interventions based on a framework of justifying reasons. It is argued that a lack of confidence in the availability of such a framework of justifying reasons might explain the popularity of the current defensive tendency, especially against the background belief that interventions based on power are by default unjustified. An analysis is provided of trust as an attitude that complements authority. No authority, and no framework of justifying reasons, without trust. But a crucial feature of trust is the courage to accept one’s own vulnerability. This insight is used as the stepping stone for the alternative stategey based on hospitality. A sketch is provided of how this might work, involving five steps, the crucial ones being (1) an invitation to the other people in the scenario to compose a plural subject and (2) an offer to take up the responsibility to host this plural subject acknowledging one’s vulnerabilty to the independence of one’s guests.

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Jan Bransen
Radboud University Nijmegen

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